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Avian influenza (AI), also known as avian flu or bird flu, is an infectious viral disease of birds. 
AI viruses predominantly circulate in wild aquatic birds, but can occasionally be transmitted 
to other animals, including poultry. Frequent mutations and the exchange of genomic 
material between viruses have led to a high genetic diversity and drives the constant 
emergence of novel virus strains. AI viruses are divided into numerous subtypes based on 
the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) surface proteins. Most AI viruses are low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses that circulate in birds without causing clinical 
disease. However, LPAI viruses of two subtypes, H5 and H7, can mutate into highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, causing severe disease and sudden death. 
Therefore, outbreaks of AI viruses can have a major impact on animal health and the 
economies of poultry industries. In addition, some AI viruses have shown to infect humans, 
and thus pose a substantial threat to public health. Recent outbreaks have highlighted the 
importance of the early detection, control and prevention of AI introductions into poultry. 
Globally, many countries have implemented surveillance programs to monitor AI viruses in 
wild birds and detect virus introductions into poultry. In the Netherlands, intensive 
surveillance has been performed for more than a decade now. Comprehensive analysis of 
surveillance data provides more insight into the circulation of AI viruses in the wild bird and 
poultry population. Detailed analysis of the viral genome has proved to be a valuable tool to 
investigate the origin and transmission patterns of viruses, in particular when combined with 
spatiotemporal information or phenotypic traits, such as the capacity of viruses to cause 
disease or infect new hosts. A better understanding of evolution and transmission patterns 
of AI viruses at the wild bird-poultry interface is important for more efficient monitoring and 
to prevent introductions into poultry. 
VIRUS GENOME AND STRUCTURE 
AI viruses are influenza A viruses that belong to the family of Orthomyxoviridae 1. The AI 
virus particle consists of 8 negative-sense single-stranded RNA gene segments enclosed 
within a lipoprotein envelope (Figure 1). Two of the gene segments encode for the HA and 
NA glycoproteins expressed on the surface of the virus, which interact with sialic acid 
receptors on host cells and mediate viral entry and release, respectively 1. The genetic and 
antigenic properties the HA and NA proteins are used for the classification of AI viruses into 
subtypes. At present, 16 HA (H1-H16) and 9 NA (N1-N9) subtypes have been identified in 
birds, which are found in a wide variety of combinations 1-3. 
The other six gene segments code for the essential internal proteins polymerase 
basic protein 1 (PB1), polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2), polymerase acidic protein (PA), 
nucleoprotein (NP), matrix protein 1 (M1), matrix protein 2 (M2), nonstructural protein 1 
(NS1) and nonstructural protein 2 (NS2, also known as the nuclear export protein (NEP)), and 
several nonessential accessory proteins 1,4. The polymerase proteins PB1, PB2 and PA form a 
RNA-dependent RNA polymerase complex, which drives transcription and replication of the 
viral genome in the nuclei of infected cells. The polymerase complexes bind to the viral RNA 
gene segments that are wrapped around NP proteins, forming ribonucleoprotein (RNP) 
complexes. The M1 protein encloses the core of the virus particle and supports the viral 
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envelope, whereas the M2 protein is present in the viral envelope as an ion channel needed 
for viral fusion and the transfer of the RNP complexes into the cytoplasm. The NS1 protein 
modulates virus replication and interacts with the host innate immune response, while the 
NS2 protein is responsible for the export of RNP complexes from the nucleus. The NS 




proteins circulate in two variants (NS allele A and B) that differ by around 30% of their amino 
acids 5. The PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP and NA proteins are encoded by gene segments 1-6, 
whereas the M1/M2 and NS1/NS2 proteins are produced upon alternative splicing of the 
mRNA transcripts from gene segments 7 and 8, respectively. 
The genome of AI viruses mutates constantly due to the lack of proofreading 
activity of the polymerase during virus replication. This generates genetically heterogeneous 
virus populations, also referred to as quasi-species or minority variant subpopulations. In 
addition, the segmented genome of influenza A viruses enables the exchange of genomic 
material between two or more AI viruses, also known as genetic reassortment . The rapid 
evolution of AI viruses results in the emergence of strains with novel gene constellations and 
subtype combinations 6-9. It also leads to the production of strains with novel virus 
characteristics, such as increased virulence or a broader host range, and allows viruses to 
rapidly adapt to new environments and to evade host immune responses. 
HOST RANGE AND TRANSMISSION 
AI viruses can infect a broad range of hosts that includes birds and mammals. Wild birds are 
the natural hosts of AI viruses, in particular waterfowl of the orders Anseriformes (mainly 
ducks, geese, and swans) and Charadriiformes (mainly gulls, terns, and waders) 10. Some of 
these wild bird species migrate over long distances, contributing to the dispersal of AI 
viruses to susceptible wild bird populations worldwide 3. AI viruses can also be transmitted 
to domesticated birds when wild birds travel to areas where poultry is kept. Among poultry, 
AI viruses are mainly found in outdoor layer chickens, domestic ducks and turkeys, which is 
likely due to their close contact to wild birds, the lack of species barrier, and higher 
susceptibility to infection, respectively 11-13. 
Besides their frequent detection in birds, certain AI virus strains are able to infect 
mammals, such as pigs, horses, dogs, cats, seals 14, and even humans 15. The host range is 
mainly determined by the receptor specificity of the HA protein. The HA protein of AI viruses 
binds to sialylated-glycan receptors expressed on the host cell membrane, but the specificity 
for certain sialic acid structures varies between virus strains of different origin. In addition, 
the expression of specific sialylated-glycan receptors differs between cell types and host 
species. For example, the HA protein of avian-origin AI viruses preferentially bind alpha 2,3-
linked sialic acids that are common in the avian intestinal epithelium, whereas human-origin 
AI viruses preferentially bind alpha 2,6-linked sialic acids that are expressed in the upper 
respiratory tract of humans 16-18. However, other viral factors, such as variations in the 
internal genes that determine the virus replication efficiency or the capacity of the virus to 
evade host immune responses, may also influence the host-range 19. 
Transmission of AI viruses between wild birds typically occurs via the faecal–oral 
route, when wild birds reside (eat and drink) at faeces-contaminated surface water 1,20. 
Infected birds can shed infectious virus particles via their faeces for several days or weeks 20. 
AI viruses can persist for extended periods of time in the environment, such as water, soil 
and surfaces, especially at low temperatures 21,22. Infection of poultry may occur by direct 
contact with wild birds or when wild birds drop their faeces in outdoor poultry facilities. 
Indirectly, transmission to poultry may occur via vectors or transport of faeces-contaminated 
materials into farms 23. Some studies have also suggested virus transmission via air or dust 
particles 24,25. The sporadic zoonotic transmission to humans often involves close contact 
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with infected poultry at farms or bird markets 26,27. In rare cases, limited human-to-human 
transmission has been reported for avian-origin influenza viruses 28. In the last century, 
sustained transmission between humans has only been observed for influenza A viruses of 
subtypes H1N1 (the Spanish flu in 1918 and the Mexican flu in 2009), H2N2 (the Asian flu in 
1957) and H3N2 (the Hong Kong flu in 1968) 29-31. 
PATHOGENICITY AND CLINICAL DISEASE 
AI viruses can be classified based on their HA and NA antigens as well as on their capacity to 
cause disease in chickens, called pathogenicity. Most AI viruses are LPAI viruses that exhibit 
low pathogenicity for chickens. These viruses usually circulate in birds without clinical signs 
of disease, but sometimes cause mild clinical symptoms in poultry, such as mild respiratory 
disease, a reduction in egg production or low mortality 32. LPAI viruses of subtypes H5 and 
H7 pose the most serious health risk, as they can mutate into highly pathogenic forms 33. 
HPAI virus infections in chickens are characterized by severe clinical symptoms and a sudden 
onset of death, up to 100% mortality over the course of a few days 34. Fatal infections have 
also been observed in wild birds, but to a much lesser extent as compared to poultry.  
The pathogenicity of AI viruses is mainly determined by the HA protein, which is 
cleaved post-translationally into HA1 and HA2 subunits by host proteases to enable viral 
entry into host cells. LPAI viruses have a mono-basic cleavage site that can be cleaved by 
proteases such as trypsin-like enzymes present in the respiratory and intestinal tract 35. 
Therefore, replication of LPAI viruses is generally restricted to these organs. Currently, H5 
and H7 are the only known subtypes that have the potential to mutate into HPAI forms 
under natural conditions. The transition from LPAI to HPAI occurs when basic amino acids 
are inserted at the cleavage site of the HA protein 33. This commonly occurs after the virus 
has been introduced to a high density population, such as a poultry flock. The multi-basic 
cleavage site, containing consecutive arginine and lysine residues, can be cleaved by 
ubiquitous furin-like proteases present in all organs, resulting in systemic virus replication. 
Virus pathogenicity is also influenced by other changes in the viral genome, such as 
alterations in the genes encoding the polymerase proteins 36,37, or a deletion in the stalk 
region of the NA gene, which is known as an important adaptation marker for poultry of 
Galliformes species (including chickens and turkeys) 38,39. 
DIAGNOSTICS AND VIRUS CHARACTERIZATION 
AI virus infections can be diagnosed using both serological and virological methods. 
Serological tests are used for routine screening for virus-specific antibodies in blood 
samples, which are generated in response to infection and detectable for several weeks or 
months after the virus is cleared. The diagnosis based on serology is generally done by 
performing an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for the detection of influenza A 
virus-specific antibodies, followed by antibody subtyping using subtype-specific 
hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) tests, neuraminidase inhibition (NI) tests or multiplex 
serological assays 40,41. 
Virological tests are used to detect current infections. The traditional method for 




eggs followed by antigenic characterization using HI and NI tests 40. Nowadays, molecular 
techniques based on reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) are often 
used to detect and characterize AI viruses in clinical samples. As recommended by the World 
Organization of Animal Health (OIE), this is done by performing a RT-PCR targeting the 
universal matrix gene (M-PCR) 42, followed by subtype-specific RT-PCR 43,44. These virological 
techniques enable high-throughput screening, especially when samples are pooled prior to 
diagnostic testing 45,46. Further virus characterization is done by sequencing fragments of the 
HA and NA gene segments, including the HA proteolytic cleavage site to infer pathogenicity 
47,48. The pathogenicity of the virus in live birds is assessed using the intravenous 
pathogenicity index (IVPI) test, in which a high viral dose is inoculated into the blood stream 
of ten six-week-old chickens and mortality is measured 40.  
In recent years, next-generation sequencing (NGS) has proved to be a valuable tool 
to investigate the genetic diversity and evolution of AI viruses. In particular, phylogenetic 
analysis using complete genome sequences is nowadays a widely adopted approach to 
study the origin of newly emerging viruses and their genetic relationship with other 
circulating AI viruses. To improve these analyses, researchers are encouraged to share 
genome sequencing data on online platforms 49. NGS also allows the detection of so-called 
minority variants that arise from biological variation in the virus population. 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 
Globally, many surveillance studies have been implemented for the early detection and 
control of AI viruses in wild birds and poultry. The surveillance programs are mainly focused 
on the detection of H5 and H7 subtyped viruses, which are classified as notifiable diseases 
by the OIE because of their ability to mutate into highly pathogenic forms 50,51. This means 
that it is compulsory to report, control and eradicate AI virus infections of subtypes H5 and 
H7 in poultry. Measures to control outbreaks include eradication of infected flocks, 
movements bans and additional testing of neighbouring farms. The surveillance programs 
vary between countries, but often consist of a combination of active and passive monitoring 
methods. 
In the Netherlands, active surveillance for AI viruses in the wild bird population has 
been performed since 1998 52,53. This surveillance program mainly focuses on the detection 
of LPAI viruses, but has been adapted during outbreaks to detect HPAI viruses as well. For 
active monitoring for AI viruses, approximately 15,000 samples are collected from live wild 
birds of various species at breeding, staging or wintering sites in the Netherlands each year. 
Most of these samples are collected from mallards and gulls, which are common wild bird 
species in the Netherlands, relatively easily accessible for sampling, and considered 
important reservoirs of AI viruses. Passive surveillance in wild birds is performed for the early 
detection of HPAI viruses, and consists of sampling and testing of sick or dead wild birds. 
Both surveillance programs are mainly based on virological methods, which consist of the 
collection of swabs or faeces for the detection of viral genomic material 53. 
Surveillance in poultry has been implemented in the Netherlands since the early 
2000s, and also consists of both active and passive monitoring programs 54. Active 
monitoring is performed by routine screening for the presence of influenza A virus-specific 
antibodies in blood samples. Each commercial poultry farm is tested at least once a year, but 
some poultry species are sampled more often, dependent on poultry type, housing system 
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and estimated risk for virus introduction 54. Indoor layer chickens, broiler chickens or ducks 
are tested once a year, while outdoor layer chicken and turkey farms are tested four times a 
year and each production cycle, respectively. The serology-based screening method enables 
the detection of LPAI viruses, which often remain unnoticed due to the lack of obvious 
clinical signs. This method not only enables the detection of the notifiable LPAI H5 and H7 
viruses, but also the detection of LPAI viruses of other (non-notifiable) subtypes. Passive 
surveillance consists of virological testing of poultry upon notification of suspected AI virus 
infection based on clinical signs 55, or to confirm positive serology. This program serves as an 
early warning system for HPAI virus infections. 
RECENT OUTBREAKS 
Outbreaks of HPAI virus infections have been reported frequently in poultry since the early 
1990s. Historically, outbreaks occurred when LPAI viruses of subtypes H5 or H7 mutated into 
HPAI viruses after introduction into poultry. These outbreaks were generally rapidly 
controlled by preventive measures, such as culling of infected poultry and movement bans. 
In some cases, virus transmission between poultry farms has led to large outbreaks. In the 
Netherlands, a large outbreak of HPAI H7N7 virus occurred in 2003, affecting both poultry 
and humans 56-58. In recent years, HPAI H5 viruses have been circulating in the wild birds, 
acting as a direct source for HPAI virus infection of poultry. 
The HA gene of the recent HPAI viruses descend from the H5N1 
A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (GsGd) lineage virus, which was first detected in China in 1996 59. 
Since 1997, descendants of the HPAI H5N1 GsGd lineage virus circulate enzootically in 
poultry in Asia 60,61. In 2005, the H5N1 virus caused massive die-offs among migratory wild 
birds in the Qinghai Lake region of China 62-64, followed by infections of poultry and wild 
birds in Russia and Kazakhstan 65. The virus has subsequently spread intercontinentally from 
Asia to Europe, the Middle East and Africa 66-68, causing numerous outbreaks of severe 
disease and high mortality among wild birds and poultry. In addition, transmissions to 
humans have been reported 69-71. Due to the global expansion and rapid evolution, GsGd 
lineage viruses have developed into numerous lineages and reassortant viruses of different 
NA subtypes, including H5N2, H5N3, H5N5, H5N6 and H5N8. The HA gene of GsGd lineage 
viruses has diversified into numerous genetic subgroups, called clades 72. 
From 2014 onwards, multiple reassortant variants of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses 
have been detected in Europe, including the Netherlands. The viruses descend from H5N8 
clade 2.3.4.4 viruses of two phylogenetic groups, referred to as group A and B, that were first 
detected in China and South Korea in 2013-2014 73,74. HPAI H5N8 viruses belonging to clade 
2.3.4.4 group A were first identified in Europe by the end of 2014 42,75, resulting in outbreaks 
in poultry in several European countries. In the Netherlands, five commercial poultry farms 
were infected 42. Influenza virus and virus-specific antibodies were found in few live wild 
birds in Russia 76 and several European countries, including the Netherlands 77,78, but lethal 
infections were rarely reported in wild birds during this outbreak. In the same period, H5N8 
clade 2.3.4.4 group A virus was also identified in North America, where it reassorted with co-
circulating LPAI viruses to generate H5N1 and H5N2 reassortant viruses, resulting in a large 
epizootic in commercial turkeys in 2014-2015 79. 
In early 2016, HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses belonging to group B re-emerged in 




introduced into Europe by late 2016 83. The virus also spread to other continents, including 
the Middle East and Africa  84-86. In contrast to the H5N8 outbreak in 2014-2015, this H5N8 
virus caused massive deaths among wild birds 87. The virus was also detected in apparently 
healthy birds, including mallards 88. In the winter of 2016-2017, more than 2000 outbreaks of 
severe disease and high mortality have been reported in wild birds and poultry, affecting 
most European countries 89. During this epizootic, multiple reassortant viruses have been 
detected, including viruses of subtype H5N5 in several European countries 83,90-95 and a 
single detection of H5N6 in Greece 96. 
In the winter of 2017-2018, outbreaks of a novel reassortant HPAI H5N6 clade 
2.3.4.4 group B virus were reported in wild birds and poultry in several European countries 
97,98. This H5N6 virus emerged from H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group B viruses in Asia 99, but 
obtained novel PB2 and NA genes. H5N6 virus infections have been associated with acute 
disease and mortality in both poultry and wild birds, but the number of outbreaks was 
limited compared to the H5N8 epizootic in 2016–2017 96. In the Netherlands, the H5N6 virus 
caused infections in three commercial poultry farms, two hobby holdings and several wild 
birds found dead 98. 
THESIS SCOPE AND OUTLINE
AI viruses circulating in the wild bird population pose a continuous risk for infection of 
poultry. A better understanding of how AI viruses are transmitted from wild birds to poultry 
is important to prevent introductions. In addition, it will contribute to more efficient 
surveillance for AI viruses, which is essential to detect and control potentially dangerous 
strains at an early stage. This thesis aims at improving our knowledge on the spread of AI 
viruses at the wild bird-poultry interface. In Chapter 2, routinely collected surveillance data 
was used to explore potential links between LPAI viruses circulating in wild birds and poultry 
in the Netherlands between 2006-2016. The objective of the study described in Chapter 3 
was to determine the susceptibility of chickens to experimental infection with LPAI viruses of 
various subtypes and genotypes. Chapter 4 describes a study in which the contribution of 
between-farm transmission to the overall incidence of LPAI virus introductions in poultry was 
assessed. In Chapter 5, we determined differences in the timing of reassortment and 
replication kinetics between three HPAI H5N5 genotypes that were detected in the 
Netherlands and other European countries in 2016-2017. In Chapter 6, we investigated 
histopathology and tissue distribution of HPAI H5N6 virus in chickens and Pekin ducks to 
elucidate differences in infection between poultry species during the 2017-2018 epizootic. 
Finally, the main results of the studies described in this thesis were summarized and 
discussed in a broader perspective in Chapter 7. This thesis contributes to a better 
understanding of AI virus spread at the wild bird-poultry interface, thereby improving the 
knowledge base for more efficient monitoring and prevention of introduction and spread of 
AI viruses in poultry. 
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In this study, we explore the circulation of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses in wild 
birds and poultry in the Netherlands. Surveillance data collected between 2006 and 2016 was 
used to evaluate subtype diversity, spatiotemporal distribution and genetic relationships 
between wild bird and poultry viruses. We observed close species-dependent associations 
among hemagglutinin and neuraminidase subtypes. Not all subtypes detected in wild birds 
were found in poultry, suggesting transmission to poultry is selective and likely depends on 
viral factors that determine host range restriction. Subtypes commonly detected in poultry 
were in wild birds most frequently detected in mallards and geese. Different temporal patterns 
in virus prevalence were observed between wild bird species. Virus detections in domestic 
ducks coincided with the prevalence peak in wild ducks, whereas virus detections in other 
poultry types were made throughout the year. Genetic analysis of the surface genes 
demonstrated that most poultry viruses were related to locally circulating wild bird viruses, 
but no direct spatiotemporal link was observed. Results indicate prolonged undetected virus 
circulation and frequent reassortment events with local and newly introduced viruses within 
the wild bird population. Increased knowledge on LPAI virus circulation can be used to 
improve surveillance strategies. 
Keywords: avian influenza virus; low pathogenic avian influenza; subtypes; wild birds; 
poultry; genetic analysis 
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Introduction 
Avian influenza (AI) is an infectious disease of birds caused by influenza A viruses. Wild aquatic 
birds of the orders Anseriformes (ducks, geese and swans) and Charadriiformes (gulls and 
waders) are the natural reservoirs of AI viruses 1. The prevalence of AI viruses in wild birds 
varies by species, age, season and geographical location 1. During wild bird migration, AI 
viruses can be carried over large geographical distances, enabling virus transmission to 
susceptible host populations across the globe 2. AI viruses can be transmitted from wild birds 
to poultry when breeding, stopover and wintering regions overlap with areas of commercial 
poultry production.  
AI viruses are classified into subtypes based on the antigenic structures present on 
the surface of the virus 3. Currently, 16 hemagglutinin (HA) and 9 neuraminidase (NA) antigenic 
subtypes have been identified in birds, which can be found in numerous combinations 2,4. Most 
AI viruses are low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses that remain subclinical or cause 
mild infection of the intestinal or respiratory tract 5. LPAI viruses of subtypes H5 and H7 can 
evolve into highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus variants that are associated with 
multi-organ systemic infection, which can cause severe disease and high mortality in birds 5. 
Outbreaks of AI virus infections can have serious consequences for animal health and 
may result in major economic losses for the poultry industry. In addition, human cases of AI 
virus infections have been reported upon direct or indirect exposure to infected poultry 6. The 
rapid and unpredictable evolution of AI viruses leads to the emergence of new influenza virus 
strains and subtype combinations 7-9. Alterations in the genetic material of a virus can lead to 
changes in the virus characteristics, such as increased virulence or expanded host range, and 
may give rise to virus variants that are more prone to infect poultry. The recurrence of AI 
outbreaks in poultry highlights the importance of global surveillance efforts for early detection 
and rapid response. 
In the Netherlands, the circulation of AI viruses in wild birds and poultry has been 
monitored for more than a decade 10,11. The collection of wild bird swab specimens enables 
virological detection of AI viruses within the wild bird population. AI virus detection and 
monitoring in commercial poultry includes both active and passive surveillance methods. 
Active surveillance is performed by serological screening for AI viruses. The sampling 
frequency depends on poultry type, housing system and estimated risk for virus introduction 
11,12. Farms holding indoor layer chickens, broiler chickens or ducks are tested once a year for 
the presence of influenza virus-specific antibodies, while outdoor layer chicken and turkey 
farms are tested four times a year and each production cycle, respectively. Passive surveillance 
consists of virological testing of poultry upon notification of AI suspicions based on clinical 
signs or to confirm positive serology. AI virus surveillance in poultry focuses mainly on the 
early detection of viruses of subtypes H5 and H7, because of their potential to become highly 
pathogenic. However, samples collected in these programs are also used to monitor 
introductions of LPAI viruses of other subtypes. 
Although a close relationship between AI viruses originating from wild birds and 
poultry has been described 13-16, wild bird species that act as source of infection for poultry 
and the actual virus transmission route has not yet been identified. In this study, surveillance 
data collected in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2016 was analysed to obtain more insight 
in the circulation of LPAI viruses in wild birds and poultry. We analysed the subtype diversity 
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among LPAI viruses from wild birds and poultry to identify potential hosts for viruses that 
infect poultry. In addition, spatiotemporal patterns of LPAI virus detections in wild birds and 
poultry were inferred to identify potential geographical locations or periods in a calendar year 
associated with infection of poultry. Finally, the genetic relationship between LPAI viruses 
isolated from wild birds and poultry was determined by phylogenetic analysis of the HA and 
NA sequences. Expanded knowledge on the circulation of LPAI viruses in wild birds and poultry 
can be used to improve surveillance strategies and control virus spread in the Netherlands. 
Methods
ETHICAL STATEMENT 
The capture of live wild birds was approved by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (Flora 
and Fauna permit FF/75A/2009/067). Wild bird handling and sampling methods were 
approved by the Animal Experiment Committee of the Erasmus MC (permit numbers 122-07-
09, 122-08-12, 122-09-20, 122-10-20 and 122-11-31). Sampling of poultry was carried out in 
accordance with the European Union Council Directive 2005/94/EC 17.
COLLECTION OF WILD BIRD AND POULTRY SAMPLES 
Active virological surveillance of AI virus infections in live wild birds was conducted by Erasmus 
MC. Individual faecal, cloacal, oropharyngeal or tracheal swabs from wild birds were collected,
transported and stored as described previously 18. Samples collected from wild birds found
dead were not included in this study. Serological monitoring of AI virus infections in
commercial poultry was conducted by the Dutch Animal Health Service (GD). Blood samples
were collected from all poultry farms one or more times a year, depending on the type of farm.
Seropositive samples were forwarded to the national reference laboratory Wageningen
Bioveterinary Research (WBVR) for confirmatory testing and stored at -20°C. Virological
surveillance of AI virus infections in commercial poultry was conducted when clinical signs
were notified or antibodies against virus subtypes H5 or H7 were detected. Individual cloacal,
oropharyngeal or tracheal swabs from poultry were collected by a specialist team of the
Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA). Swabs were tested for the
presence of influenza virus at WBVR and stored at -80°C. Information on species, location and
date was provided for all samples collected.
ANTIBODY DETECTION 
Antibody detection in poultry serum samples was performed using the FlockChek AI MultiS-
Screen Ab Test Kit (IDEXX) according to the manufacturer's protocol. Serum samples identified 
as influenza virus-positive were subsequently tested in a H5 and H7 subtype-specific 
hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test according to the OIE Manual of Standards for Diagnostic 
Tests and Vaccines 19. Further antibody characterization was done using a multiplex serological 
assay based on HA and NA antigens 20. The results were confirmed using HI tests, 
neuraminidase inhibition (NI) tests and NA-specific ELISAs 19. 
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VIRUS DETECTION AND ISOLATION 
Wild bird virus detection and isolation were performed as described previously 18. To detect 
poultry viruses, RNA was extracted from swab specimens or allantoic fluids using the MagNA 
Pure 96 instrument (Roche) with the MagNA Pure 96 DNA and Viral NA Small Volume Kit 
(Roche). Influenza virus was detected by the real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain 
reaction method targeting the matrix gene (M-PCR) 21. M-PCR positive poultry samples were 
subsequently tested for the presence of virus subtypes H5 and H7 by the subtype-specific 
PCRs as recommended by the European Union reference laboratory 22,23. The pathogenicity of 
the virus was determined by amplification of a gene fragment spanning the HA proteolytic 
cleavage site 24. Subtyping was done by using universal primer sets for amplification of HA 
and NA gene fragments of all influenza A viruses, as previously described 24,25. PCR fragments 
were sequenced by standard Sanger sequencing and compared to publicly available 
sequences using the BLAST algorithm for subtype identification. To isolate viruses, M-PCR 
positive samples were inoculated into the allantoic cavity of specific-pathogen-free (SPF) 
embryonated chicken eggs (ECEs) 19. Allantoic fluid was collected and tested for 
hemagglutination activity by standard procedures 19. Virus isolates were characterized in a HI 
test using in-house prepared antisera. A second passage in eggs was performed in case no 
virus was detected in the first passage. 
SEQUENCING 
The HA and NA sequences of LPAI viruses were generated by next-generation sequencing 
(NGS). Wild bird viruses were selected for NGS based on surveillance data. We selected 129 
wild bird viruses of subtypes that were also detected in poultry and 33 wild bird viruses of 
subtypes that were not detected in poultry to a maximum of two viruses per subtype, species, 
year and geographical region. Consensus sequences of wild bird viruses were generated as 
described previously 26. For sequencing of poultry viruses, 42 LPAI viruses obtained from 58 
virus-positive field samples were included. RNA was isolated from swab specimens or allantoic 
fluid using the High Pure Viral RNA Kit (Roche). The SuperScript III One-Step RT-PCR System 
with the Platinum Taq DNA Polymerase kit (Invitrogen) and purified universal primers were 
used for multi-segment amplification of influenza viruses 27. The PCR products were visualized 
on agarose gel and purified using the High Pure PCR Product Purification Kit (Roche). Purified 
amplicons were prepared for sequencing using the Illumina Nextera DNA Sample Preparation 
kit. Sequencing was performed with a minimum sequence coverage of 1,000x using the 
paired-end 200 Illumina MiSeq platform. To determine the consensus sequence for each HA 
and NA gene segment, reads were mapped using the ViralProfiler-Workflow, an extension of 
the CLC Genomics Workbench (Qiagen, Germany), as described previously 28. Consensus 
sequences were generated by a reference-based method using a set of Eurasian AI virus 
submitted to Genbank (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) (Supplementary Table S1) and GISAID’s 
EpiFlu Database 29 (http://www.gisaid.org) (Supplementary Table S2), respectively. 




To construct phylogenetic trees of HA and NA gene segments, cluster representatives for each 
virus subtype were selected from around 21,000 HA and 17,000 NA sequences of AI viruses 
available in GISAID’s EpiFlu Database 29 as of July 2016. Sequences outside the 75-125% range 
of the cluster median sequence length, containing sequencing errors or gaps were excluded 
for analysis. Remaining sequences were clustered at 90% sequence identity using CD-HIT 
version 4.6.6 per gene segment 30. Each cluster was represented by one sequence, known as 
the centroid sequence or cluster representative. The BLAST algorithm was used to select the 
top 50 sequence matches from publicly available HA and NA sequences for each poultry virus. 
Nucleotide sequences of cluster representatives, poultry viruses and BLAST hits were aligned 
using CLC Genomics Workbench version 8.5. Alignments were edited manually for frameshifts, 
sequence duplicates and length. A phylogenetic tree was constructed for each HA and NA 
gene segment using the Neighbour-Joining method 31 within the MEGA7 software package 32 
using the Tamura-Nei substitution model with a gamma distribution (shape parameter = 1) 
for rate variation. Bootstrap support values (1,000 replicates) of more than 70 are shown at 
the branches. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Cases were defined as subtyped if the HA or NA subtype of the virus or the subtype-specificity 
of the influenza virus-specific antibodies was determined. The number of virus detections 
mentioned in this study may differ from previous studies that have also included non-
subtyped M-PCR positive samples 12,16,33. The association between bird species and virus 
subtype was assessed performing corresponding analysis where host-virus subtype 
dependencies where graphically explored in a two dimensional plot. To estimate the temporal 
prevalence of LPAI viruses circulating in the wild bird population, cases were treated as 
epidemiological units defined as sampling clusters (groups of birds of same species sampled 
at one time and one place) where subtyped viruses were detected. Cluster prevalence was 
quantified at a monthly level for each year of the study for each wild bird species monitored. 
Data analysis was done using the statistical software package R version 3.4.0 34. The 
geographical distribution of LPAI viruses in wild birds and poultry was explored by mapping 
the sampling efforts (total number of wild birds or poultry farms sampled) and the number of 
subtyped cases during the study period. Geographical maps were plotted using the QGIS 
desktop application version 2.18.2. 
Results 
COLLECTION AND SUBTYPING OF WILD BIRD AND POULTRY SAMPLES 
During the surveillance period, in total 111,114 wild birds (9,281 sampling clusters) belonging 
to 148 species of 17 orders were sampled for virological testing (Supplementary Table S3). 
Most birds belonged to species of the order Anseriformes (77%), of which the majority were 
mallards (55%), followed by geese (26%), other wild duck species (16%), and swans (3%) (Fig 
1A). Fewer birds belonged to species of the order Charadriiformes (19%), of which 86% were 
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gulls, 12% waders and 2% other Charadriiformes species. The HA or NA subtype was 
characterized for 981 swab samples collected from 21 wild bird species. Most subtyped 
samples were obtained from mallards (45%) and gulls (43%) (Fig 1B). 
In contrast to the wild bird monitoring program, surveillance in poultry was 
performed by both serological and virological testing. As part of serological monitoring in 
poultry, in total 41,769 farms were tested, including farms holding indoor layer chickens (45%), 
outdoor layer chickens (28%), broiler chickens (17%), turkeys (6%) and ducks (2%) (Fig 1C; 
Supplementary Table S4). For virological monitoring in poultry, swab samples from 980 farms 
were tested to confirm positive serology or suspicions raised by clinical surveillance. The HA 
or NA subtype was characterized for 220 LPAI virus detections in 152 poultry farms. Subtyped 
cases were most often detected in chicken farms (76%), in particular layer farms with a free-
ranging facility, followed by turkey farms (15%) and duck farms (6%) (Fig 1D). Most infections 
in poultry were detected through antibody detection (162 subtyped cases), whereas a quarter 
of the cases were subtyped based on virology (58 subtyped cases).  
FIGURE 1. COLLECTION AND SUBTYPING OF WILD BIRD AND POULTRY SAMPLES. 
(A) Number of wild birds sampled and (B) number of subtyped cases of low pathogenic avian influenza
(LPAI) virus detections in wild birds per wild bird species. (C) Number of poultry farms tested and (D)
number of subtyped cases of LPAI virus detections in poultry farms per poultry type. All samples were
collected as part of the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance program in the Netherlands, January
2006-September 2016. A case is considered subtyped if the hemagglutinin (HA) or neuraminidase (NA)
subtype of the virus or the subtype-specificity of the influenza virus-specific antibodies is determined.
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ANALYSIS OF LPAI VIRUS SUBTYPES CIRCULATING IN WILD BIRDS AND 
POULTRY 
To obtain more insight into the circulation of LPAI virus subtypes in the Netherlands, we 
analysed the HA and NA subtypes and subtype combinations that were detected in wild birds 
(Fig 2A) and poultry (Fig 2B). The HA subtype was identified for 937 wild bird viruses and 211 
virus detections in poultry. All 16 HA subtypes except H14 and H15 were detected during 
surveillance in live wild birds. Of the most frequently identified HA subtypes in wild birds, H13 
(30%) and H16 (13%) were exclusively detected in gulls, whereas H3 (12%) and H4 (9%) were 
primarily detected in wild ducks (Fig 3A). H8, H9 and H12 were detected in wild birds only 
sporadically (frequency of <1%). In poultry, the most frequently detected HA subtypes were 
H5 (20%), H6 (15%), H9 (14%), H8 (12%) and H7 (11%). HA subtypes H4 and H12-H16 were 
FIGURE 3. VIRUS SUBTYPE DISTRIBUTION AMONG WILD BIRD SPECIES AND POULTRY. 
(A) Relative hemagglutinin (HA) subtype distribution among wild bird species and poultry. The bar width
represents the number of cases within each HA subtype. (B) Correspondence plot showing the association
between bird species and HA subtype in two dimensions (singular value (SV) 1 and SV2). (C) Relative
neuraminidase (NA) subtype distribution among wild bird species and poultry. The bar width represents
the number of cases within each NA subtype. (D) Correspondence plot showing the association between
bird species and NA subtype in two dimensions (SV1 and SV2). All subtyped cases were detected as part
of the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance program in the Netherlands, January 2006-September 2016. 
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not detected in poultry, and H3 was detected only once in domestic ducks. A two dimensional 
correspondence analysis plot combining HA subtypes and bird species shows that H13 and 
H16 viruses are closely associated with gulls, and indicates an association of H3 and H4 viruses 
with wild ducks, and H8 and H9 viruses with poultry (Fig 3B). Other HA subtypes fell around 
the centre of the correspondence plot, indicating their occurrence is host-independent.  
The NA subtype was identified for 838 wild bird viruses and 186 virus detections in 
poultry. The most frequently detected NA subtypes in wild birds were N8 (26%), N6 (19%), and 
N3 (17%). In poultry, the most frequently identified NA subtypes were N2 (26%), N7 (16%) and 
N4 (16%). These NA subtypes were found in all wild bird species except waders (Fig 3C). 
Correspondence analysis of NA subtypes and bird species combined indicates an association 
of N3 viruses with gulls and N4 viruses with poultry (Fig 3D). Due to the absence of detection, 
N1 was negatively associated with gulls and N6 was negatively associated with poultry. For 
other NA subtypes, no clear association between bird species and virus subtype was observed. 
We identified 55 HA/NA subtype combinations for 796 wild bird viruses and 35 
HA/NA subtype combinations for 177 virus detections in poultry. The most frequently 
detected HA/NA subtype combinations in wild birds were H16N3 (13%), H13N8 (11%), H13N6 
(8%) in gulls, and H3N8 (9%) and H4N6 (8%) in other wild bird species. The most frequently 
detected HA/NA subtype combinations in poultry were H8N4 (14%) and H9N2 (13%), followed 
by H7N7 (6%), H6N2 (6%) and H6N8 (5%). Of these subtype combinations, H8N4 and H9N2 
were rarely detected in wild birds (frequency of <1%). In contrast, H6N2, H6N8 and H7N7 were 
frequently isolated from wild birds, in particular from mallards and geese. 
SPATIOTEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF LPAI VIRUSES IN THE NETHERLANDS 
Wild bird samples were mainly collected in water-rich areas along the coastline of the 
Netherlands, in the provinces Zuid Holland (51%), Noord Holland (15%) and Friesland (9%) 
(Fig 4A), while most tested farms were located in poultry dense areas in the central and south-
eastern part of the Netherlands, in the provinces Gelderland (24%) and Noord Brabant (22%) 
(Fig 4B). Wild bird viruses were relatively more frequently detected in the provinces Groningen 
and Friesland, whereas the distribution of virus detections in poultry was proportional to the 
distribution of the farms. 
To analyse temporal patterns in the detection of LPAI viruses, we estimated the 
monthly cluster prevalence for each wild bird species for each year of the study period. A 
significant increase in prevalence of virus detections in wild birds was found in August, 
September, October and December compared to January (p<0.05). LPAI viruses in gulls were 
most frequently detected in summer season (June-September) (Fig 5A). Although belonging 
to the same species order, LPAI viruses in waders were more often detected during autumn 
(September-November). LPAI viruses in mallards and other wild ducks were primarily observed 
between late summer and early winter (August-December). LPAI viruses in geese and swans 
were most often detected in winter and spring season (November-April). In chickens and 
turkeys, LPAI virus detections were made throughout the year, with an increase in incidence in 
chickens in March based on both serological and virological surveillance data (Fig 5B). LPAI 
virus detections in domestic ducks were solely observed during summer and autumn (July-
November).  
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GENETIC ANALYSIS OF HA AND NA GENE SEGMENTS 
To investigate the genetic relationship between LPAI viruses from wild birds and poultry, the 
sequences of the HA and NA gene segments were determined for all 42 poultry viruses and a 
selection of 162 wild bird viruses. The sequences of the poultry viruses were subsequently 
FIGURE 5. TEMPORAL PATTERNS OF VIRUS DETECTIONS IN WILD BIRDS AND POULTRY. 
(A) Estimated cluster prevalence of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses in wild birds per month
of the year. For this analysis, subtyped cases in wild birds were clustered based on identical host species,
subtype combination, sampling location and collection date. The error bars show the standard deviation
between different years. (B) Number of subtyped cases in poultry per month of the year based on serology
(bars) and virology (dots). The black line represents the average number of poultry farms tested per month
of the year. The error bars show the standard deviation between different years. Data was collected as
part of the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance program in the Netherlands, January 2006-September
2016. A case is considered subtyped if the hemagglutinin (HA) or neuraminidase (NA) subtype of the virus
or the subtype-specificity of the influenza virus-specific antibodies is determined.
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compared to the sequences of wild bird viruses determined in this study, and publicly available 
sequences. Phylogenetic analysis was performed for all HA subtypes (H1-H3 and H5-H10) 
(Supplementary Fig. S1) and NA subtypes (N1-N5 and N7-N9) (Supplementary Fig. S2) 
detected in poultry. Most LPAI viruses isolated from poultry clustered phylogenetically with 
European virus strains. The HA gene of 21 poultry viruses and the NA gene of 25 poultry 
viruses clustered phylogenetically with viruses collected in the Netherlands. One poultry virus 
was genetically most closely related to viruses outside Europe: the HA and NA gene of 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/14003323/2014 (H5N2) clustered phylogenetically with Asian strains.  
To detect potential precursor viruses in wild birds, we determined the most identical 
wild bird viruses for each poultry virus HA and NA gene by BLAST (Supplementary Table S5). 
Related wild bird viruses were of different HA/NA subtype combination in approximately half 
of the cases. In 33 cases, the poultry virus shared the highest sequence identity with the HA 
and NA gene of two different wild bird viruses. For nine poultry viruses, a single wild bird virus 
was identified as most identical for both gene segments (Table 1). These poultry viruses 
showed nucleotide sequence identities of 97.8-99.8% (HA) and 98.2-99.9% (NA) to the most 
identical wild bird virus. The distance between the sampling sites of these poultry and wild 
bird viruses varied from 27 to 216 km. Two of the wild bird viruses were collected within a 
three-months period prior to detection in poultry.  
Most identical wild bird viruses were often isolated from mallards (75%), whereas a 
smaller subset was isolated from other duck species, swans, geese, and gulls (25%). Genetic 
analysis also revealed a close relationship between viruses derived from different poultry 
farms. Poultry viruses that were related based on both the HA and NA gene segment were 
collected within the same year: H1N5 (2007), H10N7 (2009), H6N1 (2010), H7N7 (2011), H10N9 
(2012), H5N3 (2013), and H6N2 (2014). These poultry viruses showed nucleotide sequence 
identities of 99.5-100.0% (HA) and 99.7-100.0% (NA). In seven cases, poultry viruses clustered 
together in the phylogenetic tree based on only one of the two gene segments. These poultry 
viruses were of different HA/NA subtype combination or collected in separate years. An 
exception is A/Chicken/Netherlands/13003601/2013 (H7N7) that clustered phylogenetically 
together with A/Chicken/Netherlands/13003983/2013 (H7N7) based on HA, but not NA. 
Discussion 
Analysis of surveillance data obtained in the Netherlands between January 2006 and 
September 2016 demonstrated that wild birds were frequently infected with LPAI viruses and 
infection of poultry was not uncommon. Most wild bird LPAI viruses were detected in mallards, 
which were the most sampled species among the waterfowl breeding population in the 
Netherlands. Mallards belong to the group of dabbling ducks, which are considered the main 
reservoir hosts of LPAI viruses 35. As the most abundant dabbling duck species, mallards have 
been the focus of many influenza monitoring programs 1,2,35. In poultry, most LPAI viruses were 
detected in chickens, which represent 98% of the commercial poultry population in the 
Netherlands 36. Detections were relatively more frequently made in outdoor layer chickens, 
domestic ducks and turkeys compared to indoor layers and broiler chickens, as reported 
previously 12,37,38. Outdoor-ranged poultry is considered to have an increased risk for AI virus 
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introduction because of its close contact with wild birds 37. The relatively high rate of 
introduction in turkey and domestic duck farms is likely due to a higher susceptibility of these 
poultry species to wild bird LPAI viruses. Experimental studies have demonstrated that turkeys 
are highly susceptible to influenza viruses of diverse origins 39-41. Influenza viruses from wild 
ducks may be more easily transmitted to domestic ducks than other poultry species because 
of the lack of a species barrier.  
During the ten-year surveillance period, a wide range of LPAI virus subtypes was 
identified. The HA and NA subtypes most frequently found in wild birds and poultry differed, 
and not all subtypes detected in wild birds were also found in poultry. Differences in the HA 
and NA subtype distribution between wild birds and poultry suggest that virus transmission is 
selective, and likely depends on viral factors that determine host range restriction. 
Analysis of the HA subtype diversity indicated that H13 and H16 viruses exclusively 
infect gulls, which is presumably due to a strict host range 4,42,43. H3 and H4 viruses were 
primarily isolated from wild ducks and rarely detected in poultry. These observations are 
consistent with previous surveillance studies conducted in the Netherlands 16, other European 
countries 2,35,44-47 and North America 48. In contrast, H3 and H4 virus infections have been 
repeatedly reported in poultry in Asia, mainly affecting domestic ducks 49-55, and occasionally 
chickens 49,56-58. Experimental studies have demonstrated that H3 and H4 viruses are capable 
of infecting chickens 55,59-61. However, infection in chickens is often restricted to the upper 
respiratory tract and replication efficiency differs strongly between virus strains, which may 
contribute to the observed host bias.  
H8 and H9 viruses were frequently detected in poultry, but only sporadically found 
in wild birds. The low prevalence of H8 and H9 subtypes in wild birds is consistent with 
previous findings 2,16,35,44,45,62. Like in previous studies, H8 and H9 subtypes were most 
commonly found in combination with N4 and N2, respectively 16,63. H9 viruses have frequently 
been detected in poultry in Eurasia 64-66, which may be related to increased monitoring of H9 
viruses since certain H9N2 strains have caused clinical disease and significant mortality in 
poultry 67. Moreover, transmission of H9N2 viruses from poultry to humans have been 
reported 68. According to published sequence data, H8 viruses have rarely been isolated from 
poultry outside the Netherlands. Like H9 viruses, H8 viruses may also predominantly infect 
poultry but remain undetected during most monitoring studies because no clinical signs are 
present. Although high incidence in poultry was observed, H8 and H9 virus infections have 
also been described in wild birds 69. Therefore, host range tends to be less stringent for these 
subtypes. The low number H8 and H9 virus detections in wild birds may represent a limitation 
of sampling. 
Associations between bird species and NA subtypes were often linked to HA subtype, 
e.g. N3 combined with H16 in gulls (H16N3) and N4 combined with H8 in poultry (H8N4).
Additionally, N6 was predominantly found in combination with two HA subtypes that were
not detected in poultry, H4 and H13, causing a negative association of N6 with poultry. HA
and NA subtypes that were detected in various bird species were located around the centre
of the correspondence plot, confirming their species independence. These subtypes tend to
have a rather broad host range or may rapidly adapt to a new host.
HA/NA combinations H6N2, H6N8 and H7N7, which were commonly detected in 
poultry, were in wild birds most frequently detected in mallards and geese. Mallards and geese 
are recognized reservoirs for influenza viruses 2,3. Geese mainly feed on pastures and 
agricultural fields allowing contact with poultry 70. However, a low prevalence of AI viruses has 
Circulation of LPAI viruses in wild birds and poultry
39
2
been reported in goose species 35, and several studies suggest that the role of geese in virus 
transmission is limited 71-74. A large diversity of LPAI virus subtypes was observed in mallards, 
which are likely exposed to a large variety of influenza viruses during migration. Unlike poultry, 
mallards preferably reside in water-rich areas and feed in surface water 3,75. Therefore, geese 
may act as intermediate hosts, that transfer the virus from wild ducks to poultry. Alternatively, 
geese may be susceptible or exposed to the same viruses as poultry. It should be mentioned 
that - due to irregular sampling of only a small proportion of the wild bird population and the 
absence of serological monitoring - the circulation of certain HA and NA subtypes in wild birds 
may have remain undetected, influencing the corresponding analysis. In addition, the 
detection of the same subtype in large sampling clusters may also have contributed to a bias 
in the host-subtype association. 
Spatial analysis revealed limited geographical overlap between sites of LPAI virus 
detections in wild birds and poultry, confirming previous observations 16. Most wild bird 
viruses were detected in water-rich areas along the coastline of the Netherlands, containing 
breeding, stopover and wintering locations of wild birds. Wild bird sampling activities were 
considerably biased toward these areas because of the abundance of waterfowl and the 
presence of duck decoys that are used by ornithologists and hunters for wild bird capturing. 
In addition, the relative high rate of subtyped cases in the provinces Friesland and Groningen 
could be explained by intensive sampling of gulls in these areas during fledging season. In 
contrast, LPAI virus introductions in poultry were predominantly detected in the Central and 
South-Eastern part of the Netherlands, where most poultry farms are located. The differences 
between the geographical distribution of wild bird and poultry viruses appears to be a result 
of different sampling strategies.  
The analysis of LPAI virus detections over the calendar year revealed discordant 
temporal patterns between wild bird species and poultry types. LPAI viruses in gulls were most 
frequently detected in summer, while LPAI viruses in wild ducks were primarily detected 
between late summer and early winter. These observations are consistent with previous studies 
44,46,62,76,77, and likely related to the fledging period of gull chicks 77 and the migration period 
of wild ducks 45. LPAI viruses in geese and swans were detected in winter and spring season. 
This period coincides with the period of increased LPAI virus observations in chickens, 
supporting the hypothesis that geese may have a role in transmission of LPAI viruses to 
poultry. It should be noted that serological surveillance in poultry can cause late diagnosis of 
virus infection, because antibodies can often be detected for many weeks or months post 
infection 78, when virus has already been cleared. Information on seronegative test results prior 
to influenza-specific antibody detection may be used to improve estimations of the time of 
virus introduction, but is limited by the low frequency of sampling (1-4 times a year). 
Interestingly, LPAI viruses were solely detected in domestic ducks during the seasonal peak of 
LPAI virus infections in wild ducks. This observation supports the hypothesis that LPAI viruses 
may be more easily transmitted from wild to domestic ducks.  
Genetic analysis of the HA and NA gene segments showed that many LPAI viruses 
from poultry shared common ancestors with wild bird viruses in the Netherlands. Some poultry 
viruses were more closely related to wild bird viruses from other countries in Europe and Asia. 
In these cases, virus circulation has likely been missed during wild bird surveillance in the 
Netherlands. The HA and NA gene segments of individual poultry viruses were often related 
to different wild bird viruses, indicating a lack of sequence data on immediate precursor 
viruses. Most poultry viruses were subtype reassortants compared to their closest related wild 
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bird virus, due to the emergence of novel gene constellations during genetic reassortment 7. 
For nine poultry viruses, a single virus was identified as most identical wild bird virus for both 
gene segments, but no direct spatiotemporal link was observed. These results suggest 
prolonged undetected virus circulation and frequent reassortment events with local and newly 
introduced viruses within the wild bird population. 
Genetically related wild bird viruses were often isolated from mallards. However, 
since we did not identify wild bird viruses that were linked both genetically and 
spatiotemporally, it is not known whether the viruses were introduced into poultry by mallards 
or via another (intermediate) host. Wild bird sampling activities should be performed year-
round and intensified in areas of commercial poultry production with focus on farm grounds 
with turkeys, ducks and outdoor chickens, to allow the detection of genetically related wild 
bird viruses that can also be linked spatiotemporally to poultry viruses. In addition, samples 
from wild bird species other than mallards should be collected to identify potential wild bird 
species of importance for virus transmission to poultry. 
Most poultry farms were likely infected by separate virus introductions from wild 
birds. However, some poultry viruses were genetically highly related based on the HA and NA 
gene segments, suggesting they were introduced from the same wild bird source or by 
between-farm transmission. A previous genetic analysis of the internal gene segments 
confirmed their close genetic relationship 79. In addition, combined genetic and 
epidemiological analysis has provided information on the possible routes of introduction for 
these viruses. Better understanding of factors associated with virus transmission into poultry 
is important to control virus spread and improve surveillance strategies in the Netherlands. 
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A/Barnacle goose/Netherlands/1/2006 (H1N1) 2006-01-09 KX979589 KX977747 
A/Barnacle goose/Netherlands/1/2010 (H6N8) 2010-01-08 KX977787 KX979558 
A/Barnacle goose/Netherlands/1/2011 (H6N8) 2011-01-06 KX979107 KX979461 
A/Barnacle goose/Netherlands/1/2014 (H6N8) 2014-12-15 KX978284 KX978681 
A/Bean goose/Netherlands/1/2007 (H1N1) 2007-01-15 KX978559 KX978842 
A/Bean goose/Netherlands/1/2008 (H6N8) 2008-01-22 KX977816 KX978984 
A/Bean goose/Netherlands/1/2009 (H7N1) 2009-01-21 KX979368 KX979548 
A/Bean goose/Netherlands/2/2009 (H7N1) 2009-01-21 KX978247 KX978908 
A/Bewicks swan/Netherlands/2/2007 (H4N6) 2007-12-06 KX978511 KX977631 
A/Bewicks swan/Netherlands/3/2006 (H1N1) 2006-11-17 KX978266 KX977791 
A/Bewicks swan/Netherlands/3/2007 (H4N6) 2007-12-06 KX978846 KX979193 
A/Bewicks swan/Netherlands/4/2006 (H9N2) 2006-11-17 KX977700 KX979422 
A/Bewicks swan/Netherlands/5/2008 (H5N2) 2008-12-17 KX979015 KX978975 
A/Bewicks swan/Netherlands/6/2006 (H1N1) 2006-11-22 KX978574 KX978892 
A/Bewicks swan/Netherlands/7/2008 (H7N1) 2008-12-24 KX978000 KX978951 
A/Bewicks swan/Netherlands/8/2009 (H6N8) 2008-01-04 KX977884 KX978281 
A/Brent goose/Netherlands/1/2006 (H1N1) 2006-01-10 KX979392 KX979523 
A/Dunlin/Netherlands/2/2007 (H3N8) 2007-07-31 KX978538 KX979291 
A/Dunlin/Netherlands/3/2007 (H3N8) 2007-07-31 KX979366 KX978457 
A/Eurasian teal/Netherlands/1/2008 (H6N1) 2008-09-22 KX978922 KX978742 
A/Eurasian teal/Netherlands/1/2011 (H3N8) 2011-10-15 KX979458 KX979211 
A/Eurasian teal/Netherlands/3/2008 (H6N1) 2008-09-22 KX978950 KX979001 
A/Eurasian wigeon/Netherlands/1/2006 (H6N2) 2007-12-21 KX979500 KX978832 
A/Eurasian wigeon/Netherlands/1/2008 (H6N1) 2008-09-22 KX978248 KX978405 
A/Eurasian wigeon/Netherlands/1/2009 (H5N2) 2009-09-11 KX979575 KX977926 
A/Eurasian wigeon/Netherlands/1/2010 (H5N2) 2010-09-27 KX977950 KX978397 
A/Eurasian wigeon/Netherlands/2/2007 (H1N1) 2007-10-20 KX978381 KX977776 
A/Eurasian wigeon/Netherlands/2/2008 (H7N4) 2008-12-29 KX978318 KX977640 
A/Eurasian wigeon/Netherlands/6/2007 (H1N1) 2007-11-15 KX979129 KX977745 
A/Gadwall duck/Netherlands/1/2011 (H6N2) 2011-11-04 KX978389 KX977644 
A/Gadwall duck/Netherlands/2/2006 (H9N2) 2006-01-01* KX978145 KX979196 
A/Gadwall duck/Netherlands/3/2006 (H3N8) 2006-09-03 KX978829 KX979428 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/1/2006 (H6N2) 2006-01-14 KX979150 KX978480 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/1/2007 (H1N1) 2007-01-23 KX977711 KX977666 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/1/2009 (H6N8) 2009-01-20 KX978830 KX979241 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/1/2010 (H6N1) 2010-01-20 KX977696 KX978928 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/1/2011 (H6N8) 2011-01-04 KX977775 KX978983 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/1/2012 (H1N1) 2012-11-20 KX978558 KX978251 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/11/2009 (H6N1) 2009-12-09 KX977968 KX978797 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/2/2007 (H6N8) 2007-12-12 KX979168 KX978521 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/2/2008 (H6N8) 2008-01-22 KX979494 KX978669 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/2/2009 (H5N3) 2009-12-14 KX977974 KX979382 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/2/2010 (H5N2) 2010-01-29 KX978688 KX978932 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/2/2011 (H6N2) 2011-01-13 KX977613 KX978753 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/3/2006 (H6N8) 2006-01-01* KX979190 KX979264 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/3/2007 (H6N5) 2007-12-18 KX978034 KX978798 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/3/2011 (H6N2) 2011-01-11 KX978988 KX978364 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/4/2006 (H6N8) 2006-01-01* KX978498 KX979449 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/4/2008 (H6N8) 2008-01-22 KX979397 KX979084 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/4/2009 (H5N2) 2009-02-21 KX978287 KX978719 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/4/2010 (H6N8) 2010-02-04 KX978377 KX978184 
S1 TABLE. GENBANK ACCESSION NUMBERS OF WILD BIRD VIRUS SEQUENCES. 
Genbank accession numbers of hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) gene segment sequences of 
low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses from wild birds detected as part of the national avian 
influenza (AI) surveillance program in the Netherlands, January 2006-September 2016. 
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A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/4/2011 (H1N1) 2011-01-17 KX978591 KX978181 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/5/2008 (H5N2) 2008-12-30 KX979073 KX978387 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/5/2010 (H5N3) 2010-11-13 KX978851 KX979439 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/6/2008 (H5N2) 2008-12-30 KX978329 KX978609 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/6/2009 (H6N8) 2009-01-04 KX978349 KX977708 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/6/2010 (H6N2) 2010-11-23 KX978734 KX978786 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/6/2011 (H6N8) 2011-12-14 KX978828 KX977722 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/8/2009 (H6N2) 2009-12-30 KX978319 KX978626 
A/Greater white-fronted goose/Netherlands/9/2009 (H6N2) 2009-12-30 KX978339 KX978180 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/1/2007 (H10N7) 2007-01-01* KX978192 KX977605 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/1/2008 (H5N3) 2008-01-30 KX977798 KX978667 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/1/2009 (H10N7) 2009-02-04 KX977889 KX979271 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/1/2011 (H7N7) 2011-02-23 KX979524 KX978358 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/1/2012 (H10N7) 2012-01-14 KX979240 KX978542 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/1/2013 (H7N7) 2013-01-26 KX978524 KX978579 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/1/2014 (H10N7) 2014-02-17 KX979229 KX978673 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/10/2012 (H6N1) 2012-09-05 KX979411 KX978507 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/12/2006 (H5N2) 2006-09-16 KX977669 KX979415 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/12/2009 (H11N9) 2009-09-02 KX978958 KX978900 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/12/2012 (H6N1) 2012-10-18 KX978330 KX979308 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/13/2007 (H6N5) 2007-11-01 KX977641 KX977833 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/13/2012 (H3N8) 2012-10-01 KX979517 KX979121 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/13/2013 (H7N7) 2013-12-10 KX979399 KX978080 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/14/2006 (H8N4) 2006-01-01* KX977927 KX979046 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/15/2007 (H6N8) 2007-11-09 KX979354 KX979328 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/15/2009 (H6N8) 2009-10-02 KX978489 KX978378 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/15/2011 (H6N8) 2011-09-14 KX978593 KX978920 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/16/2006 (H10N7) 2006-01-14 KX978236 KX978605 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/16/2007 (H6N8) 2007-11-15 KX978196 KX978905 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/16/2009 (H1N1) 2009-09-30 KX978081 KX977672 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/17/2009 (H6N8) 2009-10-06 KX978322 KX978549 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/17/2011 (H3N8) 2011-09-20 KX978036 KX978560 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/18/2007 (H4N6) 2007-11-22 KX979234 KX978376 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/18/2009 (H6N2) 2009-10-08 KX978564 KX979049 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/18/2010 (H6N8) 2010-09-03 KX979113 KX977957 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/19/2007 (H6N2) 2007-12-07 KX978966 KX978008 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/19/2009 (H5N3) 2009-10-26 KX978032 KX978963 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/19/2012 (H4N6) 2012-09-07 KX979134 KX978671 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/2/2007 (H10N7) 2007-01-01* KX978494 KX979021 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/2/2008 (H10N7) 2008-01-07 KX978964 KX978237 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/2/2009 (H7N7) 2009-01-09 KX978114 KX978763 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/2/2011 (H10N7) 2011-03-08 KX978624 KX979161 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/2/2015 (H7N7) 2015-01-16 KX979185 KX978353 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/20/2009 (H5N3) 2009-10-26 KX978388 KX977757 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/20/2011 (H6N8) 2011-09-24 KX978022 KX979447 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/22/2010 (H10N7) 2010-09-07 KX978006 KX978632 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/23/2006 (H1N1) 2006-08-25 KX979325 KX978811 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/23/2012 (H11N9) 2012-09-27 KX977778 KX977684 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/24/2009 (H6N1) 2009-12-01 KX978844 KX978238 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/24/2013 (H4N6) 2013-09-16 KX978385 KX978890 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/26/2010 (H4N6) 2010-09-13 KX979423 KX979292 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/26/2011 (H11N9) 2011-10-10 KX979452 KX978692 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/27/2009 (H4N6) 2009-12-21 KX978295 KX978169 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/28/2008 (H5N6) 2008-09-22 KX977852 KX978060 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/28/2009 (H1N1) 2009-12-21 KX977807 KX978631 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/28/2010 (H5N2) 2010-09-17 KX979224 KX977947 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/29/2008 (H11N9) 2008-09-22 KX978267 KX978971 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/29/2009 (H11N9) 2009-12-21 KX977705 KX977840 
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A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/3/2008 (H6N2) 2008-01-07 KX977797 KX978336 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/3/2015 (H7N7) 2015-01-24 KX978067 KX979143 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/30/2008 (H5N3) 2008-09-23 KX978877 KX978452 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/30/2010 (H3N8) 2010-09-21 KX978097 KX979363 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/30/2011 (H6N4) 2011-10-19 KX979356 KX979148 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/30/2014 (H4N6) 2014-07-21 KX978886 KX979350 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/31/2008 (H6N1) 2008-09-22 KX978655 KX978400 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/31/2012 (H7N1) 2012-01-10 KX977922 KX978711 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/31/2013 (H10N7) 2013-05-20 KX978193 KX977867 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/32/2011 (H5N2) 2011-10-20 KX979009 KX978469 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/32/2013 (H10N7) 2013-08-05 KX977924 KX978875 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/33/2014 (H10N7) 2014-12-16 KX978314 KX979578 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/34/2006 (H3N8) 2006-09-11 KX979215 KX979577 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/36/2006 (H5N3) 2006-09-11 KX979003 KX979553 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/36/2008 (H11N9) 2008-09-23 KX978075 KX978903 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/37/2011 (H1N1) 2011-12-08 KX977882 KX979536 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/40/2006 (H6N8) 2006-09-16 KX977839 KX978188 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/43/2006 (H5N2) 2006-09-18 KX979501 KX978545 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/43/2011 (H7N1) 2011-12-24 KX977677 KX978462 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/44/2011 (H7N1) 2011-12-24 KX978740 KX977735 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/47/2010 (H10N7) 2010-11-26 KX978640 KX977904 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/5/2008 (H6N8) 2008-09-10 KX979551 KX977649 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/5/2009 (H5N2) 2009-02-02 KX977767 KX978896 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/5/2012 (H10N7) 2012-05-12 KX978848 KX979065 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/5/2013 (H1N1) 2013-09-16 KX979268 KX978982 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/51/2010 (H1N1) 2010-12-03 KX978723 KX978328 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/52/2008 (H5N2) 2008-10-09 KX979499 KX977925 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/53/2010 (H1N1) 2010-12-08 KX978255 KX977899 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/55/2008 (H4N6) 2008-10-06 KX978110 KX978178 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/6/2006 (H4N6) 2006-06-03 KX977697 KX979028 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/6/2013 (H3N8) 2013-10-01 KX979335 KX979409 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/6/2015 (H10N7) 2015-03-04 KX978577 KX978040 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/60/2008 (H7N1) 2008-10-15 KX978337 KX979011 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/64/2006 (H1N1) 2006-09-22 KX978552 KX977762 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/67/2008 (H10N7) 2008-12-13 KX979437 KX977963 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/7/2008 (H3N8) 2008-08-22 KX978132 KX978054 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/7/2009 (H7N7) 2009-02-02 KX977692 KX978598 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/7/2011 (H4N6) 2011-08-15 KX978670 KX977749 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/7/2012 (H1N1) 2012-07-09 KX978074 KX978447 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/7/2014 (H6N2) 2014-10-01 KX978776 KX979466 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/76/2008 (H6N8) 2008-11-27 KX978130 KX978245 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/77/2008 (H7N1) 2008-12-29 KX977881 KX978814 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/78/2006 (H6N8) 2006-10-21 KX978159 KX977724 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/8/2008 (H6N1) 2008-09-27 KX978779 KX977984 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/8/2012 (H1N1) 2012-10-23 KX979169 KX977770 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/82/2008 (H7N7) 2008-12-17 KX979315 KX979225 
A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/9/2013 (H6N8) 2013-10-15 KX979493 KX979138 
A/Mute swan/Netherlands/2/2006 (H4N6) 2006-01-01* KX978073 KX979448 
A/Mute swan/Netherlands/3/2006 (H4N6) 2006-01-01* KX977958 KX978909 
A/Turnstone/Netherlands/1/2010 (H3N8) 2010-10-09 KX979124 KX977713 
A/Turnstone/Netherlands/2/2007 (H3N8) 2007-07-31 KX979144 KX978279 
A/Turnstone/Netherlands/3/2008 (H3N8) 2008-10-31 KX978665 KX979101 
A/Turnstone/Netherlands/4/2008 (H3N8) 2008-11-01 KX978661 KX979097 
* date unknown, set to 1st of January
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A/Chicken/Netherlands/06022003/2006 (H7N7) 2006-08-01 EPI1229818 EPI1229817 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/09006942/2009 (H10N7) 2009-04-15 EPI1229826 EPI1229825 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/10007882/2010 (H7N4) 2010-05-14 EPI1229834 EPI1229833 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/10008427/2010 (H10N7) 2010-05-20 EPI966037 EPI966050 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/10009401/2010 (H8N4) 2010-06-04 EPI1229842 EPI1229841 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/10010413/2010 (H6N1) 2010-06-21 EPI1229850 EPI1229849 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/10012103/2010 (H6N1) 2010-07-19 EPI1229858 EPI1229857 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/10020245/2010 (H9N2) 2010-12-10 EPI1229866 EPI1229865 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/11004004/2011 (H8N4) 2011-03-09 EPI1229874 EPI1229873 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/11004875/2011 (H7N1) 2011-03-22 EPI1229882 EPI1229881 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/11008325/2011 (H8N4) 2011-05-10 EPI1229890 EPI1229889 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/11008327/2011 (H7N7) 2011-05-12 EPI1230758 EPI1230760 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/11009919/2011 (H1N1) 2011-05-30 EPI1229898 EPI1229897 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/11011392/2011 (H7N7) 2011-06-22 EPI1229906 EPI1229905 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/12002495-001-005/2012 (H10N9) 2012-02-06 EPI1229914 EPI1229913 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/12014794/2012 (H7N7) 2012-08-09 EPI1229922 EPI1229921 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/13003601/2013 (H7N7) 2013-03-12 EPI1229930 EPI1229929 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/13003983/2013 (H7N7) 2013-03-18 EPI1229938 EPI1229937 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/13015884/2013 (H5N3) 2013-11-29 EPI1229946 EPI1229945 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/13016263-031-035/2013 (H5N3) 2013-12-10 EPI1229954 EPI1229953 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/14002541/2014 (H5N1) 2014-02-25 EPI1229962 EPI1229961 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/14003005/2014 (H2N7) 2014-03-05 EPI1229970 EPI1229969 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/14003323/2014 (H5N2) 2014-03-12 EPI1229978 EPI1229977 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/14004070/2014 (H9N1) 2014-03-26 EPI1229986 EPI1229985 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/15005968-056060/2015 (H5N2) 2015-04-02 EPI1230063 EPI1230062 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/15007212/2015 (H10N7) 2015-04-28 EPI774514 EPI774516 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/16007311-037041/2016  (H7N9) 2016-06-08 EPI773765 EPI773767 
A/Chicken/Netherlands/16010778-021-025/2016 (H2N3) 2016-08-30 EPI1230079 EPI1230078 
A/Chicken/NL-Barneveld/15004745-001-005/2015  (H7N7) 2015-03-11 EPI629344 EPI629341 
A/Duck/Netherlands/06027358/2006 (H3N8) 2006-09-27 EPI1230087 EPI1230086 
A/Duck/Netherlands/14015610/2014 (H6N2) 2014-11-17 EPI1230095 EPI1230094 
A/Duck/Netherlands/14016168/2014 (H6N8) 2014-11-25 EPI1230103 EPI1230102 
A/Duck/Netherlands/14016396/2014 (H6N2) 2014-11-25 EPI1230111 EPI1230110 
A/Turkey/Netherlands/06001571/2006 (H6N5) 2006-01-24 EPI1229994 EPI1229993 
A/Turkey/Netherlands/07014290/2007 (H1N5) 2007-05-31 EPI1230002 EPI1230001 
A/Turkey/Netherlands/07016245/2007 (H1N5) 2007-06-22 EPI1230010 EPI1230009 
A/Turkey/Netherlands/09006938/2009 (H10N7) 2009-04-14 EPI1230018 EPI1230017 
A/Turkey/Netherlands/11011530/2011 (H7N7) 2011-06-25 EPI1230026 EPI1230025 
A/Turkey/Netherlands/11015452/2011 (H9N2) 2011-08-31 EPI1230034 EPI1230033 
A/Turkey/Netherlands/12004763-001-004/2012 (H10N9) 2012-03-05 EPI1230042 EPI1230041 
A/Turkey/Netherlands/12005615/2012 (H10N9) 2012-03-13 EPI1230050 EPI1230049 
A/Turkey/Netherlands/13001007/2013 (H8N4) 2013-01-18 EPI1230127 EPI1230126 
S2 TABLE. GISAID ACCESSION NUMBERS OF POULTRY VIRUS SEQUENCES. 
GISAID’s EpiFlu database accession numbers of hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) gene 
segment sequences of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses from poultry, detected as part of 
the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance program in the Netherlands, January 2006-September 2016. 
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Anseriformes Ducks Mallard Anas platyrhynchos 46939 446 
Eurasian Wigeon Anas penelope 10039 22 
Gadwall Anas strepera 1317 5 
Common Teal Anas crecca 1209 8 
Northern Pintail Anas acuta 372 0 
Northern Shoveler Anas clypeata 355 1 
Common Eider Somateria mollissima 99 2 
Other ducks 312 0 
Geese White-fronted Goose Anser albifrons 12001 31 
Barnacle Goose Branta leucopsis 4933 8 
Greylag Goose Anser anser 1924 1 
Egyptian Goose Alopochen aegyptiacus 1159 0 
Bean Goose Anser fabalis 1095 3 
Brent Goose Branta bernicla 858 1 
Canada Goose Branta canadensis 326 0 
Pink-footed Goose Anser brachyrhynchus 206 1 
Other geese 110 0 
Swans Mute Swan Cygnus olor 2126 3 
Bewick's Swan Cygnus bewickii 250 14 
Other swans 46 0 
Charadriiformes Gulls Black-headed Gull Chroicocephalus ridibundus 14170 401 
Common Gull Larus canus 2087 0 
Herring Gull Larus argentatus 1024 10 
Lesser Black-backed Gull Larus fuscus 894 4 
Mediterranean Gull Larus Melanocephalus 207 1 
Great Black-backed Gull Larus marinus 31 1 
Other gulls 51 0 
Waders Turnstone Arenaria interpres 911 14 
Dunlin Calidris alpina 654 4 
Oystercatcher Haematopus ostralegus 724 0 
Red Knot Calidris canutus 163 0 
Other waders 177 0 
Other 
Charadriiformes 351 0 
Other 2172 0 
Unknown 1822 0 
Total 111114 981 
S3 TABLE. COLLECTION AND SUBTYPING OF WILD BIRD SAMPLES. 
Number of wild birds sampled and number of subtyped cases of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) 
virus detections per wild bird species as part of the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance program in 
the Netherlands, January 2006-September 2016. A case is considered subtyped if the hemagglutinin (HA) 
or neuraminidase (NA) subtype of the virus is determined. 
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Poultry type Housing system Number of farms 
tested 
Number of subtyped 
cases 
Chicken Layer Indoor 18883 20 
Outdoor 11797 120 
Unknown 8 
Broiler 7309 9 
Unknown 10 
Turkey 2269 33 
Duck 889 13 
Unknown 662 7 
Total 41769 220 
S4 TABLE. COLLECTION AND SUBTYPING OF POULTRY SAMPLES. 
Number of serologically tested poultry farms and number of subtyped cases of low pathogenic avian 
influenza (LPAI) virus detections per poultry type as part of the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance 
program in the Netherlands, January 2006-September 2016. A case is considered if the hemagglutinin 
(HA) or neuraminidase (NA) subtype of the virus or the subtype-specificity of the influenza virus-specific 
antibodies is determined. 
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S1 FIGURE. PHYLOGENETIC TREES OF HA GENES. 
Neighbour joining (NJ) phylogenetic trees of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene segments of low pathogenic 
avian influenza (LPAI) viruses from poultry, detected as part of the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance 
program in the Netherlands, January 2006-September 2016. Nucleotide (nt) sequences of cluster 
representatives, poultry viruses and top 50 BLAST hits were aligned for each HA separately: H1 (1659 nt), 
H2 (1679 nt), H3 (1699 nt), H5 (1571 nt), H6 (1596 nt), H7 (1494 nt), (H8 1626 nt), H9 (1567 nt) and H10 
(1585 nt). Phylogenetic trees were generated using the Tamura-Nei substitution model with a gamma 
distribution (shape parameter = 1) for rate variation within the MEGA7 software package. Bootstrap 
support values above 70 (1,000 replicates) are shown at the branches. Colours represent cluster 
representatives (blue), poultry viruses (red), and most identical wild bird viruses as determined by BLAST 
(red). Symbols represent poultry viruses most identical to wild bird viruses isolated in the Netherlands 
(dots), other European countries (squares) and Asia (triangles). We gratefully acknowledge the authors, 
originating and submitting laboratories of the sequences from GISAID’s EpiFlu database on which this 
research is based. All submitters of data may be contacted directly via the GISAID website 
(http://www.gisaid.org).
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S2 FIGURE. PHYLOGENETIC TREES OF NA GENES. 
Neighbour joining (NJ) phylogenetic trees of the neuraminidase (NA) gene segments of low pathogenic 
avian influenza (LPAI) viruses from poultry, detected as part of the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance 
program in the Netherlands, January 2006-September 2016. Nucleotide (nt) sequences of cluster 
representatives, poultry viruses and top 50 BLAST hits were aligned for each NA gene segment separately: 
N1 (1221 nt), N2 (1245 nt), N3 (1343 nt), N4 (1337 nt), N5 (1232 nt), N7 (1225 nt), N8 (1376 nt) and N9 
(1342 nt). Phylogenetic trees were generated using the Tamura-Nei substitution model with a gamma 
distribution (shape parameter = 1) for rate variation within the MEGA7 software package. Bootstrap 
support values above 70 (1,000 replicates) are shown at the branches. Colours represent cluster 
representatives (blue), poultry viruses (red), and most identical wild bird viruses as determined by BLAST 
(red). Symbols represent poultry viruses most identical to wild bird viruses isolated in the Netherlands 
(dots), other European countries (squares) and Asia (triangles). We gratefully acknowledge the authors, 
originating and submitting laboratories of the sequences from GISAID’s EpiFlu database on which this 
research is based. All submitters of data may be contacted directly via the GISAID website 
(http://www.gisaid.org). 
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Analysis of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses circulating in the Netherlands in a 
previous study revealed associations of specific hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) 
subtypes with wild bird- or poultry hosts. In this study, we identified putative host-associations 
in LPAI virus internal proteins. We show that LPAI viruses isolated from poultry more frequently 
carried the allele A variant of the nonstructural protein (NS) gene, compared to wild bird 
viruses. We determined the susceptibility of chickens to wild bird-associated subtypes H3N8 
and H4N6 and poultry-associated subtypes H8N4 and H9N2, carrying either NS allele A or B, 
in an infection experiment. We observed variations in virus shedding and replication patterns, 
however, these did not correlate with the predicted wild bird- or poultry-associations of the 
viruses. The experiment demonstrated that LPAI viruses of wild bird-associated subtypes can 
replicate in chickens after experimental infection, despite their infrequent detection in poultry. 
Although the NS1 protein is known to play a role in immune modulation, no differences were 
detected in the limited innate immune response to LPAI virus infection. This study contributes 
to a better understanding of the infection dynamics of LPAI viruses in chickens. 
Keywords: avian influenza virus; low pathogenic avian influenza; wild birds; poultry; 
chickens; shedding; innate immune response
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Introduction 
Avian influenza (AI) viruses are influenza A viruses that circulate among a broad range of wild 
bird species, particularly birds of the orders Anseriformes (ducks, geese, swans) and 
Charadriiformes (gulls, terns, waders) 1, and can also infect domestic poultry. AI viruses are 
divided into subtypes based on the surface glycoproteins hemagglutinin (HA) and 
neuraminidase (NA), which are involved in the attachment and release from host cells 2, 
respectively. Most viruses are low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses that produce 
subclinical infections in poultry or, occasionally, cause mild respiratory disease, a reduction in 
egg production and low mortality 3. LPAI viruses of HA subtypes H5 and H7 can mutate into 
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) variants that can cause severe progressive disease 
and high mortality in birds 4. Outbreaks of HPAI viruses can have serious impact on animal 
health and economic consequences for the commercial poultry industries. In addition, some 
strains can be transmitted to humans 5, causing major concern for public health worldwide. 
In birds, 16 HA subtypes (H1-H16) and 9 NA (N1-N9) subtypes have been found in 
numerous combinations 6,7. Some of these subtypes are specific to certain avian species, of 
which H13 and H16 viruses in gulls is a prime example 7. Our previous study on LPAI viruses 
circulating in wild birds and poultry in the Netherlands also revealed close host-dependent 
associations among other HA and NA subtypes 8. During a ten-year surveillance period in the 
Netherlands, LPAI viruses of subtypes H3N8 and H4N6 were predominantly detected in wild 
ducks, in particular mallards, but rarely detected in poultry. In contrast, LPAI viruses of subtypes 
H8N4 and H9N2 were most frequently detected in Dutch poultry, but only sporadically 
detected in wild birds. These findings suggest that transmission to poultry is selective, and 
likely influenced by viral factors that determine host range. 
Besides HA and NA, the viral genome encodes for internal proteins including 
polymerase basic protein 1 (PB1), polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2), polymerase acidic protein 
(PA), matrix proteins (M1 and M2), nucleoprotein (NP) and nonstructural proteins (NS1 and 
NS2). The NS proteins circulate in two lineages (NS allele A and B) that differ by around 30% 
of their amino acids 9. The internal proteins are responsible for viral functions, such as genome 
replication and expression, and virus assembly 10. The NS1 protein can modulate the host 
immune response and protein expression, and thereby acts as an important virulence factor 
11. Several of the internal proteins have been described to influence the infectivity,
pathogenicity and transmissibility of AI viruses in a host-dependent manner 12, but their role
in host-dependent transmission between avian species is largely unknown. Increased
knowledge on the ability of different AI virus subtypes and genotypes to infect poultry would
contribute to a better understanding of virus epidemiology. In addition, the identification of
viral factors that influence host range can be used for predicting the risk of infection in poultry,
and can help to design more efficient surveillance programs for the early detection of
potentially dangerous strains.
In this study, we analysed the association of LPAI virus internal proteins with wild bird 
or poultry hosts. We show that LPAI viruses isolated from poultry more frequently contain NS 
allele A, compared to wild bird viruses. The susceptibility of chickens to wild duck-origin LPAI 
viruses of wild bird-associated subtypes H3N8 and H4N6 and poultry-associated subtypes 
H8N4 and H9N2, carrying either NS allele A or B, was studied in an infection experiment. We 
analysed the pattern and route of viral shedding, which not only provides information on 
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potential replication sites but also gives an indication of the ability of virus transmission to 
other birds. In addition, we analysed virus replication and immunological responses in the 
respiratory and intestinal organs, which are main target tissues of LPAI viruses. This study 
contributes to a better understanding of the infection dynamics of different LPAI virus strains 
in chickens, which can be used to improve current surveillance programs. 
Material and Methods 
ETHICAL STATEMENT 
The animal experiment and associated procedures were in accordance with the national 
regulations on animal experimentation and the project license was approved by the Dutch 
Central Authority for Scientific Procedures on Animals (CCD) (permit number 
ADV401002015317; experiment number 2016.D-0057.001). The animal procedures were 
performed conform the guidelines from the European Union directive 2010/63/EU of 22 
September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes 13. 
VIRUS SELECTION
The subtypes tested in this study were selected based on their association with wild birds or 
poultry as observed in a previous surveillance study in the Netherlands 8. To identify host-
associated features in the internal proteins, a statistical comparative analysis was performed 
using the metadata-driven comparative analysis tool for sequences (meta-CATS) of the 
Influenza Research Database (IRD) (https://www.fludb.org) 14. For this analysis, we used the 
amino acid (aa) sequences of the internal proteins (PB1, PB2, PA, M1, M2, NP, NS1 and NS2) 
of the same set of 162 wild bird viruses and 42 poultry viruses as analysed previously 8. For 
each protein, a multiple sequence alignment was generated in MUSCLE version 3.8.31 15. 
Subsequently, the alignments were submitted to the automated meta-CATS pipeline in two 
groups according to their host source (i.e. wild bird or poultry). In the statistical tool, a chi-
square test of independence was performed at each aa position to identify residues that 
significantly differed between the groups (p<0.05). 
VIRUS ISOLATION AND PROPAGATION 
The viruses used in this study were provided by Erasmus MC (Rotterdam, the Netherlands) 
(Table S1). The viruses were initially isolated from oropharyngeal (OP) or cloacal (CL) swabs 
collected from wild ducks as part of the national AI virus surveillance program in wild birds in 
the Netherlands. The whole genome sequences were generated in a previous study 8. Virus 
stocks were generated by two passages in 9-11 day-old specific pathogen free (SPF) 
embryonated chicken eggs (ECEs). The virus stocks were titrated using standard methods to 
determine the median egg infectious dose (EID50) titres 16. The median tissue culture infective 
dose (TCID50) titres were determined by end-point titration in Madin-Darby Canine Kidney 
(MDCK) cells, as described previously 17. The virus stocks were diluted in sterile phosphate 
buffered saline (PBS) immediately prior to use in order to obtain 106 EID50/ml inoculum. 
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ANIMALS AND HOUSING 
A total of 184 six-week-old SPF White Leghorn chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus) of both 
sexes were obtained from MSD Animal Health (Boxmeer, the Netherlands). White Leghorn 
chickens were chosen for this research as it represents the most common and economically 
important poultry type in the Netherlands 18. The experiment was performed in biosafety level 
2 (BSL 2) facilities at Wageningen Bioveterinary Research (WBVR, Lelystad, the Netherlands). 
The chickens were housed in temperature-controlled rooms under optimal light conditions 
and humidity, and feed and water were provided ad libitum. Each experimental group was 
housed separately in floor pens with solid livestock dividing panels, and personnel changed 
clothes to prevent cross-contamination between groups.  
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The chickens were randomly divided into eight experimental groups (virus-inoculated groups) 
of 20 chickens and one experimental group (control group) of 24 chickens (Figure 1). Individual 
birds of each experimental group were numbered randomly to select chickens for tissue 
collection at different time points. At day 0, prior to inoculation, OP and CL swabs were 
collected from all chickens to confirm the absence of current AI virus infection. In addition, 
blood samples were collected by heart puncture from the control group (n=4) under 
anaesthesia by intramuscular (IM) administration of 0.4 ml Xylazine and Ketamine mixture. 
After blood collection, the chickens were immediately euthanized by intravenous (IV) 
administration of 2.0 ml Euthasol 50% solution (AST Farma, Oudewater, the Netherlands), and 
tissue samples of various organs were collected, including the trachea, lung and ileum. 
Inoculation was performed via intranasal (IN) and intratracheal (IT) administration of 
0.1 ml of 106 EID50/ml inoculum per route (inoculation dose of 105.3 EID50 per bird). The 
inoculation dose was confirmed by back-titration on MDCK cells and conversion of the TCID50 
titres into equivalent EID50 titres. For each experimental group, the viral dose was within the 
range of 0.5 log10 EID50/ml of the target titre. All birds were observed daily for clinical signs 
of disease. OP and CL swabs were taken for virus detection from live birds daily to 7 days post 
inoculation (dpi) to determine viral shedding. Four chickens from each experimental group 
were euthanized, using the same method as the control group, at 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 dpi to collect 
blood and organs. The experiment was terminated at 7 dpi. 
ANTIBODY DETECTION
Blood samples were left overnight at RT for serum separation  19, and serum samples were 
stored at -20°C until testing. For influenza virus-specific antibody detection, serum was tested 
by anti-NP ELISA (FlockChek AI MultiS-Screen Ab Test Kit (IDEXX Europe B.V., Hoofddorp, the 
Netherlands)), according to the manufacturers’ instructions. Hemagglutination inhibition (HI) 
testing for HA subtype-specific antibodies was done using standardized homologous H3, H4, 
H8 and H9 antigens. HI test results were reported as log2 HI titres, with titres of 3 log2 or higher 
considered positive. 
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VIRUS DETECTION IN SWABS 
Swabs were placed in 2.0 ml Tryptose Phosphate Broth 2.95% containing gentamicin and 
stored at -80°C until testing. For virus detection, total RNA was extracted from the swab 
specimens using the MagNA Pure 96 system (Roche, Basel, Switzerland) with the MagNA Pure 
96 DNA and Viral NA Small Volume Kit (Roche). Influenza A virus was detected by a 
quantitative real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction targeting the matrix 
gene (M-PCR), as described previously 20. For each virus, a standard curve for virus 
quantification was taken along that consisted of ten-fold serial dilutions of the working stocks 
with a known EID50 titre. The standard curve was used to convert the Ct values into equivalent 
EID50 titres and determine PCR efficiency. Results were reported as mean equivalent log10 
EID50/ml titres and their standard deviation (SD) with a lower detection limit of 101.7 EID50/ml, 
and plotted using Graphpad PRISM 8. Chickens were considered positive for viral shedding if 
virus was detected in swab samples at any time during the experiment. 
FIGURE 1. SAMPLE COLLECTION PER EXPERIMENTAL GROUP.
A total of 184 six-week-old specific pathogen free (SPF) White Leghorn chickens were divided into eight 
experimental groups of 20 chickens (virus-inoculated groups) and one experimental group of 24 chickens 
(control group). Prior to inoculation, oropharyngeal (OP) and cloacal (CL) swabs were collected from all 
chickens of each experimental group to confirm the absence of current AI virus infection. In addition, 
blood and organs were collected from four chickens in the control group (shown in grey). After 
inoculation, OP and CL swabs were taken from live birds daily to 7 days post inoculation (dpi) to determine 
viral shedding. Four chickens from each experimental group were euthanized at 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 dpi to 
collect blood and organs. The experiment was terminated at 7 dpi. 
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VIRUS DETECTION IN TISSUE 
Tissues collected for virus detection were snap-frozen on dry ice and stored at -80°C until 
processing. The frozen tissue samples (100 mg) were homogenised in 1.0 ml Trizol (TRI 
Reagent (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA)) 21. Isolation of total RNA from the 
homogenized tissue was performed using the Direct-Zol RNA Microprep isolation kit (Zymo 
Research, Irvine, CA, USA) with DNAse treatment according to the manufacturers’ protocol. A 
M-PCR was performed to quantitate viral RNA in the tissue samples, as described previously
20. Results were reported as mean Ct values and their SD.
CYTOKINE EXPRESSION IN TISSUE 
To measure cytokine expression, the quantity of the extracted RNA from tissue samples was 
assessed using the Nanodrop spectrophotometer (Thermo Fisher Scientific). RNA quality was 
inferred using the 2100 Bioanalyzer system (Aligent Technologies, Santa Clara, CA, USA). 
Samples meeting a RNA integrity number (RIN) score of 6.5 or higher have been classified as 
high-quality RNA samples obtained from frozen tissue 22, and were therefore included in this 
study. RNA (200 ng) was converted into cDNA using the Superscript IV First-Strand Synthesis 
System (Thermo Fisher Scientific). Quantitative real-time PCR was performed using PowerUp 
SYBR Green Master Mix (Thermo Fisher Scientific) in the ABI 7500 Real-Time PCR system 
(Thermo Fisher Scientific) 21. 
A panel of five candidate reference genes in chickens (HPRT1, RPLP0, HMBS, TBP, 
RPL13) was selected based on literature 23 and tested using the extracted RNA samples from 
tissues of seven birds from the virus-inoculated and control group. From this panel, two stably-
expressed reference genes (RPLP0 and TBP) were selected for each organ separately using 
NormFinder 24. Cytokine and TLR mRNA expression was measured by a PCR targeting IL-6, IL-
1β, IFN-α, IFN-β and TLR7 mRNAs. The primer sets used were identical to those described 
previously 21, except that the IL-1β forward primer was replaced with 5′-
CAGCAGCCTCAGCGAAGAG-3′. A standard curve of a plasmid containing the gene of interest 
(GenScript Biotech, Piscataway, NJ, USA) was used to determine PCR efficiency. Results were 
reported as fold change in mRNA expression relative to the control group and their SD 
calculated using the ΔΔCt method (2-ΔΔCt) 25. Comparison between virus-inoculated and 
control groups was performed using the unpaired, two-tailed Student’s t-test, with 
significance defined as p<0.05. The statistical analyses were conducted using Graphpad PRISM 
8.  
CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL GENES 
We performed genetic cluster analysis based on the internal genes (PB1, PB2, PA, NP, MP, and 
NS) to determine if genes similar to those of the inoculated viruses have previously been 
isolated from poultry. For this analysis, we used a dataset of publicly available sequences of 
around 20,000 avian-origin AI viruses obtained from GISAID’s EpiFlu database 
(http://www.gisaid.org) 26 on 27 May 2019. For each internal gene, the sequences were aligned 
in MAFFT version 7.427 27,28 and curated in Aliview version 1.26 29. Partial sequences and 
sequences containing multiple ambiguous bases (Ns) were excluded from the analysis. The 
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remaining sequences were clustered against the sequences of the inoculated viruses in CD-
HIT-EST-2D 30,31. A sequence identity threshold value of 1.5% was used to generate clusters of 
sequences that share nucleotide sequence identities of at least 98.5% with the inoculated virus. 
For each cluster, the total number of sequences (cluster size) and the number of sequences 
derived from poultry were determined. 
Results
IDENTIFICATION OF HOST-ASSOCIATIONS IN THE INTERNAL PROTEINS 
To identify amino acid (aa) residues in the internal proteins that significantly differ between 
viruses isolated from wild birds and poultry, we applied meta-CATS analysis using the 
sequences of 162 wild bird viruses and 42 poultry viruses isolated in the Netherlands. The chi-
squared analysis identified 135 statistically significant aa residues that differed between the 
host groups (p<0.05). A total of 82 aa residues were located in the NS proteins due to the 
presence of two distinct NS alleles (NS allele A and B) (Table S2). Viruses isolated from poultry 
contained relatively more frequently NS allele A (83%) than viruses isolated from wild birds 
(62%). This skewed distribution may suggest that poultry is more prone to infection with LPAI 
virus strains carrying NS allele A. 
We identified 53 statistically significant aa residues that differed between wild bird 
and poultry viruses, but were not linked to the NS alleles. These residues were located in PB1 
(10 of 48), PB2 (11 of 53), PA (14 of 53), NP (11 of 53), M1 (1 of 53), M2 (1 of 53), NS1 (4 of 53) 
and NS2 (1 of 53). A total of 44 residues were present in more than 90% of the viruses in both 
host groups, and four residues were located at highly variable aa positions, as three or more 
aa variants were detected at these positions. The five aa residues for which larger differences 
in occurrence between wild bird and poultry viruses were found are listed in Table S2. These 
were mostly arginine (R) to lysine (K) substitutions, with unknown effect on protein function. 
Based on the suspected host-association of the NS protein, we selected strains of NS allele A 
and B for further evaluation in the animal experiment. 
CLINICAL SIGNS AND SEROCONVERSION IN LPAI INFECTED CHICKENS 
Six-week-old SPF chickens were inoculated with eight wild duck-origin LPAI viruses of wild 
bird-associated (H3N8 and H4N6) and poultry-associated subtypes (H8N4 and H9N2), with 
either NS allele A or B, to study their susceptibility to infection (Table S1). The chickens were 
examined for clinical signs, swabbed daily, and euthanized at selected time points to collect 
organs and blood (Figure 1). 
During the 7-day experiment, no obvious clinical signs and no mortality were 
observed. There were no antibodies detected in serum of the control chickens. Influenza A 
virus NP-specific antibodies were detected by ELISA in chickens inoculated with H8N4 NS A 
virus (4 of 4 chickens) and H9N2 NS A virus (1 of 4 chickens) at 5 dpi (Table S3), indicating 
rapid initiation of antibody production in these chickens. At 7 dpi, seroconversion was 
observed in chickens from all experimental groups, with the exception of chickens inoculated 
with H8N4 NS B virus. HA subtype-specific antibodies were detected upon inoculation with 
H8N4 NS A virus at 5 dpi in 3 of 4 chickens (mean HI titre of 4.3±0.6 log2) and at 7 dpi in 2 of 
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4 chickens (HI titres of 5 log2). In the groups inoculated with H3N8 NS A and B viruses, subtype-
specific antibodies were detected at 7 dpi in 1 of 4 chickens (HI titres of 3 log2). 
VIRAL SHEDDING OF LPAI INFECTED CHICKENS 
Viral shedding upon inoculation of the LPAI viruses was measured daily by the detection of 
viral RNA in swab samples using influenza virus-specific M-PCR. The mean virus titres in 
oropharyngeal (OP) and cloacal (CL) swabs for each experimental group are plotted over time 
in Figure 2 and 3, respectively. The number of birds shedding virus and the mean shedding 
titres are provided in Table S4 and S5. No virus was detected in swab samples collected from 
the control birds. Viral shedding was observed in all virus-inoculated groups, except in 
chickens inoculated with H8N4 NS B virus. 
Shedding through the oropharyngeal route was predominantly detected in chickens 
inoculated with H3N8 NS A virus (12 of 20 chickens), H3N8 NS B virus (17 of 20 chickens), 
H4N6 NS A virus (19 of 20 chickens) and H4N6 NS B virus (16 of 20 chickens). The mean onset 
of OP shedding was 1.4±1.1 dpi. In chickens inoculated with H3N8 NS A virus, a peak of 
shedding was observed at 1 and 5 dpi, with a mean shedding titre of 103.8 EID50. In this group, 
one chicken was tested positive for OP shedding at 7 dpi, although the virus titre was low 
(102.4 EID50). No OP shedding was observed at 7 dpi in other experimental groups. In chickens 
inoculated with H3N8 NS B virus, a peak of shedding was observed at 1-2 dpi, with a mean 
shedding titre of 104.7 EID50, which declined and resolved by 5 dpi. H4N6 NS A virus-infected 
chickens showed a peak of shedding at 1 dpi (mean shedding titre of 104.8 EID50), followed by 
a fast decline to low virus titres between 3-7 dpi. Chickens inoculated with H4N6 NS B virus 
showed a peak of OP shedding at 1-2 dpi, with a mean shedding titre of 104.8 EID50, which 
declined and resolved by 7 dpi. However, limited shedding was detected in chickens 
inoculated with H8N4 NS A virus (7 of 20 chickens), H9N2 NS A virus (4 of 20 chickens) and 
H9N2 NS B virus (6 of 20 chickens), and no OP shedding was detected in chickens inoculated 
with H8N4 NS B virus (0 of 20 chickens).  
In addition, limited shedding through the cloacal route was observed in chickens 
inoculated with H3N8 NS A virus (2 of 20 chickens), H3N8 NS B virus (7 of 20 chickens) and 
H8N4 NS A virus (3 of 20 chickens). The majority of these chickens (11 of 12 chickens) were 
also positive for OP shedding. The mean onset of CL shedding was 3.9±1.5 dpi. The mean virus 
titre was highest at 7 dpi in all three experimental groups, with mean shedding titres ranging 
between 103.7-6.8 EID50. No virus was detected in the CL swabs of chickens inoculated with both 
H4N6 viruses, H8N4 NS B virus and both H9N2 viruses. The results demonstrate variations in 
viral shedding patterns and routes between LPAI viruses of wild bird- and poultry-associated 
subtypes and NS alleles in chickens.  
VIRAL REPLICATION IN THE RESPIRATORY AND INTESTINAL TRACT 
Tissues collected from the trachea, lung and ileum were tested by M-PCR to determine viral 
replication in the respiratory and intestinal tract of four chickens from each experimental 
group (Table 1). No virus was detected in tissues collected from the control chickens At 1 dpi, 
virus was detected in trachea and lung tissues of chickens from all virus-inoculated groups, 
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FIGURE 2. OROPHARYNGEAL SHEDDING.
Virus detected in oropharyngeal (OP) swabs collected from chickens inoculated by the intranasal (IN) 
and intratracheal (IT) route with eight strains of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses (105.3 
median egg infectious dose (EID50) per bird). The swabs  were taken daily from live birds to 7 days post 
inoculation (dpi) for virus detection by influenza virus-specific PCR (M-PCR). Viral shedding is expressed 
as the mean equivalent log10 EID50/ml titre ± standard deviation (SD) with a lower detection limit of 101.7 
EID50/ml (dashed line). The grey bars below the solid line indicate the percentage of positive swabs. 
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FIGURE 3. CLOACAL SHEDDING.
Virus detected in cloacal (CL) swabs collected from chickens inoculated by the intranasal (IN) and 
intratracheal (IT) route with eight strains of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses (105.3 median 
egg infectious dose (EID50) per bird). The swabs were taken daily from live birds to 7 days post inoculation 
(dpi) for virus detection by influenza virus-specific PCR (M-PCR). Viral shedding is expressed as the mean 
equivalent log10 EID50/ml titre ± standard deviation (SD) with a lower detection limit of 101.7 EID50/ml 
(dashed line). The grey bars below the solid line indicate the percentage of positive swabs. 
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indicative of local virus replication. Remarkably, virus was detected in trachea or lung of all 
chickens inoculated with H8N4 NS A virus and 3 of 4 chickens inoculated with H9N2 NS B 
virus, despite OP shedding was limited in these groups. At 3 and 5 dpi, most tissues examined 
were tested virus-negative, indicating a short persistence of LPAI virus in the chicken 
respiratory tract. At 7 dpi, virus was detected in the ileum collected from chickens inoculated 
with H3N8 NS A (1 of 4 chickens), H3N8 NS B (2 of 4 chickens) and H8N4 NS A (all 4 chickens) 
viruses, which were also positive for CL shedding. This shows that LPAI virus replication in the 
intestine and subsequent excretion via the cloaca is strain-dependent. Overall, virus was mainly 
detected in the respiratory tissues at 1 dpi and intestinal tissues at 7 dpi, which correlates with 
the pattern of viral shedding over time. 
CYTOKINE mRNA EXPRESSION IN THE TRACHEA AND ILEUM 
For analysis of the inflammatory cytokine response, we measured the levels of IL-6, IL-1β, IFN-
α, IFN-β and TLR7 mRNA in tissues collected from the trachea and ileum by quantitative PCR 
(Figure 4). The measured expression levels were normalized using a selected panel of reference 
genes. We determined the mean fold change in mRNA expression in chickens infected with 
LPAI viruses of wild bird-associated (H3N8 and H4N6) and poultry-associated (H8N4 and 
H9N2) subtypes, carrying either NS allele A or B, relative to uninfected chickens in the control 
group. Different time points were selected for the trachea (1 and 3 dpi) and ileum (5 and 7 
dpi) based on the detection of virus in swabs and organs. Levels of IL-6 mRNA were almost 
undetectable in all tissues examined, and therefore excluded for analysis.  
TABLE 1. VIRAL REPLICATION IN THE TRACHEA, LUNG AND ILEUM. 
The ratio of chickens virus-positive in tissue to the number of virus-inoculated chickens. The tissues were 
collected from four euthanized birds of each experimental group at 1, 3, 5 and 7 days post inoculation 
(dpi). Virus was detected by influenza virus-specific PCR (M-PCR). Viral titres are expressed as the mean 
Ct value ± standard deviation (SD). 
Trachea Lung Ileum 
Virus 1 dpi 3 dpi 1 dpi 5 dpi 1 dpi 5 dpi 7 dpi 






0/4 0/4 0/4 1/4 
(26.3) 
H3N8 NS allele B 1/4 (29.5) 0/4 4/4 
(34.6±2.8) 








0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 




0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 




0/4 0/4 0/4 4/4 
(34.2±4.9) 




0/4 0/4 0/4 
H9N2 NS allele A 2/4 
(30.9±0.9) 
0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 




0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 
dpi, days post inoculation; NS, nonstructural protein; n.d., not done. 
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In the trachea, no significant change in cytokine expression was observed at 1 dpi. At 
3 dpi, levels of IFN-β mRNA were slightly induced in chickens inoculated with the NS allele A 
variants of wild bird-associated subtypes (3.2±1.1 mean fold induction) and poultry-associated 
subtypes (2.6±1.1 mean fold induction). In the ileum, slightly reduced levels of IFN-α mRNA 
were measured at 5 dpi in chickens inoculated with wild bird-associated subtypes of NS allele 
A and B (mean fold reduction of 2.3±0.2 and 2.1±0.1, respectively). At 7 dpi, we observed 
increased within-group variability in cytokine mRNA levels in the ileum of chickens inoculated 
with wild bird-associated subtypes of NS allele B. This suggests that these strains led to 
changes in cytokine expression in a subset of the infected chickens. However, overall, the 
results indicate that LPAI viruses elicit limited innate immune responses in chickens. 
GENETIC CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF THE INOCULATED VIRUSES 
The susceptibility of chickens to the LPAI viruses of specific subtypes or NS alleles was not 
consistent with their frequency of isolation in the field. We therefore performed genetic cluster 
analysis for the internal genes (PB1, PB2, PA, NP, MP, and NS) to determine if genes similar to 
those of the inoculated viruses have previously been isolated from poultry. This may reveal 
genetic links between the inoculated viruses and poultry hosts that can help to explain the 
unexpected results of the infection experiment. For this analysis, the full-length nucleotide 
sequences of the internal genes were compared with those deposited in online databases. 
Genes similar to those of the inoculated viruses were identified by genetic cluster analysis 
using a sequence identity threshold value of 1.5%. For each genetic cluster, the cluster size 
and the number of viruses isolated from poultry were determined (Table 2). 
The genetic cluster analysis confirmed the association of NS allele A with poultry, as 
viruses carrying NS allele A clustered more often with poultry viruses compared to viruses 
carrying NS allele B. Interestingly, one or more gene segments encoding for the viral 
polymerase subunits (PB1, PB2, and PA) clustered with poultry viruses for both H3N8 viruses, 
both H4N6 viruses and H8N4 NS A virus, which could also replicate in chickens. In contrast, 
H8N4 NS B virus and both H9N2 viruses, which did not replicate in chickens, contained 
polymerase gene segments that were restricted to wild bird isolates. These findings suggest 
that the polymerase complex may play a role in infection of chickens, and may be involved in 
the transmissibility of LPAI viruses between avian hosts. 
Discussion 
In a previous study on LPAI viruses circulating in wild birds and poultry in the Netherlands, we 
found close host-dependent associations among HA and NA subtypes, suggesting selective 
virus transmission to poultry 8. Viruses of subtypes H3N8 and H4N6 were found to be 
associated with wild birds, whereas H8N4 and H9N2 were found to be associated with poultry. 
In the present study, we examined these host-subtype associations in vivo. Chickens were 
inoculated with eight strains of wild duck-origin LPAI viruses of wild bird- and poultry-
associated subtypes. No clinical signs were observed during the experiment, which is 
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consistent with the low pathogenicity of the viruses. The absence of antibody responses in 
most virus-inoculated chickens may be due to the short duration of the experiment. Viral 
shedding was observed in 82 of 160 virus-inoculated chickens, predominantly via the OP route 
early after inoculation, which is consistent with previous studies 32-34. Evidence of viral 
replication was found in all virus-inoculated groups, but strain-dependent variations in 
susceptibility and shedding patterns were observed between groups. 
Contrary to our expectations based on field observations, LPAI viruses of wild bird-
associated subtypes H3N8 and H4N6 replicated in chickens. Most chickens inoculated with 
the H3N8 viruses shed virus through both the OP and CL route. In contrast, the H4N6 viruses 
were exclusively shed through the OP route, implying that the H4N6 viruses used in this study 
replicate more efficiently in the respiratory tract than in the intestinal tract. Previous studies 
have shown that Asian H3N8 and H4N6 strains of wild bird-origin are able to infect chickens, 
although replication efficiency strongly differed between strains 35-37. In Europe, recent 
outbreaks of H3N1 viruses in Belgium have also demonstrated the ability of H3 viruses to 
infect chickens 38. Phylogenetically, the HA gene of the H3N1 viruses clusters with other 
Eurasian strains of different subtype combinations and internal gene compositions, but no 
more than 98.3% nucleotide sequence identity was found by BLAST (results not shown). The 
results in this study demonstrate that chickens are experimentally susceptible for H3N8 and 
H4N6 viruses that have been circulating in Europe, suggesting that these viruses can also be 
transmitted from anseriform to galliform hosts. Nevertheless, these subtypes were rarely 
detected in chickens during a ten-year surveillance period in the Netherlands 8. Of the LPAI 
virus subtypes H8N4 and H9N2 that were frequently found in poultry, only one H8N4 strain 
replicated efficiently in chickens. The H8N4 virus carrying NS allele A was shed in high 
concentrations through the cloaca, replicated in the respiratory and intestinal tract, and 
TABLE 2. GENETIC CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF THE INOCULATED VIRUSES. 
Clusters of internal genes similar to those of the inoculated viruses, presented as the number of 
sequences that originate from poultry out of the total number of sequences within each cluster 
(cluster size). Genetic clusters were generated by clustering publicly available sequences of around 
20,000 avian-origin AI viruses obtained from GISAID’s EpiFlu database (http://www.gisaid.org) 26 on 
27 May 2019 against the sequences of the inoculated viruses, using a sequence identity threshold 
value of 1.5%. We gratefully acknowledge the authors, originating and submitting laboratories of the 
sequences from GISAID’s EpiFlu Database on which this research is based. 
Virus PB1 PB2 PA NP MP NS 
H3N8 NS allele A 3/15 0/91 0/23 2/37 0/49 0/67 
H3N8 NS allele B 0/4 2/6 0/7 0/32 7/101 0/103 
H4N6 NS allele A 4/17 0/59 1/5 1/27 6/304 13/557 
H4N6 NS allele B 6/17 0/97 0/3 0/95 34/568 0/108 
H8N4 NS allele A 0/160 2/33 0/21 0/92 38/698 33/886 
H8N4 NS allele B 0/61 0/20 0/20 4/56 93/1034 0/79 
H9N2 NS allele A 0/59 0/64 0/58 0/108 14/510 2/86 
H9N2 NS allele B 0/15 0/16 0/56 0/1 0/149 8/35 
PB2, polymerase basic protein 2; PB1, polymerase basic protein 1; PA, polymerase acidic protein; HA, 
hemagglutinin; NP, nucleoprotein; NA, neuraminidase; MP, matrix protein; NS, nonstructural protein. 
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induced a more rapid seroconversion in chickens compared to the other inoculated viruses. 
Despite the frequent detection of H8N4 and H9N2 subtypes in poultry during the ten-year 
surveillance period, no to limited virus was detected in the swabs or tissues of chickens 
inoculated with the other H8N4 and H9N2 strains, indicating low susceptibility for these 
strains.  
Several factors may have contributed to these unexpected results. One explanation 
could be that H3N8 and H4N6 viruses have been introduced into poultry, but have not been 
detected during surveillance. This is considered unlikely, as poultry flocks are screened at least 
once a year for the presence of antibodies against AI viruses, which are generally detectable 
up to several weeks or months after infection 39. However, the antibody responses may differ 
in duration and intensity between virus subtypes and strains. H3N8 and H4N6 viruses may 
cause shorter antibody responses in chickens compared to other subtypes, resulting in a less 
frequent detection in poultry. Analysis of humoral responses to diverse LPAI viruses in chickens 
could provide more insight in variations in the duration and intensity of antibody responses 
between subtypes. Furthermore, the fact that the LPAI viruses used in this study originate from 
wild ducks, and may have been adapted to anseriform hosts, could have contributed to the 
inefficient replication of most H8N4 and H9N2 strains in chickens.  The H9N2 viruses used in 
this study are not related to the poultry-adapted H9N2 viruses that have circulated 
enzootically in poultry in Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, with sporadic spillovers to 
humans (results not shown). Finally, discrepancies between experimental studies and field 
observations may be due to environmental conditions, such as the number and density of 
chickens, virus inoculation dose and route, and concurrent infections, which can influence virus 
infection dynamics. 
Alternatively, poultry have not been exposed to the LPAI viruses that were detected 
in wild birds. The fact that H3N8 and H4N6 viruses have frequently been isolated from cloacal 
swabs of wild birds indicates the possibility of viral exposure of poultry via faecal droppings. 
Therefore, these LPAI viruses may circulate in wild bird species that have not been in contact 
with poultry. Wild bird surveillance is strongly biased towards mallards 8, while these may not 
be risk species for AI virus introduction into poultry. This is supported by previous genetic 
analysis that showed no direct relationship between wild bird and poultry viruses 8. The biased 
surveillance in wild birds may also explain why H8N4 and H9N2 viruses were less often 
detected in wild birds. Possibly these viruses predominantly circulate among other 
understudied wild bird species. An important limitation is that wild bird surveillance is solely 
based on virological monitoring. In contrast to antibody detection, virus can only be detected 
during a relatively short time frame. A previous surveillance study in Sweden reported the 
detection of H8 and H9 viruses during late spring and early summer, outside the prevalence 
peak of AI viruses in wild birds 40. In this period, the sampling frequency of wild birds in the 
Netherlands is low, which may explain the limited detection of H8N4 and H9N2 viruses.  
In this study, we also examined host-associations in genes encoding for internal 
proteins. This analysis revealed that NS allele A – although predominant in both wild birds and 
poultry – was relatively more frequently detected in poultry compared to wild birds. A similar 
distribution was observed among online available sequences, in which viruses collected from 
galliform species carried more often NS allele A compared to viruses collected from anseriform 
species 41. The skewed distribution suggests that NS A viruses may have an increased ability 
to infect poultry. Previous studies have shown that the NS1 protein can influence viral 
replication across hosts  and determines viral fitness and pathogenicity in chickens by evading 
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the immune response through inhibition of IFN type I production 42-44. The distinct NS alleles 
have also been associated with host-specific transmission of AI viruses based on in vitro 
studies using avian and mammalian cells. In mammalian cells, NS A viruses were able to 
suppress IFN type I production more efficiently compared to NS B viruses 45,46. In avian cells, 
NS A viruses replicated more efficiently in chicken and turkey cells, whereas NS B viruses 
replicated more efficiently in duck cells 47, suggesting that the NS alleles can also influence 
virus transmission at the wild bird-poultry interface. 
Our study shows that LPAI viruses of both NS alleles were able to induce viral 
shedding and replicate in respiratory and intestinal organs of chickens. This demonstrates that 
the host range of NS alleles between the avian species is not strict, which is consistent with 
previous studies showing infection and persistence of both NS alleles A and B viruses in poultry 
41,48. In addition, NS allele A and B showed comparable shedding patterns and routes for most 
subtypes, except H8N4, of which the NS A variant was shed more efficiently than the NS B 
variant. In tissue samples, the detection of virus was variable between strains, which appeared 
to be independent of NS allele. The results thus indicate variable replication efficiencies of NS 
A and B viruses in chickens. 
To study the innate immune response to the different LPAI viruses, we measured 
changes in the production of inflammatory cytokines in the respiratory and intestinal tract of 
the virus-inoculated chickens. We measured the levels of mRNA encoding for interleukins IL-
6 and IL-1β and interferons IFN-α and IFN-β, which can inhibit viral replication by interaction 
with viral components and modulation of the host cell metabolism 43, and TLR-7, which is an 
endosomal pattern recognition receptors that can detect viral RNA at the site of infection to 
induce an inflammatory response 49. In the trachea, no stimulation of the innate immune 
response was observed at 1 dpi, despite virus was detected in all virus-inoculated groups. At 
3 dpi, IFN-β mRNAs were induced to higher levels in response to NS A viruses of both wild 
bird-associated and poultry-associated subtypes. The upregulation of both IFN-β mRNAs 
expression has previously been observed in LPAI virus-infected chickens 21. However, the 
results do not correspond with the expected inhibition of IFN type I production by NS A 
viruses. In the ileum, no induction of cytokine mRNA expression was observed at 5 dpi. The 
expression of IFN-α mRNA was even slightly reduced in some groups. At 7 dpi, the expression 
of IL-1β, IFN-α, IFN-β and TLR7 mRNAs was induced by LPAI viruses of wild bird-associated 
subtypes carrying NS allele B in the ileum of some, but not all, chickens, indicating that 
immune responses vary between strains. The induction of inflammatory cytokines in the 
respiratory and intestinal tract has been reported in previous studies using LPAI viruses of 
subtypes H7N1 21 and H9N2 50, but is limited compared to HPAI viruses 43. Our study also 
indicates that LPAI viruses elicit limited innate immune responses in chickens. The cytokine 
response remained limited to undetectable when only virus-positive samples were included 
(results not shown). It should be mentioned that the analysis of the cytokine response was 
limited to few time points and tissues. In addition, the involvement of other (non-studied) 
cytokines in limiting LPAI virus infection cannot be excluded. 
The susceptibility of chickens to the viruses used in this infection experiment did not 
correlate with the detection frequencies of the HA and NA subtypes or NS alleles in the field. 
None of the poultry-associated aa residues, as specified in Table S2, were present in the 
inoculated viruses, except the K391R substitution in the PA protein of H3N8 NS B virus and 
both H4N6 and H9N2 viruses. In an attempt to explain the unexpected results, we also 
analysed potential links between the internal genes of the inoculated viruses and previous 
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isolations of similar genes from poultry hosts. Although the number of poultry viruses in the 
genetic clusters was often limited, this analysis suggested a potential role for the PB1, PB2, 
and PA genes in determining infectivity of these virus strains in chickens. Host-restriction 
factors in the polymerase genes have been described previously in several studies on avian-
human transmission of AI viruses 51,52. Also, previous proteotype analysis has shown specific 
combinations of the viral proteins among AI viruses of human and avian origin 53, Our study 
also indicates that a set of proteins may be the major host range determinant. However, the 
role of the polymerase proteins in transmission between avian hosts is poorly understood. 
Additional studies should be conducted in order to investigate the contribution of the 
polymerase activities in determining host range of AI viruses among avian species. 
Concluding, this study provides valuable information on the susceptibility of chickens 
to LPAI viruses of various subtypes and genotypes. It demonstrates that wild bird-associated 
LPAI viruses of subtypes H3N8 and H4N6 can readily replicate in experimentally infected 
chickens, despite their infrequent detection in Dutch poultry flocks. The variable susceptibility 
of chickens to poultry-associated subtypes and NS alleles could not be explained by 
differences in the innate immune response, which was limited in all chickens. The results in 
this study increase our understanding of LPAI virus infection dynamics in chickens and can be 
used to optimize surveillance strategies for LPAI viruses in wild birds and poultry. 
Avian influenza at the wild bird-poultry interface
94
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors thank Jan Cornelissen, Sandra Venema, Sylvia Pritz-Verschuren, Romy Smit, 
Marjolein Poen, Alex Bossers and Ben Peeters for their contribution. We thank the animal 
caretakers of WBVR for their support during the animal experiment. We gratefully 
acknowledge the authors, originating and submitting laboratories of the sequences from 
GISAID’s EpiFlu database. All submitters of data may be contacted directly via the GISAID 
website (http://www.gisaid.org) 26. 
FUNDING 
This work was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (project: 
WOT-01-003-066 and KB-21-006-011). 
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS 
Conceptualization: S.B., R.B., R.F. and N.B.; Methodology: S.B., E.G., R.B., R.F. and N.B.; 
Validation: S.B., E.G., M.R., M.E. and R.H.; Formal Analysis: S.B., E.G., M.A., M.R., M.E. and R.H.; 
Investigation: S.B. and M.A.; Resources: R.F. and N.B.; Data Curation: S.B.; Visualization: S.B.; 
Supervision: N.B.; Project Administration: N.B.; Funding Acquisition: R.F. and N.B.; Writing – 
Original Draft Preparation: S.B.; Writing – Review & Editing: E.G., M.A., M.R., M.E., R.H., R.B., R.F. 
and N.B. 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
CITATION 
Bergervoet SA, Germeraad EA, Alders M, Roose MM, Engelsma MY, Heutink R, Bouwstra R, 
Fouchier RAM, Beerens N. Susceptibility of chickens to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) 
viruses of wild bird- and poultry-associated subtypes. Viruses 2019. DOI: 10.3390/v11111010. 




1 Stallknecht, D. E. & Shane, S. M. Host range of avian influenza virus in free-living birds. 
Veterinary research communications 12, 125-141 (1988). 
2 Webster, R. G., Bean, W. J., Gorman, O. T., Chambers, T. M. & Kawaoka, Y. Evolution and 
ecology of influenza A viruses. Microbiological reviews 56, 152-179 (1992). 
3 Gonzales, J. L. & Elbers, A. R. W. Effective thresholds for reporting suspicions and improve 
early detection of avian influenza outbreaks in layer chickens. Scientific reports 8, 8533, 
doi:10.1038/s41598-018-26954-9 (2018). 
4 Webster, R. G. & Rott, R. Influenza virus A pathogenicity: the pivotal role of hemagglutinin. 
Cell 50, 665-666 (1987). 
5 Capua, I. & Munoz, O. Emergence of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential: open issues 
which need to be addressed. A review. Veterinary microbiology 165, 7-12, 
doi:10.1016/j.vetmic.2013.01.044 (2013). 
6 Olsen, B. et al. Global patterns of influenza a virus in wild birds. Science (New York, N.Y.) 312, 
384-388, doi:10.1126/science.1122438 (2006).
7 Fouchier, R. A. et al. Characterization of a novel influenza A virus hemagglutinin subtype (H16) 
obtained from black-headed gulls. Journal of virology 79, 2814-2822, 
doi:10.1128/jvi.79.5.2814-2822.2005 (2005). 
8 Bergervoet, S. A. et al. Circulation of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses in wild birds 
and poultry in the Netherlands, 2006-2016. Scientific reports 9, 13681, doi:10.1038/s41598-
019-50170-8 (2019).
9 Treanor, J. J., Snyder, M. H., London, W. T. & Murphy, B. R. The B allele of the NS gene of avian 
influenza viruses, but not the A allele, attenuates a human influenza A virus for squirrel 
monkeys. Virology 171, 1-9 (1989). 
10 Dou, D., Revol, R., Ostbye, H., Wang, H. & Daniels, R. Influenza A Virus Cell Entry, Replication, 
Virion Assembly and Movement. Frontiers in immunology 9, 1581, 
doi:10.3389/fimmu.2018.01581 (2018). 
11 Ayllon, J. & Garcia-Sastre, A. The NS1 protein: a multitasking virulence factor. Current topics in
microbiology and immunology 386, 73-107, doi:10.1007/82_2014_400 (2015). 
12 Cauldwell, A. V., Long, J. S., Moncorge, O. & Barclay, W. S. Viral determinants of influenza A 
virus host range. The Journal of general virology 95, 1193-1210, doi:10.1099/vir.0.062836-0 
(2014). 
13 EU. Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. Official Journal of the European
Union (2010). 
Avian influenza at the wild bird-poultry interface
96
14 Pickett, B. E. et al. Metadata-driven comparative analysis tool for sequences (meta-CATS): an 
automated process for identifying significant sequence variations that correlate with virus 
attributes. Virology 447, 45-51, doi:10.1016/j.virol.2013.08.021 (2013). 
15 Edgar, R. C. MUSCLE: multiple sequence alignment with high accuracy and high throughput. 
Nucleic acids research 32, 1792-1797, doi:10.1093/nar/gkh340 (2004). 
16 Spackman, E. & Killian, M. L. Avian influenza virus isolation, propagation, and titration in 
embryonated chicken eggs. Methods in molecular biology (Clifton, N.J.) 1161, 125-140, 
doi:10.1007/978-1-4939-0758-8_12 (2014). 
17 Bergervoet, S. A., Ho, C. K. Y., Heutink, R., Bossers, A. & Beerens, N. Spread of Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N5 Viruses in Europe in 2016-2017 Appears Related to 
the Timing of Reassortment Events. Viruses 11, doi:10.3390/v11060501 (2019). 
18 CBS. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.  (2016). 
19 Killian, M. L. Avian influenza virus sample types, collection, and handling. Methods in molecular
biology (Clifton, N.J.) 436, 7-12, doi:10.1007/978-1-59745-279-3_2 (2008). 
20 Bouwstra, R. et al. Phylogenetic analysis of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) virus 
outbreak strains provides evidence for four separate introductions and one between-poultry 
farm transmission in the Netherlands, November 2014. Euro surveillance : bulletin Europeen sur
les maladies transmissibles = European communicable disease bulletin 20 (2015). 
21 Cornelissen, J. B., Post, J., Peeters, B., Vervelde, L. & Rebel, J. M. Differential innate responses of 
chickens and ducks to low-pathogenic avian influenza. Avian pathology : journal of the W.V.P.A 
41, 519-529, doi:10.1080/03079457.2012.732691 (2012). 
22 Kap, M., Oomen, M., Arshad, S., de Jong, B. & Riegman, P. Fit for purpose frozen tissue 
collections by RNA integrity number-based quality control assurance at the Erasmus MC tissue 
bank. Biopreservation and biobanking 12, 81-90, doi:10.1089/bio.2013.0051 (2014). 
23 Staines, K. et al. A Versatile Panel of Reference Gene Assays for the Measurement of Chicken 
mRNA by Quantitative PCR. PloS one 11, e0160173, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160173 (2016). 
24 Andersen, C. L., Jensen, J. L. & Orntoft, T. F. Normalization of real-time quantitative reverse 
transcription-PCR data: a model-based variance estimation approach to identify genes suited 
for normalization, applied to bladder and colon cancer data sets. Cancer research 64, 5245-
5250, doi:10.1158/0008-5472.can-04-0496 (2004). 
25 Livak, K. J. & Schmittgen, T. D. Analysis of relative gene expression data using real-time 
quantitative PCR and the 2(-Delta Delta C(T)) Method. Methods (San Diego, Calif.) 25, 402-408, 
doi:10.1006/meth.2001.1262 (2001). 
26 Shu, Y. & McCauley, J. GISAID: Global initiative on sharing all influenza data - from vision to 
reality. Euro surveillance : bulletin Europeen sur les maladies transmissibles = European
communicable disease bulletin 22, doi:10.2807/1560-7917.es.2017.22.13.30494 (2017). 
27 Katoh, K., Misawa, K., Kuma, K. & Miyata, T. MAFFT: a novel method for rapid multiple 
sequence alignment based on fast Fourier transform. Nucleic acids research 30, 3059-3066, 
doi:10.1093/nar/gkf436 (2002). 
Susceptibility of chickens to LPAI viruses
97
3
28 Katoh, K. & Standley, D. M. MAFFT multiple sequence alignment software version 7: 
improvements in performance and usability. Molecular biology and evolution 30, 772-780, 
doi:10.1093/molbev/mst010 (2013). 
29 Larsson, A. AliView: a fast and lightweight alignment viewer and editor for large datasets. 
Bioinformatics (Oxford, England) 30, 3276-3278, doi:10.1093/bioinformatics/btu531 (2014). 
30 Fu, L., Niu, B., Zhu, Z., Wu, S. & Li, W. CD-HIT: accelerated for clustering the next-generation 
sequencing data. Bioinformatics (Oxford, England) 28, 3150-3152, 
doi:10.1093/bioinformatics/bts565 (2012). 
31 Li, W. & Godzik, A. Cd-hit: a fast program for clustering and comparing large sets of protein or 
nucleotide sequences. Bioinformatics (Oxford, England) 22, 1658-1659, 
doi:10.1093/bioinformatics/btl158 (2006). 
32 Morales, A. C., Jr. et al. Biologic characterization of H4, H6, and H9 type low pathogenicity 
avian influenza viruses from wild birds in chickens and turkeys. Avian diseases 53, 552-562, 
doi:10.1637/8877-041509-Reg.1 (2009). 
33 Pantin-Jackwood, M. J., Smith, D. M., Wasilenko, J. L. & Spackman, E. Low pathogenicity avian 
influenza viruses infect chicken layers by different routes of inoculation. Avian diseases 56, 
276-281, doi:10.1637/9950-092711-Reg.1 (2012).
34 Spickler, A. R., Trampel, D. W. & Roth, J. A. The onset of virus shedding and clinical signs in 
chickens infected with high-pathogenicity and low-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses. 
Avian pathology : journal of the W.V.P.A 37, 555-577, doi:10.1080/03079450802499118 (2008). 
35 Choi, J. G. et al. Genetic relationship of H3 subtype avian influenza viruses isolated from 
domestic ducks and wild birds in Korea and their pathogenic potential in chickens and ducks. 
Veterinary microbiology 155, 147-157, doi:10.1016/j.vetmic.2011.08.028 (2012). 
36 Cui, H. et al. Phylogenetic analysis and pathogenicity of H3 subtype avian influenza viruses 
isolated from live poultry markets in China. Scientific reports 6, 27360, doi:10.1038/srep27360 
(2016). 
37 Shi, Y. et al. Characterizations of H4 avian influenza viruses isolated from ducks in live poultry 
markets and farm in Shanghai. Scientific reports 6, 37843, doi:10.1038/srep37843 (2016). 
38 FASFC. Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain.  (2019). 
39 Trampel, D. W., Zhou, E. M., Yoon, K. J. & Koehler, K. J. Detection of antibodies in serum and 
egg yolk following infection of chickens with an H6N2 avian influenza virus. Journal of
veterinary diagnostic investigation : official publication of the American Association of 
Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, Inc 18, 437-442, doi:10.1177/104063870601800502 
(2006). 
40 Wille, M. et al. Where do all the subtypes go? Temporal dynamics of H8-H12 influenza A 
viruses in waterfowl. Virus evolution 4, vey025, doi:10.1093/ve/vey025 (2018). 
41 Turnbull, M. L. et al. Role of the B Allele of Influenza A Virus Segment 8 in Setting Mammalian 
Host Range and Pathogenicity. Journal of virology 90, 9263-9284, doi:10.1128/jvi.01205-16 
(2016). 
Avian influenza at the wild bird-poultry interface
98
42 Rajsbaum, R. et al. Species-specific inhibition of RIG-I ubiquitination and IFN induction by the 
influenza A virus NS1 protein. PLoS pathogens 8, e1003059, doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1003059 
(2012). 
43 Evseev, D. & Magor, K. E. Innate Immune Responses to Avian Influenza Viruses in Ducks and 
Chickens. Veterinary sciences 6, doi:10.3390/vetsci6010005 (2019). 
44 Cauthen, A. N., Swayne, D. E., Sekellick, M. J., Marcus, P. I. & Suarez, D. L. Amelioration of 
influenza virus pathogenesis in chickens attributed to the enhanced interferon-inducing 
capacity of a virus with a truncated NS1 gene. Journal of virology 81, 1838-1847, 
doi:10.1128/jvi.01667-06 (2007). 
45 Munir, M. et al. Alleles A and B of non-structural protein 1 of avian influenza A viruses 
differentially inhibit beta interferon production in human and mink lung cells. The Journal of
general virology 92, 2111-2121, doi:10.1099/vir.0.031716-0 (2011). 
46 Zohari, S., Munir, M., Metreveli, G., Belak, S. & Berg, M. Differences in the ability to suppress 
interferon beta production between allele A and allele B NS1 proteins from H10 influenza A 
viruses. Virology journal 7, 376, doi:10.1186/1743-422x-7-376 (2010). 
47 Adams, S. et al. The effect of avian influenza virus NS1 allele on virus replication and innate 
gene expression in avian cells. Molecular immunology 56, 358-368, 
doi:10.1016/j.molimm.2013.05.236 (2013). 
48 Suarez, D. L., Garcia, M., Latimer, J., Senne, D. & Perdue, M. Phylogenetic analysis of H7 avian 
influenza viruses isolated from the live bird markets of the Northeast United States. Journal of
virology 73, 3567-3573 (1999). 
49 Lund, J. M. et al. Recognition of single-stranded RNA viruses by Toll-like receptor 7. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 101, 5598-
5603, doi:10.1073/pnas.0400937101 (2004). 
50 Nang, N. T. et al. Induction of inflammatory cytokines and Toll-like receptors in chickens 
infected with avian H9N2 influenza virus. Veterinary research 42, 64, doi:10.1186/1297-9716-
42-64 (2011).
51 Lloren, K. K. S., Lee, T., Kwon, J. J. & Song, M. S. Molecular Markers for Interspecies 
Transmission of Avian Influenza Viruses in Mammalian Hosts. International journal of
molecular sciences 18, doi:10.3390/ijms18122706 (2017). 
52 Manz, B., Schwemmle, M. & Brunotte, L. Adaptation of avian influenza A virus polymerase in 
mammals to overcome the host species barrier. Journal of virology 87, 7200-7209, 
doi:10.1128/jvi.00980-13 (2013). 
53 Obenauer, J. C. et al. Large-scale sequence analysis of avian influenza isolates. Science (New
York, N.Y.) 311, 1576-1580, doi:10.1126/science.1121586 (2006). 





S1 Table. Viruses used in the infection experiment. 
S2 Table. Meta-CATS analysis for virus selection. 
S3 Table. Influenza virus-specific antibody detection. 
S4 Table. Oropharyngeal shedding. 
S5 Table. Cloacal shedding. 
Avian influenza at the wild bird-poultry interface
100
S1 TABLE. VIRUSES USED IN THE INFECTION EXPERIMENT. 
Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses used in this study, including the isolate identification 
numbers as listed in GISAID’s EpiFlu database (http://www.gisaid.org). The viruses were collected from 
wild ducks as part of the national avian influenza (AI) virus surveillance program in wild birds in the 
Netherlands. 
Virus subtype NS allele Isolate name GISAID isolate ID 
H3N8 A A/Mallard/Netherlands/17/2011 EPI_ISL_243527 
H3N8 B A/Mallard/Netherlands/30/2010 EPI_ISL_243634 
H4N6 A A/Mallard/Netherlands/7/2011 EPI_ISL_243399 
H4N6 B A/Mallard/Netherlands/26/2010 EPI_ISL_243498 
H8N4 A A/Mallard/Netherlands/1/2006 EPI_ISL_33854 
H8N4 B A/Mallard/Netherlands/11/2006 EPI_ISL_267765 
H9N2 A A/Mallard/Netherlands/19/2005 EPI_ISL_267193 
H9N2 B A/Eurasian wigeon/Netherlands/3/2005 EPI_ISL_64643 
S2 TABLE. META-CATS ANALYSIS FOR VIRUS SELECTION. 
A statistical comparative analysis was performed on 162 wild bird viruses and 42 poultry viruses using 
the metadata-driven comparative analysis tool for sequences (meta-CATS) of the Influenza Research 
Database (IRD) (https://www.fludb.org). In the statistical tool, a chi-square test of independence was 
performed at each aa position to identify residues that significantly differed between the groups 
(p<0.05). The sequences of the low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses used in this study were 
generated in a previous study (for details see Material and Methods section). 




No. of significant 
aa positions 
present in >90% 
viruses in both 
groups 
No. of significant 
aa positions with 
variable 
substitutions (≥ 3 
aa variants) 




found in poultry 
viruses) 
PB2 11 10 1 (V255I) 
PB1 10 7 2 1 (K577R) 
PA 14 12 1 1 (K391R) 
NP 11 9 1 1 (K77R) 
M1 1 1 
M2 1 0 1 (K18R) 
NS1 67 4 63 (NS allele A) 
NS2 20 1 19 (NS allele A) 
Total 135 44 4 5 
PB2, polymerase basic protein 2; PB1, polymerase basic protein 1; PA, polymerase acidic protein; HA, 
hemagglutinin; NP, nucleoprotein; NA, neuraminidase; M1, matrix protein 1; M2, matrix protein 2; NS1, 
nonstructural protein 1; NS2, nonstructural protein 2. 
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S3 TABLE. INFLUENZA VIRUS-SPECIFIC ANTIBODY DETECTION. 
The ratio of antibody-positive chickens to the number of virus-inoculated chickens as determined by 
influenza-specific ELISA and subtype-specific hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) tests. Serum samples taken 
at 5 and 7 days post inoculation (dpi) are shown. The HI titres are expressed as the mean log2 values 
± standard deviation (SD). 
ELISA positives HI test positives (titre) a 
Virus group 5 dpi 7 dpi 5 dpi 7 dpi 
H3N8 NS allele A 0/4 2/4 0/4 1/4 (3) 
H3N8 NS allele B 0/4 2/4 0/4 1/4 (3) 
H4N6 NS allele A 0/4 1/4 0/4 0/4 
H4N6 NS allele B 0/4 4/4 0/4 0/4 
H8N4 NS allele A 4/4 3/4 3/4 (4.3±0.6) 2/4 (5.0±0.0) 
H8N4 NS allele B 0/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 
H9N2 NS allele A 1/4 3/4 0/4 0/4 
H9N2 NS allele B 0/4 1/4 0/4 0/4 
dpi, days post inoculation; HI, hemagglutination inhibition; NS, nonstructural protein 
a HI titres of 3 log2 or higher were considered positive. 
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Poultry can become infected with low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses via (in)direct 
contact with infected wild birds, or by transmission of the virus between farms. This study 
combines routinely collected surveillance data with genetic analysis to assess the contribution 
of between-farm transmission to the overall incidence of LPAI virus infections in poultry. Over 
a ten-year surveillance period, we identified 35 potential cases of between-farm transmission 
in the Netherlands, of which ten formed geographical clusters. A total of 21 LPAI viruses was 
isolated from nine potential between-farm transmission cases, which were further studied by 
genetic and epidemiological analysis. Whole genome sequence analysis identified close 
genetic links between infected farms in seven cases. The presence of identical deletions in the 
neuraminidase stalk region and minority variants provided additional indications of between-
farm transmission. Spatiotemporal analysis demonstrated that genetically closely related 
viruses were detected within a median time interval of eight days, and the median distance 
between the infected farms was significantly shorter compared to farms infected with 
genetically distinct viruses (6.3 vs. 69.0 km; p<0.05). The results further suggest that between-
farm transmission was not restricted to holdings of the same poultry type and not related to 
the housing system. Although separate introductions from the wild bird reservoir cannot be 
excluded, our study indicates that between-farm transmission occurred in seven of nine 
virologically analysed cases. Based on these findings, it is likely that between-farm 
transmission contributes considerably to the incidence of LPAI virus infections in poultry.
Keywords: avian influenza virus; low pathogenic avian influenza; poultry; between-farm 
transmission; genetic analysis 
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Introduction 
Avian influenza (AI) is a highly contagious viral disease that affects birds. AI viruses are 
widespread in wild waterfowl, that form the natural reservoir of AI viruses 1, and can 
occasionally be transmitted to commercial poultry. The viruses carry two surface glycoproteins, 
hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA), which are used for virus classification 2. In birds, 
16 HA (H1-H16) and 9 NA (N1-N9) subtypes have been identified 3,4. 
Most AI viruses are low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus strains that cause 
subclinical infections in poultry 5. In some cases, mild respiratory disease, a reduction in egg 
production or low mortality is observed 6. AI viruses of subtypes H5 and H7 pose the greatest 
threat to commercial poultry because of their potential to evolve into highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) viruses. HPAI viruses typically cause severe illness and high mortality in poultry 
5, and some subtypes have been shown to also infect humans 7,8. Hence, surveillance 
programmes are implemented for the early detection of LPAI and HPAI viruses of subtypes H5 
and H7, which are also known as notifiable AI strains. In the Netherlands, poultry farms are 
screened serologically for AI virus infections at least once a year 9,10. In addition, virological 
testing is performed upon notification of AI suspicions based on clinical signs or the detection 
of antibodies against H5 or H7 subtyped viruses. Non-notifiable LPAI virus infections are often 
considered to be of lower risk. However, their circulation in poultry may promote the 
emergence of influenza virus strains that have the ability to be transmitted efficiently among 
poultry and even humans 11. Reassortment of these viruses with more pathogenic strains may 
have serious consequences for both animal and public health. 
Although wild birds are considered the primary source of AI virus infections in 
poultry, flocks may also become infected by subsequent spread between farms. Recent HPAI 
outbreaks have demonstrated that AI viruses can spread rapidly between farms 12-14, leading 
to huge economic losses in the poultry industry. Sustained between-farm transmission of LPAI 
viruses has also been observed in commercial poultry, e.g. during LPAI outbreaks of subtypes 
H7N2 (1996-1998 and 2001-2002) in the United States 15-18, H7N1 (1999 and 2000-2001), 
H7N3 (2002-2003 and 2004) and H5N2 (2010-2012) in poultry-dense areas in Italy 19-21, and 
recurrent outbreaks of H9N2 infections in Asia and the Middle East (late 1990s-present) 20,22. 
Various routes of between-farm transmission have been suggested, such as direct 
contact between poultry or indirect via the movement of persons (e.g. visitors, farm personnel), 
contaminated materials (e.g. farm equipment, clothing), or vectors (e.g. rodents, insects) 
between farms 23-27. Moreover, transmission over short distances may occur when the virus is 
dispersed into the environment via water, air or dust 28-31. Geographical clustering of infected 
farms implies the occurrence of transmission between neighbouring farms or separate 
introductions from the same environmental source 32,33. However, the exact route of 
introduction into poultry often remains untraced and mechanisms underlying between-farm 
spread of AI viruses are not clearly understood. 
Genetic analysis has frequently been used to study the emergence, evolution and 
between-farm transmission dynamics of HPAI viruses 34-37. Similar studies for LPAI are limited 
by the lack of genetic information, in particular for non-notifiable AI strains. LPAI virus 
infections may remain unnoticed or are not reported because the mild symptoms are thought 
to be caused by other poultry diseases 38. Therefore, LPAI viruses are primarily detected during 
routine serological screening without confirmation by virus detection. For this reason, the 
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contribution of between-farm transmission to the occurrence of LPAI virus infections in poultry 
is largely unknown. 
This study combines routinely collected surveillance data with genetic analysis to 
assess the contribution of between-farm transmission to the overall incidence of LPAI virus 
infections in poultry. We analysed 220 serological and virological detections of LPAI virus 
infections, that occurred in commercial poultry in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2016, to 
identify potential between-farm transmission cases. Spatial analysis was performed for each 
potential between-farm transmission case separately to determine if infected farms clustered 
geographically. Subsequently, whole genome sequence analysis was performed to determine 
the genetic relationship between viruses isolated from potential between-farm transmission 
cases. Genetic analysis was combined with information regarding time, distance and poultry 
type to identify epidemiological variables associated with between-farm transmission. Better 
understanding of LPAI virus transmission routes into poultry and between farms is important 
to control virus spread in an early stage.  
Material and methods 
ETHICAL STATEMENT 
Poultry blood and swab samples were collected as part of the national AI surveillance program 
in the Netherlands, which is carried out for detecting LPAI virus infections of H5 and H7 
subtypes in poultry. Samples were taken by authorized veterinarians and sent to the laboratory 
for routine diagnosis of AI virus infections. Sampling of poultry was carried out in accordance 
with Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on European Union measures for the 
control of AI 39 and regulation TRCJZ/2005/1411 of 7 June 2005 concerning the prevention, 
control and monitoring of infectious animal diseases, zoonoses and transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathies (TSEs). This study analyses the test results obtained in the surveillance 
program. No new samples were collected for this study specifically.  
STUDY POPULATION 
Samples were collected between January 2006 and September 2016. The study population 
involved 2,379 commercial poultry farms in the Netherlands, consisting of farms holding 
broiler chickens (46%), layer chickens (42%), chicken breeders (8%), turkeys (2%) and domestic 
ducks (2%), with 45,000 animals per farm on average, as registered in 2013 with moderate 
fluctuations over the study period. 
SEROLOGICAL MONITORING 
For serological monitoring, blood samples were collected from all commercial poultry farms 
in the Netherlands once a year, except outdoor layer chicken and turkey farms, which were 
sampled four times a year and each production cycle, respectively. Screening of serum for the 
presence of influenza-specific antibodies was performed by the Dutch Animal Health Service 
(GD) using the FlockChek AI MultiS-Screen Ab Test Kit (IDEXX). Samples identified as positive 
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for influenza-specific antibodies were subsequently tested by the national reference 
laboratory Wageningen Bioveterinary Research (WBVR) in a H5 and H7 subtype-specific 
hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test according to the OIE Manual of Standards for Diagnostic 
Tests and Vaccines 40. If no antibodies against virus subtypes H5 or H7 were detected, the 
subtype-specificity of the antibodies was determined using an in-house protein microarray or 
a bead-based multiplexed immunoassay of HA and NA antigens. Results were confirmed using 
influenza subtype-specific HI tests, neuraminidase inhibition (NI) tests and NA-specific 
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs) 40. 
VIROLOGICAL MONITORING 
Virological monitoring was performed to check for virus circulation upon detection of 
antibodies against H5 and H7 subtyped viruses or in case of clinical notification. Tracheal and 
cloacal swabs were collected by a specialist team of the Netherlands Food and Consumer 
Product Safety Authority (NVWA). These samples were analysed by WBVR using the real-time 
reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction method targeting the matrix gene (M-PCR) 41. 
Influenza virus-positive samples were subsequently tested in a H5 and H7 subtype-specific 
PCR 42,43. The sequence of the HA proteolytic cleavage site was analysed to determine the 
pathogenicity of the virus 44. Amplified HA and NA gene fragments were analysed by Sanger 
sequencing to determine the virus subtype 44,45. To isolate viruses, swab samples were 
inoculated into the allantoic cavity specific-pathogen-free (SPF) embryonated chicken eggs 
(ECEs) 40. Allantoic fluids positive for hemagglutination were characterized in a HI test using 
in-house prepared antisera. 
SEQUENCING 
Whole genome sequences of LPAI viruses were generated by next-generation sequencing 
(NGS), as described previously 46. In short, RNA was purified from swab specimen or allantoic 
fluid using the High Pure Viral RNA Kit (Roche), amplified using universal primers, and 
sequenced with a minimum sequence coverage of 1,000 reads using the paired-end 200 
Illumina MiSeq platform. Consensus sequences were generated in CLC Genomics Workbench 
(Qiagen) using a reference-based method 46 and submitted to GISAID’s EpiFlu database 
(https://www.gisaid.org) 47 (S1 Table). A recent study identified a limit of 0.5% for reliable 
detection of minority variants in the influenza virus genome, based on the error-rate of the 
NGS procedure 48. In this study, we used a minimum frequency of 2.0% and a minimum 
coverage of 1,000 reads, to ensure reliable detection of minority variants. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Potential between-farm transmission cases were defined as two or more poultry farms testing 
positive for LPAI virus infection of the same HA/NA subtype within a time interval between 
two consecutive detections of maximum six months. To identify statistically significant spatial 
clusters of infected farms, spatial cluster analysis was performed using the free software 
program SaTScan version 9.6 (http://www.satscan.org) 49 for each potential between-farm 
transmission case separately. Input data was represented by the background poultry farm 
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population (variable 0), infected farms (variable 1), and geographical locations of individual 
farms specified as Cartesian coordinates. The Bernoulli probability model was used to scan for 
areas with a higher rate of infected farms than would be expected by chance (p<0.05). 
Geographical maps were generated using the statistical software package R version 3.4.0 50. 
Comparison of time intervals between virus detections and distances between infected farms 
was performed by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, with significance defined 
as p<0.05. Genetic analysis was performed by aligning the nucleotide consensus sequences 
for each gene segment separately in CLC Genomics Workbench (Qiagen). These alignments 
were used to calculate the nucleotide sequence identities between viruses and identify 
minority variants at consensus-level variant sites. 
Results 
IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL BETWEEN-FARM TRANSMISSION CASES 
To identify potential between-farm transmission cases, we analysed 220 serological and 
virological detections of LPAI virus infections that occurred in commercial poultry in the 
Netherlands between 2006 and 2016, which included 162 seropositive and 58 viropositive 
farms. Of the virologically confirmed infections, the genome sequence of 42 LPAI viruses was 
obtained. Over the ten-year surveillance period, we identified 35 potential between-farm 
transmission cases involving 132 farms, including 111 seropositive and 21 viropositive farms 
(Fig 1; S2 Table). Potential between-farm transmission cases involved various subtypes, of 
which some were detected in multiple years, e.g. H7N7 (2006, 2011, 2013 and 2015), H8N4 
(2009, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2015), H6N2 (2013, 2014 and 2015), H6N8 (2011, 2012 and 2013), 
and H9N2 (2010 and 2015). A total of ten spatial clusters were identified (referred to as clusters 
A-J) (S3 Table). Cluster radii ranged from 0.1 to 5.9 km, with a median radius of 1.5 km. Seven
clusters included 2-3 infected farms (clusters A, C, D, E, H, I and J) and three clusters included
5-7 infected farms (clusters B, F and G). Most clusters were found in poultry-dense areas in the
southern (clusters B, C, G, and I) and central (clusters A, F and J) part of the Netherlands,
whereas some clusters (clusters D, E and H) were found in areas with a low poultry density.
Geographical clustering of infected farms indicates potential transmission of LPAI viruses
between neighbouring farms or separate introductions from the same environmental source.
GENETIC ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL BETWEEN-FARM TRANSMITTED VIRUSES 
NGS was performed to analyse potential transmissions between farms genetically. The LPAI 
virus sequences were obtained from 21 viropositive farms involved in nine potential between-
farm transmission cases (S1 Table). In five of these cases, two or more viropositive farms were 
located within the same spatial cluster (clusters B, C, D, E and G). The collection locations of 
the 21 LPAI viruses were plotted in a geographical map of the Netherlands (Fig 2A). 
After the whole genome sequences were determined, genetic analysis was 
performed by aligning the nucleotide consensus sequences of potentially between-farm 
transmitted viruses for each gene segment separately (Fig 2B). Viruses isolated from potential 
cases H1N5-2007, H10N7-2009, H6N1-2010, H10N9-2012, H5N3-2013 and H6N2-2014 
shared nucleotide sequence identities of 99.70-100.00% in all eight gene segments. 
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Additionally, viruses isolated from potential cases H1N5-2007 and H10N7-2009 both 
contained a deletion in the stalk region of the NA protein of 18 and 21 amino acids, 
respectively. Viruses H7N7-2011-2 and H7N7-2011-3 also showed less than 0.3% nucleotide 
sequence divergence in each gene segment, whereas virus H7N7-2011-1 showed high 
sequence identities with viruses H7N7-2011-2 and H7N7-2011-3 in gene segments encoding 
polymerase basic protein 1 (PB1), polymerase acidic protein (PA), HA, NA, matrix protein (MP) 
and nonstructural protein (NS) (99.44-100.00%), but relatively low sequence identities in gene 
segments encoding polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2) and nucleoprotein (NP) (93.79-95.85%). 
Low sequence identities were found between viruses isolated from potential cases 
H8N4-2011 and H7N7-2013. H8N4-2011 viruses showed high sequence identities in NP and 
MP (99.60%), but relatively low sequence identities in PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NA (93.81-98.35%). 
For NS only 53.84% sequence identity was observed, demonstrating that the viruses have 
distinct NS alleles. H7N7-2013 viruses shared relatively low sequence identities (<98.70%) in 
all gene segments, showing that the viruses were only distantly related. Altogether, whole 
genome sequence analysis identified highly similar viruses, sharing nucleotide sequence 
identities of 99.70-100.00% in all gene segments, in seven of nine potential cases involving 16 
FIGURE 1. GEOGRAPHICAL MAP OF POTENTIAL BETWEEN-FARM TRANSMISSION CASES. 
Map of the Netherlands showing the geographical distribution of commercial poultry farms (open dots) 
(n=2,379), farms infected with low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus (filled dots) (n=220), farms 
involved in potential between-farm transmission cases (blue) (n=132), and statistically significant spatial 
clusters (red) (n=10), including close-up maps of ten spatial clusters of seropositive farms (green) and 
viropositive farms (yellow) within potential between-farm transmission cases H7N7-2006 (A), H1N5-2007 
(B), H10N7-2009 (C), H6N1-2010 (D), H7N7-2011 (E), H8N4-2011 (F), H10N9-2012 (G), H6N8-2012 (H), 
H8N4-2012 (I) and H9N2-2015 (J). Spatial cluster analysis was performed for each potential between-
farm transmission case separately using the Bernoulli probability model (p<0.05). All samples were 
collected as part of the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance program in the Netherlands between 
January 2006 and September 2016. 
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farms. As seven farms can be considered primary infected farms, these results suggest that 
nine of 21 viropositive farms may have become infected by between-farm virus transmission. 
IDENTIFICATION OF MINORITY VARIANTS
NGS was applied to detect minority variants arising from biological variation in the virus 
population. Minority variants were analysed for all 16 genetically closely related viruses 
isolated from seven potential between-farm transmission cases using a minimum frequency 
of 2.0% and a minimum coverage of 1,000 reads (Table 1; S4 Table). The average coverage 
was 4,500 reads per nucleotide position. Shared minority variants were detected at two 
nucleotide positions in two potential cases, i.e. at nucleotide position 1017 in the HA gene of 
viruses H10N7-2009-1 and -2 (frequencies of 3%) and nucleotide position 1202 in the NP gene 
of viruses H10N9-2012-2 and -3 (frequencies of 7 and 10%, respectively). 
More often, minority variants were identified at sites that differed between the 
consensus sequences of two aligned viruses, with frequencies ranging from 2 to 47%. In 
potential cases H1N5-2007 and H7N7-2011, minority variants were identified at all sites that 
FIGURE 2. GENETIC ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL BETWEEN-FARM TRANSMISSION CASES. 
(A) Geographical map of the Netherlands showing the collection locations of low pathogenic avian
influenza (LPAI) viruses isolated from potential between-farm transmission cases (n=21). (B) Genetic
analysis of LPAI viruses isolated from potential between-farm transmission cases, showing the presence
of deletions in the neuraminidase (NA) stalk region and the percentage of nucleotide sequence identity
between viruses for each gene segment separately. All samples were collected as part of the national
avian influenza (AI) surveillance program in the Netherlands between January 2006 and September 2016.
Detailed information on the virus sequences is provided in S1 Table. PB2, polymerase basic protein 2; PB1,
polymerase basic protein 1; PA, polymerase acidic protein; HA, hemagglutinin; NP, nucleoprotein; NA,
neuraminidase; MP, matrix protein; NS, nonstructural protein.
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varied at consensus level, making a transmission event between these farms highly plausible. 
In addition, a relatively high number of nucleotide variants was found in the viral 
subpopulation of H10N9-2012-3, which were present in the consensus sequence of virus 
H10N9-2012-1. In potential case H6N2-2014, all nucleotide variants detected in the viral 
subpopulation of H6N2-2014-1 were fixed in the consensus sequence of viruses H6N2-2014-
2 and -3. The detection of shared minority variants and minority variants at consensus-level 
variant sites provides additional indications that transmission of LPAI viruses between poultry 
farms occurred. 
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH BETWEEN-FARM 
TRANSMISSION 
Genetic analysis was combined with information regarding time, distance and poultry type to 
identify epidemiological variables associated with between-farm transmission (Table 2). 
Genetically closely related viruses were isolated within a median time interval of 8 days (range 
1-36 days), which was lower but not significantly different from that of the genetically distinct
viruses (median time interval of 43 days; range 6-62 days) (p=0.06). The median distance
between the collection locations of genetically closely related viruses was 6.3 km (range 0.6-
68.9 km), which was significantly shorter compared to that of the genetically distinct viruses
(median distance of 69.0 km; range 41.3-72.3 km) (p<0.05). Genetically closely related viruses
isolated from potential cases H1N5-2007, H10N7-2009, H6N1-2010, H7N7-2011 and H10N9-
TABLE 1. Minority variant analysis of genetically closely related low pathogenic avian influenza 
(LPAI) viruses isolated from potential between-farm transmission cases. 
Potential case Virus alignment No. of 
nucleotide 
differences 
No. of shared 
minority 
variants 




H1N5-2007 1-2 4 0 4 
H10N7-2009 1-2 10 1 2 
H6N1-2010 1-2 14 0 4 
H7N7-2011 2-3 12 0 12 
H10N9-2012 1-2 25 0 4  
1-3 25 0 12 
2-3 8 1 6 
H5N3-2013 1-2 24 0 2 
H6N2-2014 1-2 9 0 4  
1-3 11 0 4 
2-3 6 0 0 
Note: The number of nucleotide differences, the number of shared minority variants (i.e. minority variants 
that are present in both viruses), and the number of minority variants at consensus-level variant sites (i.e. 
minority variants at sites that varied between viruses at consensus level) are shown. Minority variants 
were detected using a minimum frequency of 2.0% and a minimum coverage of 1,000 reads. All samples 
were collected as part of the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance program in the Netherlands 
between January 2006 and September 2016. Detailed information on the virus sequences is provided in 
S1 Table. 
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2012 were collected within spatial clusters with distances between farms ranging from 0.6 to 
6.9 km, suggesting local spread between farms or independent infections by the same local 
source. Additionally, seropositive farms were detected within the same spatial cluster in 
potential cases H1N5-2007, H6N1-2010 and H10N9-2012, indicating more farms were 
infected with the same virus. Interestingly, in potential cases H1N5-2007 and H10N9-2012, 
two infected farms within the same spatial cluster shared the same owner. Farms involved in 
potential cases H5N3-2013 and H6N2-2014 were located at respectively 21.3 and 18.5-68.9 
km distance, indicating long-distance spread. 
Finally, poultry types involved in potential between-farm transmission cases were 
examined. All genetically distinct viruses were isolated from outdoor chicken layer farms. The 
16 genetically closely related viruses were isolated from six chicken layer farms with outdoor 
facilities (38%), and ten farms with an indoor housing system, including six turkey farms (38%), 
two duck farms (13%) and two chicken layer farms (13%). Potential spread within a poultry 
type was observed between farms infected with viruses H1N5-2007-1 and -2 (turkeys), H6N1-
2010-1 and -2 (indoor chickens), H10N9-2012-2 and -3 (turkeys), H5N3-2013-1 and -2 
(outdoor chickens), and H6N2-2014-1 and -3 (domestic ducks). Within the spatial clusters of 
potential cases H1N5-2007 and H6N1-2010, the seropositive farms were of the same poultry 
type, and no infections were detected in farms holding a different poultry type (S3 Table). In 
contrast, potential spread between farms holding different poultry types was observed in 
farms infected with viruses H10N7-2009-1 and -2 (turkeys-outdoor chickens), H7N7-2011-1 
and -2 (outdoor chickens-turkeys), H10N9-2012-1 and the two other infected farms (outdoor 
chicken-turkeys), and H6N2-2014-2 and the two other infected farms (outdoor chickens-
domestic ducks). The combined results suggest that between-farm transmission of LPAI 
viruses was not related to indoor or outdoor housing systems and not restricted to holdings 
of the same poultry type. 
Discussion 
This study evaluates the contribution of between-farm transmission to the overall incidence 
of LPAI virus infections in commercial poultry in the Netherlands. We analysed serological and 
virological detections of LPAI virus infections to identify potential between-farm transmission 
events. Subsequently, genetic analysis was combined with spatiotemporal and poultry type 
information to identify epidemiological variables associated with between-farm transmission. 
Over a ten-year surveillance period, we identified 35 potential between-farm transmission 
cases involving 132 of 220 infected poultry farms. We showed that in ten of these cases farms 
clustered geographically. The number of farms involved in each case was relatively small (2-7) 
infected farms), as compared to previous LPAI virus outbreaks, including those of subtypes 
H7N2 (1996-1998 and 2001-2002) in the United States, and H7N1 (1999 and 2000-2001), 
H7N3 (2002-2003 and 2004) and H5N2 (2010-2012) in Italy, that reported between 24-388 
infected farms 20,21. Some subtypes were detected in multiple years, which may be due to 
recurrent virus introductions from the wild bird population. However, no related wild bird 
viruses were detected in the same time frame between 2006 and 2011 51, or in recent years. 
Also, none of the viruses were associated with HPAI outbreaks that were reported in the 
Netherlands in 2014, 2016 and 2017 46,52,53. 
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Genetic analysis was performed using the whole genome sequences of 21 LPAI viruses isolated 
from nine potential cases. This analysis revealed that viruses isolated from potential cases 
H8N4-2011 and H7N7-2013 were only distantly related. Between-farm transmission could 
therefore be excluded in these two cases. In addition, virus H7N7-2011-1 showed low 
sequence identities with viruses H7N7-2011-2 and H7N7-2011-3 in two gene segments, which 
is presumably due to reassortment of gene segments between co-circulating viruses. 
Reassortment events are commonly observed in wild birds, the natural host of a vast diversity 
of AI viruses 54. Therefore, reassortment likely occurred in the wild bird population and two 
distinct reassortment variants were subsequently introduced into the poultry facilities 
separately. 
Genetically closely related viruses, showing less than 0.3% nucleotide sequence 
divergence in each gene segment, were identified in seven of nine virologically analysed cases 
involving 16 poultry farms. The close genetic relationship between the viruses suggests 
between-farm transmission or separate introductions from the same environmental source. 
NA stalk deletions were identified in potential cases H1N5-2007 and H10N7-2009. A deletion 
in the NA stalk region is considered a marker of virus adaptation to chickens, turkeys and other 
gallinaceous hosts 55,56, and is rarely detected in wild birds without a link to poultry. NA stalk 
deletions cause a change in tropism from the intestine to the respiratory tract in chickens 57,58, 
thereby increasing virus pathogenicity 59. The length and position of NA stalk deletions is 
highly variable 56. The fact that NA stalk deletions of identical length and position were 
identified strongly indicates that between-farm transmission occurred. 
Moreover, shared minority variants or minority variants at consensus-level variant 
sites were identified in all seven potential between-farm transmission cases of genetically 
closely related viruses. These minority variants, although often present at low level, suggest 
that the viruses are genetically more closely related than predicted based on the consensus 
sequence. Interestingly, genetically closely related viruses isolated from potential cases H1N5-
2007 and H7N7-2011 showed minority variants at all consensus-level variant sites. In these 
two cases, the virus on the secondary infected farm was likely isolated shortly after direct 
transmission from the primary infected farm or introduction from the same environmental 
source. In contrast, a relatively low number of minority variants together with a relatively high 
number of nucleotide differences in potential case H5N3-2013 suggests prolonged within-
flock transmission before samples were collected. In some cases, the genetic relationship 
based on minority variants may be underestimated due to passaging of the virus strains in 
eggs. 
Surprisingly, minority variant analysis indicated that virus H10N9-2012-1 was 
genetically more closely related to virus H10N9-2012-3 than to virus H10N9-2012-2, despite 
the larger time interval between the collection dates. At the same time, viruses H10N9-2012-
1 and -2 shared two fixed nucleotide variants that were not present in virus H10N9-2012-3. 
We therefore hypothesize that the virus was transmitted from H10N9-2012-1 to H10N9-2012-
2 and -3 via another (seropositive) farm within the same spatial cluster. This hypothesis is 
supported by the relatively high number of nucleotide differences between virus H10N9-2012-
1 and the other two isolates. Minority variant analysis also revealed that viruses H6N2-2014-1 
and -2 shared four fixed nucleotide variants that were not present in virus H6N2-2014-3, and 
viruses H6N2-2014-1 and –3 shared two fixed nucleotide variants that were not present in 
virus H6N2-2014-2. No minority variants were identified at sites that differed between H6N2-
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2014-2 and -3. Based on these results, we assume that virus H6N2-2014-1 acted as a precursor 
virus for both viruses H6N2-2014-2 and -3. 
Contact tracing to study the intensity of movements between farms could reveal potential 
modes of transmission, but is generally not performed for non-notifiable LPAI viruses. Here, 
we analysed other epidemiological links between farms, such as the time interval between 
virus detections, the distance between farms and poultry types, to identify variables that may 
be associated with between-farm transmission. 
Temporal analysis demonstrated that genetically closely related viruses were 
detected within a median time interval of eight days (range 1-36 days). Previous studies have 
shown that viral shedding can already be observed from one day after experimental infection 
in chickens 60,61. The mean infectious period of individual LPAI virus infected birds was 
estimated to range between 4-8 days 60,62,63. However, the duration of the infectious period of 
an infected flock can take much longer, depending on within-flock transmission dynamics 
influenced by the virus and flock characteristics, such as poultry type, age of production and 
the presence of concomitant diseases 64. At flock level, the infectious period is estimated to 
range between 1-2 months for chickens 65, and 2-11 months for turkeys 63. This is much longer 
compared to HPAI, as most LPAI infections remain subclinical and control measures are not 
applied for subtypes other than H5 and H7. The time intervals  between the potential cases 
fall within the estimated infectious period of LPAI virus infected flocks, and is therefore 
consistent with between-farm transmission.  
Our study further suggests that both local and long-distance transmissions occurred, 
and that between-farm transmission was not restricted to holdings of the same poultry type. 
Additionally, no relation was found between indoor or outdoor housing systems and potential 
between-farm transmission. However, despite representing only 2% of the total poultry 
population in the Netherlands, turkeys were involved in a relatively high number of potential 
between-transmission cases. This may be explained by a higher susceptibility of this species 
to AI viruses 66. Interestingly, all genetically distinct viruses were isolated from outdoor 
chickens, which may become infected more easily through direct or indirect contact with wild 
birds 67. 
Potential local spread within a poultry type was observed between farms infected 
with viruses H1N5-2007-1 and -2, H6N1-2010-1 and -2, and H10N9-2012-2 and -3. During 
these events, transmission may have occurred via movement of persons or contaminated 
equipment between neighbouring farms, which is likely to occur between farms of the same 
poultry type because of a high probability of shared personnel, equipment and transport 
services 25-27,68. This transmission route is supported by the fact that no influenza infections 
were detected in farms holding a different poultry type in potential cases H1N5-2007 and 
H6N1-2010, and two infected farms in potential cases H1N5-2007 and H10N9-2012 shared 
the same owner. Since AI viruses can persist for extended periods in the environment 31,69, 
transport of contaminated materials is also considered an important route of virus spread over 
long distances 33. Between-farm transmission via human-mediated transport was therefore 
considered the most probable route of transmission for potential long-distance spread within 
a poultry type, which was observed between farms infected with viruses H5N3-2013-1 and -2, 
and H6N2-2014-1 and -3.  
Alternatively, virus may have been transmitted between neighbouring farms by 
vectors 23,24, or via airborne transmission when virus particles or virus-contaminated dust 
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particles are being dispersed into the environment 28,30. These transmission routes may explain 
potential local spread between farms holding different poultry types, which was observed 
between farms infected with viruses H10N7-2009-1 and -2, H7N7-2011-2 and -3, and from 
H10N9-2012-1 to the other infected farms. During the latter event, virus was detected in air 
samples up to 60 meters downwind of two infected turkey farms 2-9 days after infection was 
confirmed 28. However, detection decreased rapidly with distance. Hence, the probability of 
between-flock transmission by air decreases with increasing distance 32,70, and will depend 
heavily on environmental conditions, such as wind 35. In addition, most potential transmission 
events occurred between farms with indoor facilities, suggesting airborne transmission is less 
likely because of mechanical barriers.  
In conclusion, our study indicates that between-farm transmission occurred in seven of nine 
virologically analysed cases. Based on these findings, transmission between poultry farms 
likely contributes considerably to the incidence of LPAI virus infections in poultry, although 
separate introductions from the wild bird reservoir cannot be excluded. In this study, genetic 
analysis was limited to few potential between-farm transmission cases for which virus was 
isolated. More frequent collection of samples for virological monitoring of non-notifiable LPAI 
viruses in poultry would be of great value to obtain more knowledge on LPAI virus 
transmission dynamics. This study highlights the value of genetic analysis to complement 
serological data and to improve epidemiological investigations on LPAI virus transmissions, 
which can be used to guide disease control strategies. 
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S1 Table. Viruses isolated from potential between-farm transmission cases.
S2 Table. Identification of potential between-farm transmission cases. 
S3 Table. Spatial clusters within potential between-farm transmission cases. 
S4 Table. Identification of minority variants. 
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S4 TABLE. IDENTIFICATION OF MINORITY VARIANTS.
Minority variant analysis of genetically closely related low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses 
isolated from potential between-farm transmission cases. All nucleotide positions that varied between 
viruses at consensus level are shown. Minority variants consist of shared minority variants (i.e. minority 
variants that are present in both viruses) and minority variants at consensus-level variant sites (i.e. minority 
variants at sites that varied between viruses at consensus level). Minority variants were detected using a 
minimum frequency of 2.0% and a minimum coverage of 1,000 reads. All viruses were detected as part of 
the national avian influenza (AI) surveillance program in the Netherlands between January 2006 and 
September 2016. Detailed information on the virus sequences is provided in S1 Table. PB2, polymerase 
basic protein 2; PB1, polymerase basic protein 1; PA, polymerase acidic protein; HA, hemagglutinin; NP, 
nucleoprotein; NA, neuraminidase; MP, matrix protein; NS, nonstructural protein. 







Var. A Var. B Var. A Var. B Var. A Var. B Var. A Var. B 
H1N5-2007 PB2 2049 T C 100% 0% 15% 85% 
PA 885 A C 67% 33% 0% 100% 
HA 523 G A 61% 39% 0% 100% 
NS 521 C T 65% 35% 0% 100% 
H10N7-2009 PB2 2061 A G 100% 0% 26% 74% 
PB2 2065 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB1 472 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB1 1930 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB1 2142 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PA 2059 A C 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 766 C T 100% 0% 11% 89% 
HA 1017 T A 97% 3% 97% 3% 
NP 337 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 
NS 30 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 
NS 284 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
H6N1-2010 PB2 646 C A 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB2 2187 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB1 202 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PA 73 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PA 1053 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PA 1071 A T 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PA 1133 T G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PA 1892 G T 100% 0% 0% 100% 
NP 287 C T 100% 0% 0% 100% 
NA 284 C T 100% 0% 2% 98% 
NA 444 A C 55% 45% 0% 100% 
NA 710 G A 57% 43% 0% 100% 
NA 1297 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 
NS 214 G A 100% 0% 4% 96% 
H7N7-2011 PB2 232 A C 100% 0% 16% 84% 
PB2 513 C T 100% 0% 16% 84% 
PB2 1084 C T 100% 0% 16% 84% 
PB2 1359 C T 100% 0% 16% 84% 
PB1 1011 T C 100% 0% 15% 85% 
PA 497 T C 73% 27% 10% 90% 
PA 1842 G A 100% 0% 15% 85% 
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Var. A Var. B Var. A Var. B Var. A Var. B Var. A Var. B 
HA 445 G A 100% 0% 32% 68% 
HA 629 A G 72% 28% 8% 92% 
HA 1238 C A 100% 0% 35% 65% 
NA 631 T C 100% 0% 12% 88% 
NA 926 G A 100% 0% 12% 88% 
H5N3-2013 PB2 260 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB2 702 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB2 741 A C 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB1 213 C T 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB1 456 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB1 578 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB1 1158 C T 100% 0% 12% 88% 
PB1 1611 C T 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB1 1654 A C 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PB1 1869 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PA 294 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 
PA 1158 G T 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 460 T - 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 461 A - 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 462 T - 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 464 A T 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 606 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 617 A T 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 859 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 1077 C T 100% 0% 0% 100% 
NP 249 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
NP 260 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
NA 1143 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 
MP 932 T G 95% 5% 0% 100% 
H10N9-2012 PB2 590 A C 100% 0% 32% 68% 100% 0% 
PB2 1048 C T 100% 0% 32% 68% 100% 0% 
PB2 1960 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 3% 97% 
PB2 2300 T G 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
PB1 318 C A 100% 0% 100% 0% 4% 96% 
PB1 1383 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 7% 93% 
PB1 1908 C T 100% 0% 0% 100% 6% 94% 
PB1 2218 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
PA 392 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 3% 97% 
PA 666 T C 100% 0% 32% 68% 100% 0% 
PA 1284 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 6% 94% 
PA 1355 C T 100% 0% 100% 0% 6% 94% 
PA 1524 C T 100% 0% 0% 100% 6% 94% 
PA 1864 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 3% 97% 
HA 49 G A 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 544 A G 100% 0% 30% 70% 100% 0% 
HA 566 C A 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
HA 769 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
HA 1379 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
NP 681 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 3% 97% 
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Var. A Var. B Var. A Var. B Var. A Var. B Var. A Var. B 
NP 939 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 3% 97% 
NP 951 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 3% 97% 
NP 1090 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
NP 1202 C G 100% 0% 93% 7% 90% 10% 
NA 45 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
NA 48 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
NA 1054 G A 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
MP 421 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
NS 209 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
NS 338 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
H6N2-2014 PB2 1785 A C 79% 21% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
PB1 239 G A 64% 36% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
PB1 239 G A 64% 36% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
PB1 354 T C 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
PB1 1833 G A 78% 22% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
PB1 1836 G A 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
PA 318 A G 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 236 A G 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
HA 376 G T 100% 0% 0% 100% 100% 0% 
NP 46 A G 53% 47% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
NA 45 T C 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
NA 558 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 100% 0% 
MP 604 A G 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 
NS 430 A G 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
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During the epizootic of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8 virus in Europe in 2016–
2017, HPAI viruses of subtype H5N5 were also isolated. However, the detection of H5N5 
viruses was limited compared to H5N8. In this study, we show that the genetic constellation 
of a newly isolated H5N5 virus is different from two genotypes previously identified in the 
Netherlands. The introduction and spread of the three H5N5 genotypes in Europe was studied 
using spatiotemporal and genetic analysis. This demonstrated that the genotypes were 
isolated in distinguishable phases of the epizootic, and suggested multiple introductions of 
H5N5 viruses into Europe followed by local spread. We estimated the timing of the 
reassortment events, which suggested that the genotypes emerged after the start of autumn 
migration. This may have prevented large-scale spread of the H5N5 viruses on wild bird 
breeding sites before introduction into Europe. Experiments in primary chicken and duck cells 
revealed only minor differences in cytopathogenicity and replication kinetics between H5N5 
genotypes and H5N8. These results suggest that the limited spread of HPAI H5N5 viruses is 
related to the timing of the reassortment events rather than changes in virus pathogenicity or 
replication kinetics. 
Keywords: avian influenza; highly pathogenic avian influenza; genetic analysis; reassortment
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Introduction 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses belonging to the A/Goose/Guangdong 
/1/1996 (GsGd) lineage were first detected in domestic geese in China in 1996 1. The virus 
caused outbreaks in poultry and humans in Hong Kong in 1997 2, and was first detected in 
wild birds in 2002 3. The virus was subsequently disseminated intercontinentally from Asia to 
Europe, Africa and the Middle East by wild migratory birds in 2005 4. As descendants of the 
H5N1 GsGd lineage continued to circulate among poultry and wild birds, the hemagglutinin 
(HA) gene evolved into numerous phylogenetic clades. In addition, reassortment of H5N1 
GsGd lineage viruses with co-circulating low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses led to 
the emergence of new reassortant viruses of various gene constellations and subtype 
combinations. In 2014, HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses of subtype H5N8 emerged in Asia 5,6, 
which were divided into phylogenetic groups A and B. From 2014 onwards, several reassortant 
variants of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses came to prominence, causing outbreaks of severe 
disease and high mortality among wild birds and commercial poultry worldwide. 
In late 2014, HPAI H5N8 viruses belonging to clade 2.3.4.4 group A were introduced 
into Europe 7,8 and North America 9,10 by wild migratory birds. Intersubtype reassortment 
produced HPAI viruses of subtypes H5N1 and H5N2, the latter of which caused a large 
outbreak in commercial poultry in the United States in 2014-2015 11. In 2016, HPAI H5N8 
viruses belonging to clade 2.3.4.4 group B re-emerged in Asia. The virus was first detected at 
the Qinghai Lake in China and the Ubsu-Nur Lake at the border between Russia and Mongolia, 
in May 2016 12-14, and subsequently spread to Europe, Africa and the Middle East in the autumn 
and winter of 2016-2017 15. During this epizootic, over 2000 outbreaks in wild birds and poultry 
were reported in Europe 16. In 2017, a reassortant virus of subtype H5N6 virus emerged from 
H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group B viruses in Asia 17, infecting wild birds and poultry in several 
European countries in the autumn and winter of 2017-2018 18.  
During the HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group B epizootic in 2016-2017, multiple 
reassortant variants of subtype H5N5 were detected in Europe (19-26). However, the number 
of birds detected with HPAI H5N5 virus was limited compared to H5N8 19. After the first 
detection of HPAI H5N5 virus in the Kamchatka region of Russia in October 2016 20, a total of 
24 outbreaks were reported in 11 European countries 19-26, mainly affecting wild birds. 
Infections of poultry and captive birds were reported during eight outbreaks 23-25. Genetic 
analysis suggested that different H5N5 variants were introduced into Europe 21,23,26. These 
H5N5 viruses contained the same HA cleavage site (PLREKRRKR/GLF) as was observed in the 
majority of the H5N8 isolates 20-22,24, and showed intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) scores 
in chickens comparable to H5N8 22,24. However, the limited number of infected birds may 
suggest that the H5N5 viruses exhibit characteristics different from H5N8, such as decreased 
infectivity, transmissibility or pathogenicity. 
Here, we describe the genetic analysis of a newly isolated HPAI H5N5 virus that is 
genetically distinct from two H5N5 viruses previously isolated in the Netherlands. The Dutch 
H5N5 viruses were genetically compared with HPAI H5N5 viruses detected in other European 
countries, and the timing of reassortment was estimated. This study demonstrates that the 
three H5N5 genotypes were isolated in overlapping, but distinguishable outbreak phases. 
Results suggest multiple introductions of H5N5 viruses into Europe followed by local spread. 
We observed variations in the estimated timing of reassortment that led to the emergence of 
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the H5N5 genotypes. Experiments in primary chicken and duck cells showed only minor 
differences in cytopathogenicity and virus replication between H5N5 genotypes and H5N8. 
These findings suggests that the spread of H5N5 viruses in Europe is mainly driven by the 
timing of reassortment rather than changes in virus pathogenicity and replication kinetics. 
Material and methods 
VIRUS DETECTION AND SEQUENCING 
Virus detection and sequencing were performed for one newly isolated HPAI H5N5 strain from 
a goose found dead in Utrecht, the Netherlands, on 22 May 2017 (A/Go/NL-Utrecht/17006881 
-001/2017; H5N5-19), as described previously 21. In short, RNA was isolated from a tracheal
swab sample using the MagNA Pure 96 system (Roche) with the MagNA Pure 96 DNA and
Viral NA Small Volume Kit (Roche). The sample was tested for the presence influenza A virus
by using a real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction targeting the matrix
protein (MP) gene (M-PCR) 27, and subsequently tested in a H5 subtype-specific PCR as
recommended by the European Union reference laboratory 28,29. Sanger sequencing was
performed to determine the pathogenicity and the neuraminidase (NA) subtype of the virus
30,31. The whole genome sequence was generated by next-generation sequencing (NGS), as
described previously 21. Briefly, RNA was isolated from the swab sample using the High Pure
Viral RNA Kit (Roche). Multi-segment amplification was performed using the SuperScript III
One-Step RT-PCR System with the Platinum Taq DNA Polymerase High Fidelity kit (Thermo
Fisher Scientific) and purified universal primers 32. Purified amplicons were sequenced by using
the Illumina Nextera DNA Sample Preparation kit and the paired-end 200 Illumina MiSeq
platform with a minimum sequence coverage of 1,000 reads. The whole genome consensus
sequence was generated by a reference-based method using the ViralProfiler-Workflow, an
extension of the CLC Genomics Workbench version 11.0 (Qiagen) 21, and submitted to the
GISAID’s EpiFlu database (https://www.gisaid.org) 33 (EPI_ISL_288411). The most closely related
viruses to the newly isolated H5N5 strain were identified by BLAST on 10 May 2019 (Table S1).
PHYLOGENETIC ANALYSIS
Phylogenetic trees were generated for each gene segment separately using the nucleotide 
sequences of the newly isolated HPAI H5N5 strain and other HPAI H5N5 viruses isolated 
during the epizootic in 2016-2017. Detailed information on the HPAI H5N5 virus sequences 
used in this study is provided in Table S2. We included the top 20 non-H5N5 sequence 
matches from the GISAID’s EpiFlu Database for each H5N5 genotype to assess the origin of 
the gene segments. As a reference, HPAI H5N8 cluster representatives were included, 
representing clusters of H5N8 viruses isolated during the epizootic in 2016-2017. To select 
these cluster representatives, clustering of nucleotide sequences of around 675 HPAI H5N8 
2016-2017 viruses available in the GISAID’s EpiFlu Database on 10 May 2019 was performed 
using CD-HIT version 4.6.8 34,35. A nucleotide sequence identity threshold value of 1.5% was 
used to define clusters. The cluster representatives and the number of H5N8 viruses within 
each cluster are listed in Table S3. After selecting the best fit model of nucleotide substitution, 
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phylogenetic analysis was performed using the maximum likelihood (ML) method within the 
MEGA7 software package 36. Trees were generated using the Tamura-Nei substitution model 
with a discrete gamma distribution (TN93+G) with 5 rate categories. Bootstrap support values 
above 70 (1,000 replicates) are shown at the branches.  
NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Network analysis was performed for viruses belonging to genotypes H5N5-GT2 and H5N5-
GT3. For each virus, the full-length nucleotide sequences of the eight gene segments were 
concatenated and aligned in the software program DNA Alignment (Fluxus Technology) 
(http://www.fluxus-engineering.com). Sequence gaps were treated by complete deletion and 
ambiguous states were replaced by searching for the best replacement within the sequence 
having minimal distance. Phylogenetic networks were reconstructed using the median-joining 
method in the software program Network version 5 (Fluxus Technology) 37. Networks were 
displayed in the software program Network Publisher version 2.1.1.2 (Fluxus Technology). The 
number of nucleotide substitutions between strains are shown as values near branches. 
MOLECULAR CLOCK ANALYSIS 
The time to the most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) was estimated for each gene segment 
of viruses belonging to genotypes H5N5-GT2 and H5N5-GT3. The sequences of HPAI H5N5 
2016-2017 viruses were supplemented with HPAI H5N8 and H5N5 reference sequences and 
the top 100 most similar sequences of both genotypes obtained from the GISAID’s EpiFlu 
Database on 24 January 2018. For gene segments PB1 and NP, we estimated the TMRCA for 
genotypes H5N5-GT2 and H5N5-GT3 using the top 100 most similar sequences of each 
genotype separately obtained from the GISAID’s EpiFlu Database on 10 May 2019. Multiple 
sequence alignments were performed with MUSCLE version 3.8.31 38 and curated in Aliview 
version 1.20 39. For each segment, ML trees were generated using MEGA7 36 to select for the 
lineages of interest. Time scaled phylogenies were reconstructed using the Bayesian Markov 
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) as implemented in BEAST version 1.8.4 
(http://beast.community/beast), as described previously 21. This analysis was conducted using 
the SRD06 substitution model 40, the Bayesian Skyline coalescent model, and an uncorrelated 
log-normal relaxed molecular clock. The Bayesian MCMC analysis was run for 100,000,000 
states and the effective sample size (ESS) was checked in Tracer version 1.6 
(http://beast.bio.ed.ac.uk/Tracer). Maximum clade credibility (MCC) tree files were summarized 
in Tree Annotator version 1.8 with a burn-in of 10%. The TMRCA values were obtained from 
the MCC trees visualized in FigTree version 1.4.3 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree). 
CELL CULTURES 
Madin-Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) cells were obtained from Philips-Duphar and maintained 
in complete Dulbecco's Modified Eagle Medium (DMEM) (Thermo Fisher Scientific) 
supplemented with 5% fetal calf serum (FCS) (Harlan Bioproducts for Science) and 0.1% 
penicillin-streptomycin (Thermo Fisher Scientific). Primary chicken embryo fibroblast (CEF) and 
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duck embryo fibroblast (DEF) cells were prepared from 11-day-old specific-pathogen free 
(SPF) chicken embryos (Gallus gallus domesticus) and seronegative 14-day-old commercial 
Pekin duck embryos (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus), respectively, as described previously 41. 
Briefly, embryo head, limbs and internal organs were removed and a single-cell suspension 
was prepared by trypsinization. The primary chicken and duck cells were seeded in growth 
medium containing 1.0x Medium 199 with Earle's salts (Thermo Fisher Scientific), 3.6% new 
born calf serum (NBCS) (Thermo Fisher Scientific), 0.12% sodium bicarbonate (Thermo Fisher 
Scientific), 2mM L-glutamine (Thermo Fisher Scientific), 0.1x MEM Vitamin solution (Thermo 
Fisher Scientific) and 0.1% gentamicin (Sigma-Aldrich). After one day, growth medium was 
replaced by maintenance medium containing 0.4x Medium 199 with Earle's salts (Thermo 
Fisher Scientific), 3.0% new born calf serum (NBCS) (Thermo Fisher Scientific), 0.05x Ham's F-
10 Nutrient Mix, 0.11% sodium bicarbonate (Thermo Fisher Scientific), 1mM L-glutamine 
(Thermo Fisher Scientific), 0.1x M.E.M. Vitamins solutions (Thermo Fisher Scientific), 0.1% 
gentamicin (Sigma-Aldrich) and 0.12% tryptose phosphate broth. When confluence was 
reached after 2-3 days, cells were trypsinized and stored in liquid nitrogen for later use. 
VIRUS PROPAGATION AND TITRATION 
The viruses used for the in vitro experiments represent genotypes H5N5-GT1, H5N5-GT2, 
H5N5-GT3 and European H5N8 NL-Zeewolde-like virus, and are listed in Table S4. The viruses 
were isolated from swab samples using embryonated chicken eggs (ECEs), as described 
previously 42. Virus stocks of second passage allantoic fluids were stored in aliquots at -80°C. 
The medium tissue culture infective dose (TCID50) titres of the virus stocks were determined 
by end-point titration in MDCK cells. In short, a total of 2.5x104 MDCK cells/well was seeded 
in culture medium into each well of a 96-well tissue culture plate. The following day, infection 
medium was prepared by replacing FCS in culture medium by 0.3% bovine serum albumin 
(BSA). Cells were inoculated with ten-fold serial dilutions of the virus stocks in infection 
medium. After two days, an immunoperoxidase monolayer assay (IPMA) was performed using 
mouse anti-nucleoprotein (anti-NP) HB65 monoclonal antibodies and HRP-conjugated rabbit 
anti-mouse secondary antibodies (Dako) on monolayers fixed in 4% paraformaldehyde 
solution 43. TCID50 titres were calculated using the Reed and Muench method 44. 
VIRUS INFECTION OF PRIMARY CHICKEN AND DUCK CELLS 
The cytopathogenic effect (CPE) of HPAI H5N5 and H5N8 viruses in primary CEF and DEF cells 
was measured using the real-time cell analysis (RTCA) system (xCelligence; Roche and ACEA 
Biosciences) 45. For this real-time monitoring assay, a total of 3.5x105 cells was seeded in 
growth medium into each well of the 8-well electronic tissue culture plate (E-plate) (ACEA 
Biosciences). After one day, cells were inoculated at a multiplicity of infection (MOI) of 0.001 
in serum-free growth medium. Mock-infected cells were taken along as negative controls. The 
electrical impedance of the cell-covered electrodes, displayed as cell index (CI) value, was 
measured every 30 minutes. An increase in CI value indicates cell proliferation and adhesion, 
whereas a decrease in CI value indicates cell death. The CI values were normalized at 2 hpi to 
determine the time point when the CI value reaches half maximal (CI50) value. The experiment 
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was carried out three times in duplicate.
To generate growth curves of viral replication in CEF cells, a total of 3.5x105 cells was 
seeded in growth medium into each well of a 24-well tissue culture plate. After one day, cells 
were inoculated with virus at a MOI of 0.001 in serum-free growth medium. Supernatants were 
collected at 4-hour intervals from 2 to 42 hpi and stored at -80°C until used for virus titration. 
TCID50 titres were determined by end-point titration in MDCK cells as described above. The 
experiment was carried out twice in triplicate. Results were expressed by the mean and its 
standard deviation (SD). 
Results 
GENETIC ANALYSIS OF HPAI H5N5 VIRUSES IN THE NETHERLANDS 
We determined the whole genome sequence of a novel HPAI H5N5 virus that was isolated 
from a goose found dead in Utrecht, the Netherlands, in May 2017. To determine the gene 
constellation of this virus, the most closely related viruses were identified (Table S1), and 
phylogenetic trees were reconstructed for each gene segment separately (Figure S1). For 
phylogenetic analysis, we used the full-length nucleotide sequences of all HPAI H5N5 viruses 
isolated during the HPAI H5 2016–2017 epizootic (Table S2), and sequences of closely related 
viruses of other subtypes. In addition, HPAI H5N8 cluster representatives were included that 
represent the genetic diversity among H5N8 viruses during the epizootic (Table S3). The 
genetic analysis revealed that the newly isolated H5N5 strain was genetically distinct from two 
H5N5 viruses previously isolated in the Netherlands. This suggests that at least three different 
HPAI H5N5 reassortant variants circulated in the Netherlands, referred to as genotypes H5N5-
GT1, H5N5-GT2 and H5N5-GT3. 
The gene constellations of the genotypes are shown in Figure 1, where the gene 
segments are colored according to their phylogenetic cluster. Gene segments HA, MP and 
nonstructural protein (NS) of the three H5N5 genotypes clustered with the H5N8-China and 
Russia-Mongolia reference virus, whereas distinct clusters were identified for gene segments 
polymerase basic protein 1 (PB1), polymerase basic 2 (PB2), polymerase acidic (PA), NP and 
NA. The PB2 and NP genes of genotype H5N5-GT1 clustered with European H5N8 NL-
Zeewolde-like viruses detected in the Netherlands (H5N8-PA I and H5N8-PA II), whereas the 
PA and NA genes are related to Eurasian LPAI viruses detected in previous years (Table S5). 
Genotype H5N5-GT2 contains reassorted PB2, PB1, NP and NA genes related to LPAI viruses 
detected in Eurasia in previous years. Genotype H5N5-GT3 is genetically highly similar to 
genotype H5N5-GT2, but contains reassorted PB1 and NP genes that were related to two LPAI 
viruses detected in the Netherlands in 2014. 
INCIDENCE AND SPATIOTEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF HPAI H5N5 
GENOTYPES IN EUROPE 
The viruses that were detected in the Netherlands were genetically compared to HPAI H5N5 
viruses detected in other European countries to reveal the incidence of the genotypes (Table 
1; Figure S2). Results show that genotype H5N5-GT1 consisted of a unique gene constellation
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that was detected only once (H5N5-1). Genotype H5N5-GT2 viruses were most frequently 
detected, as 13 viruses were identified in Europe during the epizootic in 2016–2017 (H5N5-3 
to -15). This genotype was first identified in Kamchatka, Russia, in October 2016 (H5N5-2). 
Four viruses (H5N5-16 to -19) were identified for genotype H5N5-GT3. For two H5N5 viruses 
(H5N5-20 and -21), the genotype could not be determined because of insufficient sequence 
data. Overall, this analysis demonstrates that the H5N5-GT2 was the most frequently isolated 
genotype of H5N5 viruses in Europe, followed by H5N5-GT3. 
The collection locations of the European HPAI H5N5 viruses were plotted in a 
geographical map to elucidate the spatial distribution of the genotypes (Figure 2a). Genotype 
H5N5-GT1 was detected only once in the Netherlands. The collection locations of viruses 
FIGURE 1. GENE CONSTELLATIONS OF HPAI H5N5 GENOTYPES.
Schematic representation of reassortment events that resulted in the emergence of three highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (HPAI) H5N5 genotypes detected during the HPAI H5 2016-2017 epidemic (H5N5-GT1, 
H5N5-GT2 and H5N5-GT3). Novel genes were obtained by reassortment of HPAI viruses with co-circulating 
low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) ancestor viruses. Gene segments are colored according to their 
phylogenetic cluster, as shown in Figure S1. PB2, polymerase basic protein 2; PB1, polymerase basic protein 
1; PA, polymerase acidic protein; HA, hemagglutinin; NP, nucleoprotein; NA, neuraminidase; MP, matrix 
protein; NS, nonstructural protein. 
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belonging to genotype H5N5-GT3 were restricted to areas in the northern part of Germany 
and the Netherlands. In contrast, H5N5-GT2 viruses were isolated from six European countries 
(The Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Italy, Croatia, and Hungary), demonstrating that H5N5-
GT2 was geographically the most widespread genotype. 
Analysis of the collection dates shows that HPAI H5N5 viruses were detected between 
October 2016 and May 2017 (Figure 2b). Genotype H5N5-GT1 was isolated in the early phase 
of the outbreak (in November 2016), H5N5-GT2 during the outbreak peak (between December 
2016 and March 2017), and H5N5-GT3 during the outbreak peak and in the late phase of the 
outbreak (in January, February and May 2017). This shows that the H5N5 genotypes were 
isolated in overlapping, but distinguishable outbreak phases. 
GENETIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HPAI H5N5 VIRUSES 
Phylogenetic network analysis was performed to study genetic relationships between the HPAI 
H5N5 viruses of the same genotype. For viruses belonging to genotypes H5N5-GT2 and 
H5N5-GT3, the full-length nucleotide consensus sequences of all eight gene segments were 
concatenated and median-joining networks were reconstructed. This analysis was not 
TABLE 1. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N5 viruses isolated during the HPAI H5 






date Collection location 
H5N5-GT1 1 Tufted duck 2016-11-14 Netherlands 
H5N5-GT2 2 Environment 2016-10-01 Russia 
3 Swan 2016-12-13 Germany 
4 Mute swan 2016-12-13 Netherlands 
5 a Barnacle goose 2016-12-22 Germany 
6 Greylag goose 2016-12-27 Germany 
7 Mute swan 2016-12-27 Croatia 
8 Eurasian wigeon 2016-12-29 Italy 
9 Gadwall 2017-01-10 Italy 
10 Mute swan 2017-01-20 Croatia 
11 Grey heron 2017-01-22 Germany 
12 a Mute swan 2017-01-31 Poland 
13 Common buzzard 2017-02-06 Germany 
14 Mute swan 2017-02-14 Hungary 
15 Chicken 2017-03-07 Croatia 
H5N5-GT3 16 Turkey 2017-01-22 Germany 
17 Cormorant 2017-01-30 Germany 
18 Egret 2017-02-14 Germany 
19 Goose 2017-05-22 Netherlands 
Unknown 20 a Mute swan 2017-02-09 Czech Republic 
21 a Spot-billed pelican 2017-02-14 Czech Republic 
Note: Detailed information on the virus sequences is provided in Table S2. 
a Viruses with incomplete genome sequence were excluded for phylogenetic network analysis. 
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performed for genotype H5N5-GT1, as only one virus of this genotype was isolated. In 
addition, viruses with incomplete genome sequences (H5N5-5, H5N5-12, H5N5-20 and H5N5-
21) were excluded.
The median-joining network of genotype H5N5-GT2 viruses shows that the Russian 
Kamchatka virus (H5N5-2) was genetically relatively more distantly related to the European 
strains (Figure 2c). The Croatian virus H5N5-10 was genetically most closely related, showing 
55 nt differences. The viruses shared two nucleotide variants that were not present in other 
European strains. The two other viruses isolated in Croatia (H5N5-7 and -15) were more 
distantly related to the Russian Kamchatka virus (H5N5-2) (59–66 nt differences). Moreover, 
the three Croatian viruses (H5N5-7, -10 and -15) were genetically relatively distantly related 
to each other, showing 24–27 nt differences. In contrast, the H5N5 viruses isolated in the 
Netherlands (H5N5-4) and in Germany (H5N5-3, -6 and -11) were genetically closely related 
(10–18 nt differences), as they share a predicted common ancestor. The network further 
revealed clustering of the Italian strains (H5N5-8 and -9), showing 7 nt differences, suggesting 
local virus circulation. 
FIGURE 2. SPATIOTEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION AND PHYLOGENETIC NETWORK ANALYSIS OF HPAI 
H5N5 GENOTYPES. (a) Map of Europe showing the geographical distribution of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) H5N5 viruses isolated during the HPAI H5 2016–2017 epidemic, with countries reporting 
HPAI H5N5 virus infection (blue) and the collection locations of HPAI H5N5 viruses, colored by genotype. 
(b) Number of HPAI H5N5 viruses detected isolated during the HPAI H5 2016–2017 epidemic per month,
colored per genotype. (c) Median-joining network analysis of viruses belonging to genotypes H5N5-GT2.
(d) Median-joining network analysis of viruses belonging to genotype H5N5-GT3. The number of
nucleotide substitutions between strains are shown as values near branches. Detailed information on the
virus sequences is provided in Table S2.
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Phylogenetic network analysis of genotype H5N5-GT3 viruses identified the German 
isolate H5N5-17 as a direct precursor of virus H5N5-18 (3 nt differences) that was isolated in 
the same region (Figure 2d). In contrast, the German isolate H5N5-16 and the Dutch isolate 
H5N5-19 share a predicted common ancestor but are genetically more distantly related (20–
23 nt differences). Phylogenetic network analysis shows that genetic relationships between the 
H5N5 viruses are largely consistent with geographical location, and indicates multiple virus 
introductions into Europe followed by local spread. 
TIMING OF THE HPAI H5N5 REASSORTMENT EVENTS 
To estimate the timing of the reassortment events that led to the emergence of the HPAI H5N5 
genotypes, we performed molecular clock analysis. This analysis was not performed for 
genotype H5N5-GT1, which was detected only once. The median TMRCA for the individual 
gene segments of viruses belonging to genotypes H5N5-GT2 and H5N5-GT3 was estimated 
in the time-scaled phylogenetic trees (Table 1) (Figure S3). This molecular clock analysis 
showed that the European H5N5-GT2 viruses share a predicted common ancestor with the 
Russian Kamchatka virus, with a median TMRCA ranging from November 2015 (NA segment) 
to August 2016 (PA and MP segments) (nodes 1). These estimations of the TMRCA indicate 
that genotype H5N5-GT2 emerged in August 2016 (June–September 2016). The European 
H5N5-GT2 viruses share a predicted common ancestor with a median TMRCA ranging from 
April 2016 (NA segment) to November 2016 (MP and NS segments) (nodes 2). This analysis 
indicates that the European H5N5-GT2 viruses share a predicted common ancestor in 
November 2016 (November–December 2016). 
 Genotype H5N5-GT3 viruses share a predicted common ancestor with the Russian 
Kamchatka virus and the European H5N5-GT2 viruses for all gene segments except PB1 and 
NP, which were genetically most closely related to LPAI viruses detected in previous years. The 
median TMRCAs for the PB1 and NP gene segments of the H5N5-GT3 viruses were estimated 
in October 2016 (May 2016–January 2017) and September 2016 (March 2016–December 
2016), respectively (nodes 3). These results suggest that the reassortment event that led to the 
emergence of genotype H5N5-GT3 occurred in the autumn of 2016. 
The time-scaled phylogenetic trees further showed that although the HA, MP and NS 
genes of all three H5N5 genotypes fall in the same cluster of H5N8 China and Russia-
Mongolia-like viruses, short phylogenetic distances within the clusters (so-called subclusters) 
were observed between genotype H5N5-GT1 and European H5N8 NL-Zeewolde-like viruses, 
and between genotypes H5N5-GT2 and H5N5-GT3. Interestingly, the MP gene of one H5N5-
GT2 strain (H5N5-3) forms a phylogenetic subcluster with H5N8 viruses detected in Hungary, 
Germany and Poland in the same time period. These results suggest that this H5N5-GT2 virus 
may have obtained a novel MP gene by reassortment with H5N8 virus. 
Altogether, molecular clock analysis shows variations in the timing of the 
reassortment events of the different H5N5 genotypes. The time at which the three genotypes 
emerged may have caused the differences in incidence and geographical distribution of the 
H5N5 viruses. 
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CYTOPATHOGENICITY AND REPLICATION OF HPAI H5N5 VIRUSES IN 
PRIMARY CHICKEN AND DUCK CELLS 
We performed real-time cell analysis to determine the cytopathogenicity of HPAI H5N5 and 
H5N8 viruses in primary cultures of embryonic fibroblasts of chickens (CEF) and ducks (DEF). 
The cells were inoculated with viruses representing genotypes H5N5-GT1, H5N5-GT2, H5N5-
GT3 and European H5N8 NL-Zeewolde-like virus (Table S4), and CPE was monitored by 
measuring the electrical impedance of the cell monolayer, which is expressed as the CI value. 
A decrease in CI value was observed between 10–12 hpi in inoculated CEF cells and between 
12–14 hpi in inoculated DEF cells, marking the onset of virus-induced cytopathogenicity 
(Figure 3a and 3b). The CPE observed in the inoculated cultures increased over time, and 
resulted in complete cell death within 42 hours.
FIGURE 3. CYTOPATHOGENICITY AND REPLICATION OF HPAI H5N5 VIRUSES IN PRIMARY AVIAN 
CELLS. (a,b) Cytopathogenicity of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N5 and H5N8 virus in 
primary chicken embryo fibroblast (CEF) and duck embryo fibroblast (DEF) cells measured by the real-time 
cell analysis (RTCA) system. The electrical impedance of the cell-covered electrodes was displayed as cell 
index (CI) value and normalized at two hours post infection (hpi). Virus was inoculated at a multiplicity of 
infection (MOI) of 0.001. Mock-infected cells were taken along as negative controls (grey). (c,d) The mean 
time at which the CI value decreased to 50% of the maximum (CI50) value after infection of primary CEF 
and DEF cells with HPAI H5N5 and H5N8 virus. The p-value was calculated using a two-tailed unpaired 
Student’s t-test with p<0.05 considered statistically significant. (e) Growth curves of HPAI H5N5 and H5N8 
virus in primary CEF cells. Virus was inoculated at a MOI of 0.001. Samples were taken at four hour intervals 
from 2 to 42 hpi and titrated to determine the medium tissue culture infective dose (TCID50) titres. Error 
bars indicate standard deviations (SD). 
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The time point at which half of the maximal CI value (CI50) was reached was 
determined to compare the cytopathogenicity of the different viruses. In CEF cells, the CI50 
value was reached at 17.5 ± 0.7 hpi for H5N5-GT2 virus, at 18.9 ± 0.5 hpi for H5N5-GT3, and 
at 19.4 ± 0.8 hpi for H5N5-GT1 (Figure 3c). In DEF cells, cytopathogenicity for H5N5-GT2 was 
also highest (18.0 ± 0.5 hpi), followed by H5N5-GT3 (19.2 ± 0.4 hpi) and H5N5-GT1 (20.6 ± 
0.5 hpi) (Figure 3d). Although the differences in cytopathogenicity between the viruses are 
small, these results suggest that genotype H5N5-GT2 is significantly more pathogenic to both 
primary chicken and duck cells compared to the other H5N5 genotypes (p<0.001). In addition, 
H5N5-GT3 appeared more pathogenic to DEF cells than H5N5-GT-1 (p<0.001). In contrast, 
upon inoculation with H5N8 virus, the CI50 value was reached at 21.3 ± 1.1 hpi in CEF cells 
and 21.3 ± 0.6 hpi in DEF cells, which was significantly slower compared to the H5N5 viruses 
(p<0.001 and p<0.05, respectively). This suggests that H5N8 is less pathogenic to primary 
chicken and duck cells compared to H5N5, although the measured differences are small. 
In addition, we studied virus replication in CEF cells to investigate the relationship 
between cytopathogenicity and replication kinetics. Growth curves were generated by the 
collection of supernatants at four hour intervals (2–42 hpi), which were titrated to determine 
the infectious titres. Results show that H5N5 genotypes and H5N8 virus replicate to 
comparable virus titres in CEF cells (Figure 3e). The results suggest that the reassortment 
events may have resulted in minor changes in cytopathogenicity, whereas no changes in 
replication kinetics between H5N5 genotypes and H5N8 virus were observed in primary 
chicken cells. 
Discussion 
In 2016-2017, HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group B viruses caused a large-scale epizootic among 
wild birds and poultry in Europe. Concurrently, related HPAI viruses of subtype H5N5 were 
detected, although the number of birds detected with H5N5 infection was limited compared 
to H5N8. Genetic analysis demonstrates that three different genotypes of H5N5 were 
introduced into Europe. In this study, we analysed the emergence, spread and in vitro 
characteristics of these genotypes.
Viruses of genotype H5N5-GT2 were most frequently isolated and geographically the 
most widespread in Europe. Phylogenetic analysis demonstrated that the European H5N5-GT2 
viruses share a predicted common ancestor with the H5N5 virus isolated in the Kamchatka 
region of Russia at the beginning of October 2016. Most European H5N5-GT2 viruses were 
isolated in December 2016 and January 2017. Phylogenetic network analysis demonstrated 
genetic relationships between H5N5-GT2 viruses largely corresponding with collection 
locations, as the Russian Kamchatka virus was genetically distinct from the viruses isolated in 
Europe, and the H5N5 viruses detected in the Netherlands and Germany were genetically 
distinct from viruses isolated in south-eastern European countries (Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Croatia and Italy). The phylogenetic network further revealed a close genetic 
relationship between the Italian strains. The results therefore indicate multiple introductions 
of H5N5-GT2 viruses into Europe followed by local spread, similar to H5N8 viruses 46. 
Most H5N5-GT2 viruses were detected during the peak of the HPAI H5N8 outbreak 
in Europe, when high mortality rates among wild birds and multiple outbreaks in commercial 
poultry were reported 46,47. Molecular clock analysis indicated that the European H5N5-GT2 
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viruses share a predicted common ancestor in November 2016, which is in accordance with 
molecular clock analysis that was performed for Italian strains 22. The European H5N5-GT2 
viruses share a common ancestor with the Russian Kamchatka virus in August 2016, after 
European H5N8 viruses emerged between May-August 21,22,26. Similar results were obtained in 
a previous study on the emergence of H5N5-GT2 26. These results suggest that genotype 
H5N5-GT2 presumably emerged in the summer of 2016 on the breeding grounds of migratory 
wild birds in the northern part of Russia. The emergence of the virus at the end of the breeding 
season, just before or after the start of autumn migration, may resulted in limited spread 
compared to H5N8. The Kamchatka region is located in the Russian Far East, at a large distance 
from the known breeding sites for migratory wild birds in Russia. Therefore, the virus may have 
been dispersed from the common breeding areas to both Europe and the Kamchatka region 
during migration via separate flyways.  
Phylogenetic analysis further indicated that, although belonging to genotype H5N5-
GT2, one German virus (H5N5-3) obtained a novel MP gene by reassortment with H5N8 virus. 
This reassortment event resulted in a larger distance to other German H5N5-GT2 viruses 
(H5N5-6 and -11) and the Dutch H5N5-GT2 virus (H5N5-4). In the phylogenetic network, 6 
out of 9 nucleotide differences between H5N5-3 and the predicted common ancestor of 
H5N5-3 and H5N5-11 were present in the MP gene. 
The second most frequently detected HPAI H5N5 genotype is H5N5-GT3. Genetic 
analysis of the newly isolated H5N5 virus in the Netherlands revealed that this virus also 
belongs to genotype H5N5-GT3. The virus was isolated in May 2017, after a two-month gap 
of H5N5 detections in Europe. Phylogenetic analysis with other European H5N5 viruses 
showed that the virus shares a predicted common ancestor with viruses detected in Germany. 
Viruses with this gene constellation were solely detected in the northern part of Germany and 
in the Netherlands, indicating local virus circulation. The H5N5-GT3 viruses show a close 
genetic relationship with viruses of genotype H5N5-GT2, but contain reassorted PB1 and NP 
genes. These reassorted genes were genetically most closely related to LPAI viruses detected 
in the Netherlands in 2014, which may be explained by the intense wild bird surveillance 
activities in the Netherlands and the lack of recent sequence data. Molecular clock analysis 
estimated a common ancestor for the reassorted genes in September and October 2016. 
Possibly, an ancestor virus containing both gene segments has been circulating between 2014-
2016, and was involved in the emergence of genotype H5N5-GT3 by reassortment with H5N5-
GT2 virus during a single reassortment event. The timing of the reassortment event suggests 
that this occurred after the start of autumn migration, locally in Europe. No viruses of genotype 
H5N5-GT3 were detected on the breeding grounds, suggesting that relatively small amounts 
of wild birds became infected resulting in limited spread in Europe.  
Genotype H5N5-GT1 was detected once, and this was the first detection of HPAI 
H5N5 virus in Europe. This detection was made in the Netherlands in November 2016, 
concurrently with the first cases of H5N8 in the Netherlands 21, and other European countries 
16,48. As previously reported, this genotype clustered phylogenetically with H5N8 viruses found 
in the Netherlands 21. Therefore, H5N5-GT1 virus likely derived from reassortment of HPAI 
H5N8 and co-circulating LPAI viruses in the PA and NA genes 21,23,24. Because no viruses with 
the same gene constellation were detected and recent sequence data on genetically related 
LPAI viruses was missing, molecular clock analysis could not be used to estimate the timing of 
the reassortment event giving rise to this genotype. However, the single detection of H5N5-
GT1 may suggest that the reassortment event occurred after wild birds migrated from their 
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breeding grounds, which may have prevented the virus to spread among large populations of 
birds. 
However, changes in virus characteristics, such as infectivity, transmissibility or 
pathogenicity may have also contributed to the limited spread of HPAI H5H5 viruses 
compared to H5N8 viruses. In this study, we infected primary chicken and duck cells to 
examine the cytopathogenicity and replication kinetics of the three H5N5 genotypes and 
H5N8 virus. For all tested viruses, infection of primary chicken and duck cells resulted in 
complete cell death within two days, demonstrating high cytopathogenicity. A comparison of 
the cytopathogenic effects revealed small differences between the three H5N5 genotypes and 
H5N8 virus in both primary chicken and duck cells. The H5N5 viruses appeared more 
cytopathogenic than the H5N8 virus, and cytopathogenicity of H5N5-GT2 was somewhat 
enhanced compared to H5N5-GT1 and H5N5-GT3. However, no changes in replication kinetics 
between the viruses were observed. The high in vitro cytopathogenicity and fast kinetics of 
virus replication are in accordance with the high IVPI scores that were reported for H5N5 
viruses of genotypes H5N5-GT1 (3.00) (21, unpublished results) and H5N5-GT2 (2.87-3.00) 22,24, 
which were comparable to H5N8 viruses (2.85-3.00) 13,22,23. The H5N5 and H5N8 viruses carry 
the same HA, MP and NS gene segments, suggesting that the viral genetic factors associated 
with the high pathogenicity are likely present in these genes. The viruses contain the same HA 
cleavage site, which is the major determinant of the highly pathogenic phenotype. However, 
other genomic features may also contribute to the pathogenicity of the virus. A previous study 
identified truncations of the C-terminal of NS1 and the PB1-F2 protein, which are virulence 
factors associated with host adaptation 26. These results indicate that the differences in the 
incidence and distribution between the viruses are no direct result from changes in 
pathogenicity or replication efficiency. 
An important limitation of this study is that we used an in vitro system to investigate 
differences in pathogenicity and replication that will not fully represent the in vivo situation. 
The primary duck cells were obtained from Pekin ducks, a domestic duck breed derived from 
the mallard, while the viruses studied were isolated from a variety of wild bird species. In 
addition, pre-existing immunity in the wild bird population due to previous infections with 
related LPAI viruses may have protected wild birds against HPAI H5N5 infection, thereby 
influencing the spread of HPAI H5N5 viruses in Europe. In recent years, H5N2 virus descending 
from H5N8 group A viruses in 2014-2015 in North America 11, and H5N6 virus descending 
from H5N8 group B viruses in 2017-2018 in Europe 18, have dominated and even replaced co-
circulating HPAI strains. However, the emergence of H5N5 virus from H5N8 group B viruses in 
2016-2017 resulted in only limited infections. H5N2 viruses isolated during the outbreaks in 
North America in 2015 exhibited an unusual long pre-clinical period, long mean death time, 
and high level of viral shedding in turkeys, which may have contributed to the widespread 
distribution of H5N2 viruses 49. Although H5N8 and H5N5 viruses both affected various poultry 
types, the high number of H5N8 outbreaks in poultry compared to H5N5 may have 
contributed to the increased dissemination of H5N8 viruses in Europe. Further experimental 
animal studies comparing H5N5 and H5N8 viruses should be performed to obtain insight in 
the infection dynamics of these viruses. 
In conclusion, this study suggests that the limited spread and the differences in 
geographical distribution of HPAI H5N5 viruses are related to the timing of the reassortment 
events and introduction into Europe rather than changes in virus pathogenicity or replication 
kinetics.  
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S1 TABLE. VIRUSES MOST CLOSELY RELATED TO THE NEWLY ISOLATED H5N5 STRAIN. 
Genetically most closely related viruses to the newly isolated highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
H5N5-GT3 virus strain (A/Go/NL-Utrecht/17006881-001/2017; H5N5-19) as identified for each gene 
segment by BLAST in the GISAID’s EpiFlu database (http://www.gisaid.org) on 10 May 2019. PB2, 
polymerase basic protein 2; PB1, polymerase basic protein 1; PA, polymerase acidic protein; HA, 
hemagglutinin; NP, nucleoprotein; NA, neuraminidase; MP, matrix protein; NS, nonstructural protein. 
Gene 
segment 




PB2 A/M_Swan/NL-Groningen/16015826-001/2016 H5N5 EPI_ISL_287565 2311/2316 (99.8%) 
PB1 A/egret/Germany-SH/R1459/2017 H5N5 EPI_ISL_259525 2281/2286 (99.8%) 
PA A/M_Swan/NL-Groningen/16015826-001/2016 H5N5 EPI_ISL_287565 2203/2208 (99.8%) 
A/Mute_swan/Hungary/5879/2017 H5N5 EPI_ISL_256462 
HA A/M_Swan/NL-Groningen/16015826-001/2016 H5N5 EPI_ISL_287565 1746/1751 (99.7%) 
NP A/cormorant/Germany-SH/R896/2017 H5N5 EPI_ISL_260059 1507/1507 (100.0%) 
A/egret/Germany-SH/R1459/2017 H5N5 EPI_ISL_259525 
NA A/M_Swan/NL-Groningen/16015826-001/2016 H5N5 EPI_ISL_287565 1434/1441 (99.5%) 
A/Mute_swan/Hungary/5879/2017 H5N5 EPI_ISL_256462 
MP A/Mute_swan/Hungary/5879/2017 H5N5 EPI_ISL_256462 1002/1002 (100.0%) 
NS A/cormorant/Germany-SH/R896/2017 H5N5 EPI_ISL_260059 864/865 (99.9%) 
A/egret/Germany-SH/R1459/2017 H5N5 EPI_ISL_259525 
A/Mute_swan/Hungary/5879/2017 H5N5 EPI_ISL_256462 
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S3 TABLE.  LIST OF H5N8 CLUSTER REPRESENTATIVES. 
Sequences of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8 viruses used as cluster representatives in 
this study as listed in the GISAID’s EpiFlu™ Database. The cluster representatives were selected by 
clustering the nucleotide sequences of around 675 HPAI H5N8 2016-2017 viruses available in the 
GISAID’s EpiFlu Database on 10 May 2019. A nucleotide sequence identity threshold value of 1.5% was 
used to define clusters. We gratefully acknowledge the authors, originating and submitting laboratories 
of the sequences from GISAID’s EpiFlu™ Database on which this research is based. All submitters of data 
may be contacted directly via the GISAID website (http://www.gisaid.org). PB2, polymerase basic protein 
2; PB1, polymerase basic protein 1; PA, polymerase acidic protein; HA, hemagglutinin; NP, nucleoprotein; 
MP, matrix protein; NS, nonstructural protein. 





PB1 A/Brown-headed_Gull/Qinghai/ZTO1-B/2016 EPI_ISL_224742 436 
A/Goose/Hungary/65817/2016 EPI_ISL_255174 18 
PB2 A/Brown-headed_Gull/Qinghai/ZTO1-B/2016 EPI_ISL_224742 97 
A/T_Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-001/2016 EPI_ISL_268674 261 
A/mute_swan/Hungary/51049/2016 EPI_ISL_237730 103 
PA A/Brown-headed_Gull/Qinghai/ZTO1-B/2016 EPI_ISL_224742 174 
A/T_Dk/NL-Monnickendam/16013865-006-008/2016 EPI_ISL_268669 15 
A/T_Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-001/2016 EPI_ISL_268674 241 
A/domestic_duck/Siberia/50K/2016 EPI_ISL_240678 62 
A/chicken/Taiwan/x37/2016 EPI_ISL_256398 2 
NP A/Brown-headed_Gull/Qinghai/ZTO1-B/2016 EPI_ISL_224742 62 
A/T_Dk/NL-Zeewolde/16013976-001/2016 EPI_ISL_268674 260 
A/duck/India/10CA01/2016 EPI_ISL_237553 1 
A/domestic_duck/Siberia/50K/2016 EPI_ISL_240678 69 
A/mute_swan/Hungary/51049/2016 EPI_ISL_237730 101 
A/chicken/Astrakhan/3131/2016 EPI_ISL_240110 1 
HA A/Brown-headed_Gull/Qinghai/ZTO1-B/2016 EPI_ISL_224742 675 
MP A/Brown-headed_Gull/Qinghai/ZTO1-B/2016 EPI_ISL_224742 490 
NS A/Brown-headed_Gull/Qinghai/ZTO1-B/2016 EPI_ISL_224742 480 
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S5 TABLE. LPAI ANCESTOR VIRUSES OF REASSORTANT GENES. 
Novel genes were obtained by reassortment of the (HPAI) H5N5 genotypes detected during the HPAI 
H5 2016-2017 epizootic (H5N5-GT1, H5N5-GT2 and H5N5-GT3) with co-circulating low pathogenic 
avian influenza (LPAI) ancestor viruses. The most closely related LPAI ancestor viruses were identified 
by BLAST in the GISAID’s EpiFlu database (http://www.gisaid.org) on 10 May 2019. PB2, polymerase 
basic protein 2; PB1, polymerase basic protein 1; NP, nucleoprotein; NA, neuraminidase. 
Geno-
type 









PA A/duck/Mongolia/17/2011 H4N3 EPI_ISL_294001 2174/2209 (98%) 
NA A/Mallard duck/Sweden/139899/2012 H15N5 EPI_ISL_267231 1410/1442 (97%) 
H5N5-
GT2 
PB2 A/Barnacle goose/Netherlands/2/2014 H3N6 EPI_ISL_267243 2294/2316 (99%) 
PB1 A/Duck/Mongolia/709/2015 H10N7 EPI_ISL_206696 2288/2316 (98%) 
NP A/Mallard duck/Netherlands/7/2014 H6N2 EPI_ISL_243620 1519/1540 (98%) 
NA A/duck/Kyoto/261007/2014 H6N5 EPI_ISL_237150 1418/1439 (98%) 
H5N5-
GT3 
PB1 A/mallard duck/Netherlands/9/2014 H6N2 EPI_ISL_267352 2279/2316 (98%) 
NP /Barnacle goose/Netherlands/2/2014 H3N6 EPI_ISL_267243 1525/1540 (99%) 
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S1 FIGURE. PHYLOGENETIC ANALYSIS OF H5N5 VIRUSES. 
Phylogenetic trees of individual gene segments of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N5 viruses 
isolated during the HPAI H5 2016-2017 epizootic, including the top 20 sequence matches of other subtypes 
identified by BLAST in the GISAID’s EpiFlu database (http://www.gisaid.org) on 10 May 2019. The H5N5 
virus sequences are coloured according to their genotype (H5N5-GT1, red; H5N5-GT2, dark blue; H5N5-
GT3, light blue). As a reference, HPAI H5N8 cluster representatives were included (green). Detailed 
information on the HPAI H5N5 and H5N8 virus sequences is provided in Table S2 and Table S3, respectively. 
The most closely related low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) ancestor viruses of the reassortant genes, 
as listed in Table S5, are depicted in bold. Phylogenetic analysis was performed using the maximum 
likelihood (ML) method within the MEGA7 software package. PB2, polymerase basic 2; PB1, polymerase 
basic 1; PA, polymerase acidic; HA, hemagglutinin; NP, nucleoprotein; NA, neuraminidase; MP, matrix 
protein; NS, nonstructural protein.  
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S2 FIGURE. GENE CONSTELLATIONS OF H5N5 VIRUSES. 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N5 viruses isolated during the HPAI H5 2016-2017 
epizootic, ordered by genotype. Gene segments are coloured according to their phylogenetic cluster. 
Detailed information on the virus sequences is provided in Table S2. PB2, polymerase basic protein 2; 
PB1, polymerase basic protein 1; PA, polymerase acidic protein; HA, hemagglutinin; NP, nucleoprotein; 
NA, neuraminidase; MP, matrix protein; NS, nonstructural protein. 
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S3 FIGURE. MAXIMUM CLADE CREDIBILITY TREES. 
Maximum clade credibility (MCC) trees were generated to estimate the median time to the most recent 
common ancestor (TMRCA) for each gene segment of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N5 
viruses isolated during the HPAI H5 2016-2017 epizootic. The H5N5 virus sequences are coloured 
according to their genotype (H5N5-GT1, red; H5N5-GT2, dark blue; H5N5-GT3, light blue). The median 
TMRCAs estimates were determined for H5N5-GT2 viruses (node 1), European H5N5-GT2 viruses (node 2), 
and H5N5-GT3 viruses (node 3). The estimated TMRCAs, the 95% highest posterior density (HPD) intervals 
and posterior values for each of the numbered nodes are listed in Table 2. PB2, polymerase basic 2; PB1, 
polymerase basic 1; PA, polymerase acidic; HA, hemagglutinin; NP, nucleoprotein; NA, neuraminidase; MP, 
matrix protein; NS, nonstructural protein. 
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Avian influenza (AI) is an infectious viral disease of birds caused by influenza A viruses that 
belong to the family of Orthomyxoviridae. AI viruses have been isolated from a wide range of 
bird species, but wild waterfowl belonging to the orders Anseriformes (including ducks, geese 
and swans) and Charadriiformes (including gulls, terns and waders) are considered the natural 
reservoir hosts 1. The viral genome is composed of eight negative-sense RNA gene segments 
that encode the surface proteins hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA), eight internal 
proteins, and several nonessential accessory proteins (Chapter 1) 2. Currently, 16 HA (H1-H16) 
and 9 NA (N1-N9) subtypes have been identified in many different combinations in birds 3-6. 
Frequent mutations and reassortment of the segmented genomes of AI viruses have led to a 
high genetic diversity and drives the constant emergence of novel virus strains 7-9. 
Most AI viruses are low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses that circulate in wild 
birds without signs of disease. Periodically, AI viruses spill over from wild birds to other hosts, 
including mammals and poultry (chickens, domestic turkeys and domestic ducks). In poultry, 
some LPAI strains can cause mild clinical signs, such as mild respiratory disease, a reduction in 
egg production or low mortality 10. Once introduced into poultry, LPAI viruses of subtypes H5 
and H7 can mutate into highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses 11. HPAI virus 
infections can cause variable clinical signs in wild birds, and are characterized by severe disease 
and high mortality in poultry. For this reason, viruses of subtypes H5 and H7 in poultry are 
considered notifiable by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 12,13. Outbreaks of AI 
viruses can have a major impact on animal health and economic consequences for poultry 
industries. In addition, some AI viruses can be transmitted to humans, and thus pose a 
substantial threat to public health. The recurrence of AI virus outbreaks highlights the 
importance of the early detection, control and prevention of AI introductions into poultry.  
This thesis 
This thesis aimed to gain more insight in the spread of AI viruses at the wild bird-poultry 
interface, thereby contributing to the knowledge on how to efficiently monitor and prevent 
the introduction and spread of AI viruses from wild birds to poultry. Based on routinely 
collected surveillance data in the Netherlands, we found that LPAI viruses of certain subtypes 
were frequently detected in poultry, but only sporadically in wild birds (Chapter 2), indicating 
undetected circulation of these subtypes in the wild bird population. In contrast, LPAI virus 
subtypes that were common in wild birds, were rarely detected in poultry. The observation 
that chickens are susceptible for these wild bird-biased subtypes indicated that LPAI viruses 
are likely not transmitted directly from frequently sampled wild bird species to poultry 
(Chapter 3). In addition, we demonstrated that poultry flocks in the Netherlands were not only 
infected with LPAI viruses from wild birds, but also by transmission between farms (Chapter 
4). Finally, we investigated the potential contribution of the timing of emergence of novel HPAI 
reassortant viruses (Chapter 5), and variations in HPAI virus pathogenicity between species 
(Chapter 6), in determining the spread of HPAI viruses at the wild bird-poultry interface. 
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LPAI VIRUSES AT THE WILD BIRD-POULTRY INTERFACE 
In the last two decades, the circulation of AI viruses in wild birds and poultry has been studied 
intensively in many countries worldwide, including the Netherlands. Surveillance programs 
have been implemented for the early detection of emerging AI viruses, but have also been 
used to study the spatiotemporal distribution, subtype diversity and evolution of AI viruses. 
These surveillance programs have provided many insights into the complex epidemiology of 
AI viruses. Still, wild bird species that act as source of infection for poultry and transmission 
routes often remain unidentified. Previous studies have shown that wild birds carry a wide 
variety of AI viruses, but the distribution of subtypes varies between the wild bird species. 
Charadriiformes species, in particular gulls, are predominantly infected with LPAI viruses of 
subtypes H13 and H16, which are only occasionally found in other birds 4,6. Among 
Anseriformes species, of which mallards have been most extensively studied, LPAI viruses of 
subtypes H3, H4 and H6 are most frequently detected, while other subtypes (H8-H12) are rare 
14-18. Analyses of the subtype distribution and the genetic compositions of wild bird and
poultry viruses can be used in efforts to identify wild bird species at source of AI virus
introductions into poultry. Illuminating sources and transmission routes of AI viruses into
poultry is pivotal to the design of effective strategies to prevent introductions and manage
further spread.
Undetected circulation of LPAI viruses in the wild bird population 
As part of this thesis, we explored the circulation of LPAI viruses in wild birds and poultry in 
the Netherlands between 2006-2016 using routinely collected surveillance data (Chapter 2). 
We found that wild birds in the Netherlands were frequently infected with LPAI viruses and 
infection of poultry was not uncommon. Most LPAI viruses in wild birds were isolated from 
mallards and gulls. LPAI virus infections in poultry were most frequently detected in outdoor 
chickens, turkeys and domestic ducks. A wide range of LPAI virus subtypes was identified, with 
differences in subtype incidence between Charadriiformes and Anseriformes wild bird species 
corresponding with previous studies 4,6,14-17. The study also revealed differences in the subtype 
distribution between wild bird species and poultry. While LPAI viruses of subtypes H8 and H9 
were frequently detected in poultry in the Netherlands, these subtypes were rarely detected 
in wild birds. This is remarkable, given the fact that wild birds are considered the primary 
source of AI virus infection for poultry. We hypothesized that the transmission of viruses of 
certain subtypes from wild birds to poultry is selective, and may depend on viral factors that 
determine host specificity. H8 and H9 viruses may be able to infect poultry more easily and 
exhibit a higher fitness in poultry. For example, certain H9 strains have been circulating 
enzootically in poultry in Asia 19,20, indicating infectivity and efficient transmission of the virus 
in poultry. However, phylogenetic analysis showed that H9 strains isolated from poultry in the 
Netherlands are not related to the Asian virus lineages, but share clades with viruses isolated 
from wild birds, particularly from mallards in the Netherlands and Sweden (Chapter 2). 
Experimental infection of chickens with H8 and H9 viruses isolated from wild ducks in the 
Netherlands resulted in limited and strain-dependent replication (Chapter 3). These findings 
indicate that LPAI viruses may not directly transmitted from mallards and other frequently 
sampled wild bird species to poultry. This is supported by the fact that no direct genetic links 
were identified between wild bird and poultry viruses in the Netherlands, indicating prolonged 




into poultry (Chapter 2). The results suggest that LPAI viruses of subtypes detected in poultry 
may be more prevalent in avian species or periods of the year for which sampling activities are 
low. 
Mallards are considered important hosts for the maintenance and dispersal of LPAI 
viruses, as they are the most abundant dabbling duck species, infected with LPAI virus at high 
prevalence, carry a wide range of LPAI virus subtypes and migrate over large geographical 
distances. Mallards have therefore been the focus of influenza surveillance studies in many 
countries 1,5,16-18,21,22, including the Netherlands (Chapter 2) 23. A study in Sweden indicated 
that mallards have a role in the maintenance of rare subtypes in wild birds, including H8 and 
H9 15. It was shown that the internal genes of LPAI viruses of rare subtypes fall into clades with 
LPAI viruses of subtypes that are detected at high frequencies in mallards. However, the 
infrequent detection of certain LPAI virus subtypes suggests that mallards may not be the 
primary reservoir for all subtypes 18, and may not be the primary reservoir for LPAI viruses that 
infect poultry. It has been hypothesized that viruses of rare subtypes, including H8 and H9, 
have a reservoir host other than mallards 15, which have not been sampled frequently during 
surveillance, e.g. because these birds are harder to catch. Anseriformes species that also carry 
LPAI viruses include other dabbling ducks, such as Eurasian wigeons, common teals and 
gadwalls 21,24, diving ducks 25,26, and non-duck species, such as geese 23,27 and swans 28-31. In 
addition, seabirds that belong to the Charadriiformes order, in particular common murres, 
were relatively frequently infected with the antigenically related influenza A group 1 viruses, 
which include viruses of subtypes H8 and H9 32. Thus, certain wild bird species may be 
predominant hosts for LPAI virus subtypes and strains that infect poultry, but remain 
unidentified due to limited sampling. It is also possible that certain unfrequently sampled wild 
bird species act as intermediate (bridge) hosts between mallards and poultry. If the bridge 
host is susceptible and able to transmit H8 and H9 viruses, and comes into direct contact or 
share their habitat with both mallards and poultry 33, then these viruses would be likely 
detected more frequently in chickens, even if the subtypes are rare in mallards. We observed 
that geese were frequently infected with LPAI viruses of the same subtype combinations as 
poultry, e.g. H6N2, H6N8 and H7N7 (Chapter 2), indicating a role for geese in the transmission 
of LPAI viruses to poultry. However, no viruses of subtypes H8 and H9 have been isolated from 
this species, and genetic evidence for direct transmission of LPAI viruses from geese to poultry 
is lacking. Increased sampling of non-traditional species is needed to identify potential wild 
bird species of importance for virus transmission to poultry. 
The infrequent detection of H8 and H9 viruses in wild birds may also be affected by 
the time at which sampling activities were performed. In most surveillance studies, sampling 
of wild birds is done during autumn migration, when the LPAI virus prevalence in wild birds is 
high and sample collection is easy. LPAI viruses of common subtypes may be detected more 
frequently due to a higher fitness in mallards, while subtypes with a lower fitness are less 
frequently detected due to competition 15, producing a biased picture of which subtypes 
circulate in wild birds year-round. After the prevalence peak, re-infections with the same or 
related HA subtypes are uncommon due to host population immunity 34,35, enabling infection 
of more distantly related viruses. Indeed, viruses of subtype H8 were detected most frequently 
outside the prevalence peak during a year-round surveillance study in mallards in Sweden 15. 
A bias in the timing of sampling may also be a reason why LPAI viruses of subtypes H8 and 
H9 were only sporadically detected in wild birds in the Netherlands (Chapter 2). Increased 
sampling outside the prevalence peak may allow the detection of rare subtypes.  
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Common LPAI virus subtypes in wild birds are rarely detected in poultry 
In contrast to the H8 and H9 subtypes, viruses of subtypes H3 and H4 were frequently detected 
in wild birds in the Netherlands and other European countries 14-16, but rarely in poultry 
(Chapter 2). It has been suggested that subtypes that are frequently detected in mallards may 
have increased host specificity and therefore may be less able to infect other hosts 15, such as 
chickens. However, an infection experiment demonstrated that chickens are susceptible to 
infection with wild duck-origin LPAI viruses of subtypes H3 and H4, despite their infrequent 
detection in poultry in surveillance studies (Chapter 3). The results suggest that the infrequent 
detection of H3 and H4 viruses in poultry is not caused by host range restrictions of the virus 
or a lower susceptibility of chickens for these subtypes. If virus transmission from mallards to 
chickens occurs via another avian (bridge) host, this species may act as a barrier for 
transmission of H3 and H4 viruses. However, the fact that mallards have been identified as 
frequent visitors of free-range areas of Dutch chicken farms 23,36 indicates that transmission 
between mallards and chickens could take place without the intervention of a bridge host. 
Although no direct contact between mallards and poultry was observed, transmission from 
mallards to poultry may occur via indirect contact, e.g. via faeces-contaminated water or soil 
36. In this situation, the environment provides a bridge for LPAI virus transmission from wild
birds to poultry. It is possible that the persistence of LPAI viruses in the environment varies
between subtypes and strains 37 and might be reduced for the H3 and H4 viruses, resulting in
a low number of introductions of these subtypes into poultry flocks.
Another explanation for the rare detection of subtypes H3 and H4 in poultry could 
be that virus introduction and circulation of these subtypes in poultry remained undetected 
during routine screening due to subtype-dependent variations in antibody responses. Poultry 
farms are tested at least once a year for the presence of antibodies against AI viruses. These 
antibodies are generally detectable for several weeks or months 38. However, the antibody 
response of chickens against viruses of subtypes H3 and H4 may be lower or waning earlier 
than for viruses of subtypes H8 and H9. If so, viruses of subtypes H3 and H4 may not be 
detected in poultry due to insufficient sampling. This would also mean that the number of 
LPAI virus introductions into poultry is higher than expected based on currently available 
surveillance data. Long-term experimental studies that investigate antibody responses against 
different subtypes and strains in poultry are needed to determine potential variations between 
LPAI viruses.  
The role of between-farm transmission in LPAI virus spread 
Although wild birds are considered the primary source of LPAI virus infections in poultry, flocks 
may also become infected by transmission between farms. Continuous monitoring and control 
of LPAI viruses in poultry is particularly important to prevent the large-scale spread of LPAI 
viruses of subtypes H5 and H7, which can eventually mutate into HPAI viruses in poultry. 
Previous HPAI outbreaks have demonstrated the devastating consequences of what happens 
without controlling LPAI H5 and H7 viruses in poultry, of which the HPAI H7N1 outbreak in 
Italy in 2000-2001 is a prime example 39. The HPAI H7N7 virus that caused a large outbreak in 
the Netherlands in 2003 likely also emerged after the introduction of a LPAI virus in poultry 40. 
The spread of LPAI H5 and H7 viruses in poultry increases the likelihood of LPAI-to-HPAI 
transition events and the occurrence of other virulence mutations. Sustained between-farm 
transmission of LPAI viruses has most frequently been reported for viruses of subtypes H5 and 




since 1990 19,20 and a recent outbreak of H3N1 virus in Belgium in 2019 47 demonstrated that 
LPAI viruses of other (non-notifiable) subtypes can also spread rapidly in poultry with major 
socio-economic impact on the poultry industries. Therefore, it is important not only to prevent 
LPAI virus introductions from the wild bird reservoir, but also to prevent virus transmission 
between poultry farms.  
Genetic analysis of poultry viruses in the Netherlands demonstrated that between-
farm transmission likely contributed considerably to the incidence of LPAI virus infections in 
poultry in the Netherlands between 2006-2016 (Chapter 4). Contrary to previous LPAI 
outbreaks with sustained transmission between farms, the between-farm transmission events 
in the Netherlands have not led to massive spread of LPAI viruses. The spread of LPAI viruses 
may be affected by many factors that determine transmission between poultry flocks, such as 
biosecurity measures, poultry density, poultry production types, between-farm contacts and 
trading movements, and virus characteristics. Decreased biosecurity in poultry dense areas 
was probably the most important factor in the spread of LPAI H7N1 virus in Italy 48. Strict 
biosecurity is considered the most effective measure to prevent outbreaks and subsequent 
spread in poultry. However, knowledge on transmission routes is fundamental to design 
effective preventive measures. Various routes of between-farm transmission have been 
suggested, including direct contact between poultry, indirect contact via the movement of 
persons, contaminated materials, or non-avian vectors between farms 49-54, and transmission 
of virus via water, air or dust 55-58. The risk of virus transmission likely depends on the distance 
between farms 59,60 and is thought to occur more frequently between farms of the same 
poultry type due to a higher probability of contacts 51. Indeed, we identified clusters of farms 
infected with the same virus, but also showed that between-farm transmission was not 
restricted to holdings of the same poultry production type (Chapter 4). Unfortunately, the 
routes of transmission of LPAI viruses between the infected farms in the Netherlands could 
not be resolved, which is partly due to the limited number of virus isolations from poultry and 
the lack of contact tracing. 
Between-farm transmission may also depend on the characteristics of the virus. 
Large-scale spread of viruses is influenced by the ability of the virus to replicate and be shed 
for a sufficient period, which allows transmission between hosts. For example, the rapid spread 
of HPAI H5N2 virus in turkeys in the USA in 2014-2015 was likely associated with an unusually 
long pre-clinical period, high levels of virus shedding, and increased adaptation of the virus to 
turkeys 61. For some of the LPAI viruses that were transmitted between poultry holdings in the 
Netherlands, we identified a deletion in the stalk region of the NA protein (Chapter 4), which 
is an important adaption marker in Galliformes hosts (chickens and turkeys) 62,63 and may 
influence virus replication, excretion and pathogenicity 64-66. An experimental study on the 
transmission dynamics of LPAI H5N7 and H7N7 viruses in chickens indicated that transmission 
characteristics can vary considerably between strains 67. Experiments comparing transmission 
efficiencies of different LPAI virus strains in various poultry types are limited, in particular for 
non-notifiable subtypes. 
Optimisation of LPAI virus surveillance efforts 
A reduction in time and resources for AI virus surveillance in live wild birds has been observed 
in recent years. In addition, surveillance in poultry will likely not be expanded, since the newly 
adopted regulation on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’) no longer obliges 
European Union (EU) member states to take immediate eradication measures, while control 
Avian influenza at the wild bird-poultry interface
212
measures and surveillance remain required for LPAI H5 and H7 viruses from April 2021 
onwards 68. However, continued or even expanded monitoring with more targeted surveillance 
approaches is needed in order to better understand how LPAI viruses are spread at the wild 
bird-poultry interface. The undetected circulation of LPAI viruses in the wild bird population is 
likely due to biases for target species, locations and times in the surveillance studies, 
hampering the identification of wild bird risk species for LPAI virus introduction into poultry. 
Surveillance may be improved by determining which wild bird species are common near farms, 
allowing targeted sampling of species within specific periods of the year.  Video-camera 
monitoring has recently been used to quantify wild fauna visits in free-range facilities of an 
outdoor chicken farm in the Netherlands, providing round-the-clock monitoring data 36. 
Although this study is limited to one farm, it confirms previous observations that mallards are 
common near farms 23, and also identifies a wide range of other species that may be involved 
in the transmission of viruses to poultry. There have also been research efforts to develop a 
method to investigate (indirect) contacts between wild birds and poultry based on faecal 
microbiome compositions 69. These studies contribute to the identification of potential wild 
bird risk species for infection of poultry, and a better understanding of the role of wild birds 
in the transmission of LPAI viruses to poultry. It remains unclear why certain subtypes that are 
common in mallards are not transmitted to poultry, or remain undetected, while indirect 
contact between the two bird groups has been observed. Experimental studies on the 
persistence of LPAI viruses in the environment, the within-flock transmissibility of LPAI viruses, 
and the induction of adaptive immune responses upon LPAI virus infections in poultry are 
limited, but would provide more information on subtype-dependent differences in LPAI virus 
dynamics. 
Surveillance for LPAI virus infections in poultry in the Netherlands is more stringent 
than required by the EU programme 70,71. For example, outdoor chickens and turkeys are tested 
more frequently than other poultry types because of the assumed higher risk for LPAI virus 
infections 72-74. In addition, multiplex serological methods have been used for rapid diagnostic 
screening for all subtypes 75. In contrast, in most EU member states, serological monitoring in 
poultry is limited to LPAI viruses of subtypes H5 and H7. Heightened surveillance of high-risk 
poultry species and the implementation of multiplex serological methods in other European 
countries would provide more insight into the occurrence of non-notifiable LPAI virus 
subtypes in poultry outside the Netherlands, allowing larger-scale comparison between 
subtype distributions in wild birds and poultry. Poultry surveillance in the Netherlands could 
be improved by increasing routine sampling of domestic ducks, which also have a higher risk 
for LPAI virus introduction 74,76,77, and were relatively frequently infected with LPAI viruses in 
the Netherlands despite their relatively small population size (Chapter 2). In addition, LPAI 
virus infections often remain unnoticed until routine serological screening due to a lack of 
clinical signs, while virus isolation and subsequent genetic characterisation can be used to 
trace viruses beyond antigenic subtype and allows comparative analysis between wild bird and 
poultry viruses. Therefore, increased virological screening for non-notifiable LPAI viruses in 
poultry would be valuable to increase our understanding of the transmission of LPAI viruses 
from wild birds to poultry and between farms. Also, contact tracing and tracking of secondary 
infections is generally not performed during LPAI virus outbreaks of non-notifiable subtypes, 




HPAI VIRUSES AT THE WILD-BIRD POULTRY INTERFACE 
HPAI outbreaks do not only occur after LPAI viruses of subtype H5 or H7 mutate into HPAI 
variants in poultry with subsequent transmission between farms, but also when HPAI viruses 
of poultry spill over into wild birds, circulate in wild birds, and eventually enter poultry farms 
elsewhere. In recent years, many countries worldwide have encountered outbreaks of HPAI 
viruses in poultry that were introduced by wild birds. These outbreaks were caused by HPAI 
viruses belonging to the H5 A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (GsGd) lineage, which emerged in 
China in 1996 78, and have caused numerous outbreaks in poultry in Asia since 1997. The HPAI 
H5 GsGd lineage viruses continued to circulate in poultry and evolved into multiple genetic 
clades and subtype combinations (i.e. H5N2, H5N3, H5N5, H5N6 and H5N8) 79. A role for wild 
birds in the spread of these viruses was already suggested during outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 
clade 2.2 virus in poultry in Asia during 2001-2004 80, but became more evident during a large-
scale HPAI H5N1 outbreak in migratory birds in Qinghai Lake, China, in spring 2005 81,82, and 
the subsequent global expansion of HPAI H5N1 viruses during the 2005-2006 epizootic 5. 
These HPAI H5N1 viruses were highly pathogenic for some wild bird species 81,82, while prior 
to the detection of HPAI H5 GsGd lineage viruses, HPAI viruses were rarely detected in wild 
birds, and outbreaks of severe disease and high mortality were confined to poultry 83. The 
spread of HPAI viruses in wild birds can be influenced by many factors, such as wild bird 
species infected, pre-existing immunity due to previous infections, the timing of reassortment 
events, or alterations in virus characteristics. With introductions and subsequent circulating of 
HPAI viruses in the wild bird population, it has become increasingly important to prevent re-
introductions into poultry. A better understanding of HPAI virus circulation in wild birds will 
help to predict virus spread in wild birds and the risk of exposure of these viruses to poultry. 
The timing of reassortment influences HPAI virus spread in wild migratory birds 
In late 2014, outbreaks of HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group A viruses in Europe 84,85 and North 
America 61 occurred simultaneously, preceding a detection of the virus in South Korea in early 
2014 86. In a comprehensive global analysis based on genetic, epidemiological and 
ornithological data, long-distance migratory birds were identified as the most likely ancestral 
hosts for both outbreaks 87, confirming previous outbreak studies 88-90. The affected poultry 
farms were often located in wild bird areas, and indirect contact with materials contaminated 
with wild bird faeces was considered the most likely route of introduction into poultry farms 
87. Other routes, such as virus introduction via trade of infected poultry or poultry products,
were considered less likely. The analysis also identified main routes of large-scale geographical
spread of the H5N8 virus by migratory birds, from Southeast Asia to northern breeding
grounds during spring, and then in autumn from these breeding grounds to wintering sites in
North America and Europe 87.
Two years later, in 2016-2017, the most extensive HPAI outbreak occurred in Europe 
91. This outbreak was characterized by the detection of many different reassortment viruses. In
total, five different HPAI H5N8 viruses of clade 2.3.4.4 group B reassortant viruses were
detected in Europe 92-95, containing variable genome segment constellations by reassortment
with co-circulating LPAI viruses. In addition, three HPAI H5N5 reassortant viruses and one HPAI
H5N6 virus were identified during this epizootic 92-99 (Chapter 5), which were detected at lower
frequencies compared to H5N8. Like the H5N1 clade 2.2 viruses and H5 clade 2.3.4.4 group A
viruses, the H5 clade 2.3.4.4 group B viruses were detected at northern breeding grounds in
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spring 100,101, prior to their introduction into Europe during autumn. Presumably, the viruses 
were introduced into Europe by migratory wild birds that travel over long distances from 
northern breeding grounds to wintering sites in Europe, similar to the HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 
group A virus in 2014 87. The detection of a HPAI H5N5 virus in the Russian Far East also 
indicated that the viruses were disseminated by migratory birds via a separate flyway towards 
the Beringia region 96 (Chapter 5). However, in contrast to the HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group 
A virus 88, H5N5 viruses were not detected in North America. Phylogenetic analysis also 
indicated similarities in the spread of HPAI viruses within Europe, with multiple independent 
introductions of H5N5 viruses into Europe followed by local spread (Chapter 5), similar to 
H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group B viruses 94,102.  
Information on patterns of global HPAI virus spread, combined with estimates of the 
timing of reassortment events, can be used to estimate when (i.e. before, during or after the 
migration of birds from their breeding grounds) and where (i.e. at breeding grounds or along 
migration routes to Europe) reassortment events occurred, providing more insight into the 
evolutionary history of the viruses. The emergence of novel strains just before or during the 
breeding season may enable virus spread to many birds at breeding sites, and subsequent 
widespread dispersal to other (wintering-) areas, while strains that emerge at the end of the 
breeding season, after the start of the autumn migration, may be transmitted only to a 
relatively low number of wild birds. Indeed, the most frequently detected and geographically 
widespread HPAI H5N8 reassortant probably emerged in spring, while the less frequently 
detected H5N8 reassortant likely emerged in summer 92. Likewise, the most frequently isolated 
HPAI H5N5 reassortant probably emerged in summer, while the H5N5 reassortant that was 
detected at low frequencies likely emerged in autumn 94 (Chapter 5). Although alterations in 
the virus genome may also influence HPAI virus spread, e.g. by affecting virus infectivity, 
transmissibility and pathogenicity, infection of primary chicken and duck cells revealed only 
minor differences in cytopathogenicity and replication kinetics between H5N5 variants and 
H5N8 viruses (Chapter 5). Thus, the timing of emergence may be an important driver of 
variations in the number of detections of different virus subtypes and reassortant variants, and 
may also explain the limited distribution of H5N5 viruses compared to H5N8 viruses. 
Comprehensive analysis of the viral genome increases our understanding of the evolution and 
spread of HPAI viruses in the wild bird population. 
Differences in HPAI virus pathogenicity among wild bird and poultry species 
The number of recorded HPAI virus infections varied between the outbreaks of H5N8 clade 
2.3.4.4 group A viruses 2014-2015 84, H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group B viruses in 2016-2017 92, and 
H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4 group B viruses in 2017-2018 in Europe 103,104. In addition, apparent 
differences in mortality were observed in wild birds 91. The H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group A virus 
was detected in only a limited number sick or dead wild birds, and in faecal samples of Eurasian 
wigeons in the Netherlands 105. Also, HPAI virus-biased antibodies were detected in wild birds 
in the Netherlands, mainly Eurasian wigeons and swans 106. In contrast, during the H5N8 clade 
2.3.4.4 group B outbreak, mass deaths of wild birds were reported, of which most involved 
tufted ducks and Eurasian wigeons 107. During this outbreak, virus was also detected in 
apparently healthy birds, mainly mallards 102, indicating that these species may be more 
resistant and therefore can act as a reservoir. HPAI virus-biased antibodies were also detected 




H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4 group B virus also caused lethal infections in wild birds of various species, 
but the number of detections was low compared to the H5N8 2.3.4.4 group B outbreak 104. 
Previous experimental studies in mallards and Pekin ducks have demonstrated that 
HPAI GsGd viruses of diverse subtypes have reduced virulence compared to the parental H5N1 
virus 108-111, showing that virus pathogenicity varies between subtypes and strains. Also, the 
susceptibility to disease and the ability to efficiently shed virus differs between species 111. 
Corresponding with the field observations, H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group A virus infection was 
subclinical in common waterfowl species 110. Eurasian wigeons showed the highest excretion 
of virus 110, which is in line with the detection of virus in faeces and antibodies in this species 
during the outbreak. In contrast, an experimental study with H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 virus group B 
virus showed high mortality among mallards 112, which corresponds with the high number of 
deaths among wild birds during the outbreak. Pre-existing immunity may have existed in the 
mallard population, explaining the detection of this virus in apparently healthy mallards during 
the outbreak.  
Virus pathogenicity of HPAI H5 GsGd lineage viruses also differed between poultry 
species, with attenuated and less invasive infection in ducks as compared to chickens 113,114. 
Intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) tests confirmed high pathogenicity for all three 
outbreak strains in chickens. However, interestingly, IVPI tests in Pekin ducks, the most 
common domestic duck species, revealed a lower pathogenicity score for the H5N8 2.3.4.4 
group A virus compared to the 2.3.4.4 group B viruses of subtypes H5N8 and H5N6 104. 
Although the H5N6 virus showed similar high pathogenicity in both chickens and Pekin ducks, 
analysis of the virus distribution and associated histopathology between various organs still 
revealed less extensive virus distribution in ducks as compared to chickens (Chapter 6). Also, 
histopathological changes and viral antigen was detected in most organs of chickens, whereas 
in ducks the presence of microscopic lesions and the expression of antigen were more 
prominent in respiratory organs, especially the lung (Chapter 6), indicating that the 
presentation of the disease varies between the two poultry species. Moreover, previous 
experimental studies with HPAI H5 GsGd lineage viruses have demonstrated viral antigen 
expression in the pancreas and brain 108,109,115-117, but this was not observed for the HPAI H5N6 
virus in Pekin ducks (Chapter 6), indicating that the tissue distribution can also vary between 
strains. Changes in virus pathogenicity may influence HPAI virus infection dynamics in wild 
birds and poultry. If the virus does not cause serious disease, infected wild birds will likely 
continue to migrate, allowing virus dispersal over large geographical distances. In addition, 
the viruses may remain undetected due to a lack of overt clinical signs, but pose a high risk 
for susceptible bird populations, such as poultry. Experimental studies determining virus 
infectivity, transmissibility and pathogenicity of novel HPAI reassortant viruses in different bird 
species are of great value to better understand the role of viral characteristic changes in HPAI 
virus spread. 
Optimisation of HPAI virus surveillance efforts 
Based on the global patterns of HPAI virus spread that have been identified during previous 
outbreaks, recommendations can be made with regard to wild bird surveillance sampling 
location and timing. Increased sampling activities in Southeast Asia before the breeding 
season in early spring, in northern breeding areas in the breeding season in spring and early 
summer, and/or sampling at (better accessible) stopover sites along major migration routes 
in late summer and during autumn, would help to predict the spread of HPAI viruses to Europe. 
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Sampling at sites where large amount of wild birds from different migration routes come in 
contact may be most efficient. In addition, local sampling of wild birds in Europe during the 
arrival of migratory birds in autumn and early winter would be advisable for the early detection 
of HPAI viruses entering Europe. Increased sampling along major wild bird flyways will increase 
available data to investigate viral dispersal in migratory birds, allowing a more detailed analysis 
of virus evolution in time. 
Mallards have been the focus of many surveillance programs, but monitoring should 
also be targeted towards other key species in the dispersal of HPAI viruses that migrate over 
large distances, are less susceptible for disease, and therefore may be responsible for the 
global spread of HPAI viruses. Furthermore, variations in pathogenicity between virus strains 
among avian species must be taken into account during the design of surveillance strategies 
for HPAI viruses. Passive monitoring has been put in place by EU member states for the 
detection of HPAI viruses in sick or dead wild birds 70,71, but active monitoring is required for 
the detection of HPAI viruses in wild bird species that survive HPAI virus infection without 
presenting overt signs of disease. The latter approach would be valuable for the timely 
detection of HPAI viruses when no wild bird mortality is observed, and to identify wild bird 
species that are responsible for long-distance spread. Active surveillance by serological 
monitoring can also provide information on previous HPAI virus infections and the immune 
status of wild birds. Passive surveillance will remain useful for the detection of HPAI viruses in 
species that become sick or die upon infection, thereby acting as an early warning system for 
local virus circulation.  
Although the current passive surveillance program for AI viruses in poultry is 
sufficient for the early detection of HPAI virus introductions into poultry, the threat of HPAI 
viruses circulating in wild birds highlights the importance of early control measures to prevent 
HPAI transmission to poultry. Control measures include keeping poultry indoors to prevent 
contact with wild birds when HPAI virus detections are reported in the Netherlands or other 
European countries, and enhancing farmer awareness and implementation of biosecurity 
measures during high-risk periods for HPAI virus introductions. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Concluding, the studies described in this thesis provide novel insights into the spread of AI 
viruses at the wild bird-poultry interface. We demonstrated that detailed genetic analysis of 
AI viruses, including viruses of non-notifiable subtypes, is a valuable tool to investigate the 
origin, evolution and transmission patterns of viruses, thereby improving our understanding 
of AI virus circulation at the wild bird-poultry interface. The studies also emphasized the value 
of combining genetic analysis with information on the spatiotemporal distribution or 
phenotypic traits, such as the capacity of viruses to replicate or cause disease in specific hosts. 
The studies have led to recommendations regarding current national and international 
surveillance programs, including more targeted monitoring based on sampling location, 
timing and species. More targeted monitoring is pivotal to identify sources of virus infections 
in poultry and to elucidate potential routes of virus transmission into poultry and between 
farms. The implementation of more efficient monitoring and effective prevention of 
introduction and spread of AI virus in poultry is important to reduce the threat to both animal 
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Aviaire influenza (AI), ook wel vogelgriep genoemd, is een besmettelijke vogelziekte die wordt 
veroorzaakt door het influenza A virus, dat behoort tot de familie Orthomyxoviridae. AI 
virussen komen van nature voor bij wilde vogels. De belangrijkste gastheren behoren tot de 
orders Anseriformes (waaronder eenden, ganzen en zwanen) en Charadriiformes (waaronder 
meeuwen, sternen en steltlopers). Het AI virus bevat een negatief enkelstrengs RNA genoom 
dat bestaat uit acht gensegmenten (Hoofdstuk 1). Twee gensegmenten coderen voor de 
hemagglutinine (HA) en neuraminidase (NA) eiwitten, die aan het oppervlakte van het virus 
tot expressie komen. Deze HA en NA eiwitten zijn respectievelijk betrokken bij het vasthechten 
aan en het verlaten van de gastheercel, en worden gebruikt om AI virussen onder te verdelen 
in subtypen. In vogels komen 16 HA (H1-H16) subtypen en 9 NA (N1-N9) subtypen voor, in 
variërende combinaties. De overige segmenten van het virale genoom bestaan uit de 
zogenoemde interne genen, die coderen voor eiwitten die onder andere verantwoordelijk zijn 
voor de replicatie van het virale genoom, eiwitexpressie en modulatie van het 
afweermechanisme van de gastheer. AI virussen kunnen in een hoog tempo veranderen. 
Tijdens de replicatie van het virus treden kleine veranderingen (mutaties) op in het virale 
genoom, wat resulteert in genetische variatie in de viruspopulatie. Daarnaast kunnen 
gensegmenten worden uitgewisseld tussen twee of meerdere AI virussen, waardoor grote 
genetische veranderingen optreden binnen een zeer korte tijdsperiode. Dit verschijnsel wordt 
ook wel reassortment genoemd. Door de snelle evolutie ontstaan continu nieuwe 
virusvarianten van nieuwe HA en NA subtype combinaties, waardoor het virus zich eenvoudig 
kan aanpassen aan zijn omgeving en de afweermechanismen van de gastheer omzeilt. 
Naast de HA en NA subtypen worden AI virussen ook onderverdeeld op basis van 
het ziekmakend vermogen van het virus, ofwel de pathogeniteit. Er wordt onderscheid 
gemaakt tussen laagpathogene aviaire influenza (LPAI) virussen en hoogpathogene aviaire 
influenza (HPAI) virussen. De meeste AI virussen zijn LPAI virussen die in wilde vogels 
circuleren zonder ziekte te veroorzaken. Wilde vogels kunnen het AI virus overdragen naar 
andere dieren, waaronder zoogdieren en pluimvee (kippen, kalkoenen en eenden). In pluimvee 
kunnen sommige LPAI virussen milde ziekteverschijnselen veroorzaken, bestaande uit 
verminderde voeropname, eilegdaling of lage mortaliteit. LPAI virussen van subtypen H5 en 
H7 kunnen in pluimvee muteren naar de zeer besmettelijke HPAI variant. HPAI virussen 
veroorzaken wisselende ziekteverschijnselen in wilde vogels, en ernstige klinische 
verschijnselen en massale sterfte onder pluimvee. Om die reden is, ter voorkoming van 
grootschalige vogelgriepuitbraken, het melden en bestrijden van AI virussen van subtypen H5 
en H7 in pluimvee verplicht gesteld door de Wereldorganisatie voor Diergezondheid (OIE), 
ook als het een LPAI variant betreft. Uitbraken van vogelgriep leveren niet alleen een direct 
gevaar op voor de diergezondheid, maar kunnen ook grote sociale en economische gevolgen 
hebben voor de pluimveehouderij. Bovendien kunnen sommige varianten mensen infecteren, 
en vormen daarmee een bedreiging voor de volksgezondheid. Het vroegtijdig herkennen, 
controleren en voorkomen van uitbraken is daarom van groot belang. 
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Dit proefschrift 
Het in dit proefschrift beschreven onderzoek beoogt meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de 
verspreiding van AI virussen in wilde vogels en pluimvee. Deze kennis is belangrijk voor de 
ontwikkeling van efficiënte monitoringsstrategieën en effectieve maatregelen, ter voorkoming 
van AI virusintroductie en -verspreiding in pluimvee. Uit een langdurige monitoringsstudie 
naar AI virussen in wilde vogels en commercieel gehouden pluimvee in Nederland is gebleken 
dat LPAI virussen van bepaalde subtypen regelmatig in pluimvee worden gedetecteerd, maar 
slechts sporadisch in wilde vogels (Hoofdstuk 2). Dit suggereert dat LPAI virussen die 
pluimvee infecteren in wilde vogels circuleren, maar niet worden gedetecteerd. LPAI virussen 
die veel in wilde vogels voorkomen werden daarentegen zelden in pluimvee gevonden. De 
bevinding dat kippen experimenteel vatbaar zijn voor LPAI virussubtypen die een sterkte 
associatie laten zien met wilde vogels (Hoofdstuk 3) suggereert dat LPAI virussen 
waarschijnlijk niet rechtstreeks van de vaak bemonsterde wilde vogelsoorten op pluimvee 
worden overgedragen. Daarnaast laat de studie zien dat pluimveekoppels in Nederland niet 
alleen besmet zijn geraakt met LPAI virussen uit wilde vogels, maar ook door overdracht van 
virussen tussen pluimveebedrijven (Hoofdstuk 4). Tenslotte onderzochten we de bijdrage van 
het moment van ontstaan van nieuwe HPAI virusvarianten (Hoofdstuk 5), en variaties in de 
pathogeniteit van HPAI virussen tussen vogelsoorten (Hoofdstuk 6), in de verspreiding van 
HPAI virussen in wilde vogels en pluimvee. 
DE VERSPREIDING VAN LPAI VIRUSSEN IN WILDE VOGELS EN PLUIMVEE 
Wereldwijd wordt al ruim twee decennia intensief gemonitord op de aanwezigheid van AI 
virussen in wilde vogels en pluimvee. Ook Nederland kent intensieve monitoringprogramma’s, 
die niet alleen gebruikt worden voor de vroege detectie van nieuw opkomende AI virussen in 
wilde vogels en pluimvee, maar ook om de verspreiding, diversiteit en evolutie van AI virussen 
te bestuderen. De monitoring voor AI virussen in wilde vogels bestaat uit actieve monitoring 
in levende vogels en passieve monitoring in ernstig zieke of dode vogels. In beide gevallen 
vindt het aantonen van infectie meestal plaats op basis van virologische methoden, waarbij 
bepaald wordt of viraal genetisch materiaal aanwezig is in monsters uit de keel en cloaca van 
vogels. De monitoring voor AI virussen in pluimvee bestaat ook uit actieve als passieve 
monitoring. Tijdens de actieve monitoring worden alle pluimveebedrijven in Nederland 
tenminste één keer per jaar serologisch getest op de aanwezigheid influenza virus-specifieke 
antistoffen in het bloed. De passieve monitoring op basis van virologische methoden wordt 
uitgevoerd ter bevestiging van positieve serologie of wanneer er sprake is van een verdenking 
op basis van klinische verschijnselen. De monitoringstudies hebben reeds belangrijke inzichten 
geleverd in de complexe epidemiologie van AI virussen. Echter, vaak wordt de bron van AI 
virusinfecties in pluimvee en verspreidingsroutes niet geïdentificeerd. Eerdere studies hebben 
laten zien dat wilde vogels veel verschillende AI virussen bij zich dragen, en dat de detectie 
van verschillende subtypen varieert tussen vogelsoorten. Charadriiformes soorten, waaronder 
meeuwen, zijn voornamelijk geïnfecteerd met LPAI virussen van subtypen H13 en H16, die 
zelden in andere vogelsoorten worden gevonden. In Anseriformes soorten, waarvan de wilde 
eend het meest intensief is bemonsterd, worden LPAI virussen van subtypen H3, H4 en H6 
vaak gedetecteerd, terwijl andere subtypen (H8-H12) zelden worden gevonden. Analyses van 




kunnen worden gebruikt om wilde vogelsoorten te identificeren die de bron zijn van 
virusinfecties in pluimvee. Het bepalen van de oorsprong en verspreidingspatronen van AI 
virussen naar pluimvee is cruciaal voor het ontwerpen van effectieve strategieën om 
introducties en verspreiding te voorkomen. 
Onopgemerkte circulatie van LPAI virussen in de wilde vogelpopulatie 
Als onderdeel van dit proefschrift is de genetische diversiteit en verspreiding van LPAI virussen 
in wilde vogels en commercieel pluimvee in Nederland tussen 2006 en 2016 in kaart gebracht 
(Hoofdstuk 2). Hiervoor zijn de gegevens uit monitoringsstudies gebruikt. Uit deze studie 
blijkt dat in Nederland een grote diversiteit aan LPAI virussen in wilde vogels circuleert. 
Bovendien vinden er regelmatig introducties in pluimvee plaats. De meeste LPAI virussen uit 
wilde vogels zijn geïsoleerd uit monsters van wilde eenden en meeuwen. LPAI virusinfecties in 
pluimvee werden het vaakst aangetoond in legkippen met vrije uitloop, kalkoenen en eenden. 
Er is een breed scala aan LPAI virussubtypen geïdentificeerd, met verschillen in 
subtypeverdeling tussen Charadriiformes en Anseriformes vogelsoorten die overeenkomen 
met eerdere studies. De studie onthulde ook verschillen in de subtypeverdeling tussen wilde 
vogels en pluimvee. Zo werden virussen van subtypen H8 en H9 regelmatig in pluimvee 
gedetecteerd, maar slechts sporadisch in wilde vogels. Dit is opvallend aangezien wilde vogels 
als de belangrijkste bron voor AI virussen worden beschouwd. De resultaten doen vermoeden 
dat de verspreiding van LPAI virussen van wilde vogels naar pluimvee selectief is, en mogelijk 
afhankelijk is van virale factoren die de gastheerspecificiteit van het virus bepalen. H8 en H9 
subtypen zijn mogelijk beter in staat om pluimvee te infecteren dan subtypen die minder vaak 
in pluimvee worden gevonden. Bepaalde H9 virusstammen circuleren endemisch in pluimvee 
in Azië, wat duidt op een efficiënte verspreiding van het virus in pluimvee. Fylogenetische 
analyses toonden echter aan dat H9 virusstammen geïsoleerd uit pluimvee in Nederland niet 
verwant zijn aan de Aziatische virusstammen, maar voorouders delen met virussen geïsoleerd 
uit wilde vogels, met name wilde eenden in Nederland en Zweden (Hoofdstuk 2). 
Experimentele infectie van kippen met H8 en H9 virussen geïsoleerd uit wilde eenden in 
Nederland liet zien dat de vatbaarheid van kippen sterk varieerde tussen de verschillende H8 
en H9 virusstammen (Hoofdstuk 3). Deze bevindingen suggereren dat LPAI virussen niet 
rechtstreeks worden overgedragen van wilde eenden en andere vaak bemonsterde wilde 
vogelsoorten naar pluimvee. Dit wordt ondersteund door het feit dat er geen directe 
genetische verwantschappen zijn aangetroffen tussen virussen uit wilde vogels en pluimvee 
(Hoofdstuk 2), wat aangeeft dat LPAI virussen die pluimvee infecteren in wilde vogels 
circuleren zonder te worden gedetecteerd. 
Wilde eenden worden gezien als belangrijke gastheren voor het behoud en de 
verspreiding van LPAI virussen, omdat zij de meest voorkomende eendensoort zijn, vaak 
geïnfecteerd zijn met LPAI virussen, een grote diversiteit aan LPAI virussen bij zich dragen en 
over grote geografische afstanden kunnen migreren. Veel monitoringsprogramma’s richten 
zich daarom op wilde eenden, zo ook in Nederland (Hoofdstuk 2). Een studie in Zweden liet 
zien dat wilde eenden waarschijnlijk een rol hebben in het behoud van zeldzame LPAI 
virussubtypen, waaronder H8 en H9. Zij toonden aan dat de interne genen van zeldzame 
subtypen genetisch verwant zijn aan LPAI virussen van subtypen die vaak worden 
gedetecteerd in wilde eenden. Echter, het feit dat bepaalde LPAI virussubtypen zelden in wilde 
eenden worden gedetecteerd suggereert dat wilde eenden niet de belangrijkste gastheer zijn 
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voor alle subtypen, en mogelijk ook niet de gastheer zijn voor LPAI virussen die pluimvee 
infecteren. Het is mogelijk dat virussen van zeldzame LPAI virussubtypen, waaronder H8 en 
H9, in wilde vogelsoorten circuleren die minder vaak worden bemonsterd tijdens 
monitoringsprogramma’s, bijvoorbeeld omdat deze vogels moeilijker te vangen zijn. 
Anseriformes vogelsoorten die ook LPAI virussen bij zich dragen zijn bijvoorbeeld andere 
zwemeenden (waaronder smienten, wintertalingen en krakeenden), duikeenden, ganzen en 
zwanen. Bovendien zijn zeevogels die tot de Charadriiformes orde behoren, in het bijzonder 
de zeekoet, relatief vaak geïnfecteerd met influenza A groep 1 virussen, waar subtypen H8 en 
H9 onder vallen. Bepaalde wilde vogelsoorten zijn dus mogelijk belangrijke gastheren voor 
LPAI virussen die pluimvee infecteren, maar worden niet geïdentificeerd door beperkte 
bemonstering. Het is ook mogelijk dat deze vogelsoorten fungeren als tussengastheren voor 
de overdracht van virussen van wilde eenden naar pluimvee. Als de tussengastheer vatbaar is 
voor H8 en H9 virussen, in staat is om deze virussen over te dragen en hun leefomgeving deelt 
met zowel wilde eenden als pluimvee, dan zouden de virussen waarschijnlijk vaker worden 
gedetecteerd in pluimvee, zelfs als de subtypen zeldzaam zijn in wilde eenden. De observatie 
dat ganzen relatief vaak besmet zijn met LPAI virussen van hetzelfde subtype als pluimvee, 
bijvoorbeeld H6N2, H6N8 en H7N7 (Hoofdstuk 2), kan wijzen op een rol voor ganzen in de 
overdracht van LPAI virussen naar pluimvee. Er zijn echter geen virussen van subtypen H8 en 
H9 uit deze vogelsoort geïsoleerd en geen genetisch aanwijzingen voor directe overdracht 
van LPAI virussen van ganzen naar pluimvee gevonden. Bemonstering van niet-traditionele 
vogelsoorten is nodig om mogelijke wilde vogelsoorten te identificeren die betrokken zijn bij 
de overdracht van virus naar pluimvee. 
De geringe detectie van H8 en H9 virussen in wilde vogels wordt mogelijk ook 
veroorzaakt door de periode in het jaar waarin de bemonsteringsactiviteiten worden 
uitgevoerd. In veel monitoringsstudies vindt bemonstering van wilde vogels plaats tijdens de 
migratieperiode in de herfst, wanneer een hoge prevalentie van virus in wilde vogels wordt 
waargenomen en het verzamelen van materiaal relatief eenvoudig is. Virussen van 
veelvoorkomende subtypen worden tijdens deze periode mogelijk vaker gedetecteerd door 
een hogere fitness in wilde eenden, terwijl subtypen met een lagere fitness door concurrentie 
minder vaak worden gevonden. Na de prevalentiepiek komen herinfecties met dezelfde of 
gerelateerde subtypen minder vaak voor vanwege immuniteit in de gastheerpopulatie, wat 
infectie met minder verwante virussen en subtypen mogelijk maakt. Tijdens een 
monitoringsonderzoek in wilde eenden in Zweden werden LPAI virussen van subtype H8 
inderdaad vaker buiten de prevalentiepiek gedetecteerd. De tijd van bemonstering kan ook 
een reden zijn waarom subtypen H8 en H9 slechts sporadisch in wilde vogels in Nederland 
zijn gedetecteerd (Hoofdstuk 2). Verhoogde bemonstering van wilde vogels buiten de 
prevalentiepiek kan de detectie van zeldzame subtypen mogelijk maken. 
Veelvoorkomende subtypen in wilde vogels zelden gedetecteerd in pluimvee 
In tegenstelling tot subtypen H8 en H9 werden subtypen H3 en H4 regelmatig in wilde vogels 
in Nederland en andere Europese landen gedetecteerd, maar zelden in pluimvee (Hoofdstuk 
2). Het is mogelijk dat subtypen die vaker in wilde eenden worden gedetecteerd een 
verhoogde gastheerspecificiteit hebben en daardoor minder goed in staat zijn om andere 
gastheren te infecteren, zoals kippen. Een experimentele studie toonde echter aan dat kippen 




wilde eenden, ondanks hun geringe detectie in pluimvee (Hoofdstuk 3). Deze resultaten 
suggereren dat de zeldzame detectie van subtypen H3 en H4 in pluimvee niet wordt 
veroorzaakt door gastheerrestricties van het virus of een lagere vatbaarheid van kippen voor 
deze subtypen. Als virusverspreiding tussen wilde eenden en pluimvee via een andere vogel 
verloopt, kan het zijn dat deze tussengastheer een barrière voor de overdracht van H3 en H4 
virussen vormt. Het feit dat wilde eenden in andere studies zijn geïdentificeerd als frequente 
bezoekers van vrije uitloopgebieden van Nederlandse kippenbedrijven, impliceert echter dat 
de overdracht tussen wilde eenden en kippen kan plaatsvinden zonder de tussenkomst van 
een andere vogel. Hoewel geen direct contact tussen wilde eenden en pluimvee is 
waargenomen, kan overdracht van wilde eenden op pluimvee plaatsvinden via indirect 
contact, bijvoorbeeld via gecontamineerd water. In deze situatie fungeert de omgeving als 
brug voor de overdracht van LPAI virussen van wilde vogels naar pluimvee. Het is mogelijk dat 
de persistentie van LPAI virussen in de omgeving varieert tussen virussubtypen en -stammen. 
Voor subtypen H3 en H4 is dit mogelijk verminderd, wat resulteert in een lager aantal 
introducties van deze subtypen in pluimvee. 
Een andere verklaring voor de geringe detectie van subtypen H3 en H4 in pluimvee 
zou kunnen zijn dat virusintroductie en -circulatie van deze subtypen in pluimvee tijdens 
routinematige screening onopgemerkt is gebleven vanwege subtype-afhankelijke variaties in 
de antilichaamrespons. Pluimveebedrijven worden ten minste één keer per jaar getest op de 
aanwezigheid van antilichamen tegen AI virussen. Deze antilichamen zijn over het algemeen 
enkele weken of maanden detecteerbaar. De antilichaamrespons van kippen tegen virussen 
van subtypen H3 en H4 kan echter lager zijn of eerder afnemen dan voor virussen van 
subtypen H8 en H9. In dat geval worden subtypen H3 en H4 niet in pluimvee gedetecteerd 
vanwege de beperkte bemonstering. Dit zou ook betekenen dat het aantal LPAI 
virusintroducties in pluimvee hoger ligt dan verondersteld op basis van de huidige 
monitoringsgegevens. Langlopende experimentele studies naar antilichaamresponsen tegen 
verschillende virussubtypen- en stammen in pluimvee zijn nodig om mogelijke variaties tussen 
LPAI virussen te achterhalen. 
De rol van de verspreiding van LPAI virussen tussen bedrijven 
Hoewel wilde vogels worden beschouwd als de belangrijkste bron van AI virussen, kan 
pluimvee ook besmet raken door overdracht tussen bedrijven. Monitoring is belangrijk om 
zicht te houden op LPAI virussen die in Nederland circuleren. Het is belangrijk om de 
verspreiding van LPAI virussen van subtypen H5 en H7 te controleren om mutaties naar HPAI 
virussen te voorkomen. Eerdere grootschalige vogelgriepuitbraken in pluimvee, zoals de 
uitbraak van het HPAI H7N1 virus in Italië in 2000-2001, tonen de verwoestende gevolgen van 
wat er gebeurt als LPAI virussen van subtypen H5 en H7 niet op tijd worden bestreden. Het 
HPAI H7N7 virus dat in 2003 een grote uitbraak in Nederland veroorzaakte is vermoedelijk 
ook ontstaan na de introductie van een LPAI virus in pluimvee. De verspreiding van LPAI H5 
en H7 virussen in pluimvee verhoogt het risico op mutatie van LPAI naar HPAI virus en het 
ontstaan van andere virulentie mutaties. Verspreiding van LPAI virussen tussen 
pluimveebedrijven wordt meestal gerapporteerd voor virussen van subtypen H5 en H7, die 
meldings- en bestrijdingsplichtig zijn. Echter, terugkerende uitbraken van H9N2 virussen in 
Azië en het Midden-Oosten sinds 1990, en een recente uitbraak van het H3N1 virus in België 
in 2019, tonen aan dat LPAI virussen van andere subtypen ook snel kunnen verspreiden in 
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pluimvee met grote sociaal-economische gevolgen voor de pluimveehouderij. Het is daarom 
niet alleen belangrijk om maatregelen te nemen ter voorkoming van nieuwe introducties uit 
wilde vogels, maar ook om de verspreiding van vogelgriepvirussen tussen pluimveebedrijven 
tegen te gaan. 
Een genetische analyse toonde aan dat virusverspreiding tussen pluimveebedrijven 
waarschijnlijk aanzienlijk heeft bijgedragen aan het totale aantal LPAI virusintroducties in 
pluimvee in Nederland tussen 2006-2016 (Hoofdstuk 4). In tegenstelling tot eerdere 
grootschalige LPAI virusuitbraken heeft tussen-bedrijf transmissie in Nederland echter niet 
geleid tot massale verspreiding van LPAI virussen. De verspreiding van LPAI virussen in 
pluimvee kan worden beïnvloed door vele factoren, zoals maatregelen om verspreiding van 
infectieziekten te voorkomen (bioveiligheid), pluimveedichtheid, soorten pluimvee, contacten 
en transport tussen bedrijven, en eigenschappen van het virus. Verminderde bioveiligheid in 
gebieden met een hoge pluimveedichtheid was waarschijnlijk een belangrijke factor bij de 
verspreiding van het LPAI H7N1virus in Italië. Een strenge bioveiligheid wordt beschouwd als 
de meest effectieve maatregel om uitbraken en de daaropvolgende verspreiding van AI 
virussen in pluimvee te voorkomen. Kennis van verspreidingsroutes is van fundamenteel 
belang om effectieve preventieve maatregelen te kunnen nemen. Transmissie tussen bedrijven 
kan via verschillende routes verlopen, waaronder direct contact tussen pluimvee, indirect 
contact via personen, besmet materiaal of vectoren, en overdracht van virussen via water, lucht 
of stofdeeltjes. Het risico van virusoverdracht lijkt afhankelijk te zijn van de afstand tussen 
bedrijven en vaker voor te komen tussen bedrijven van hetzelfde pluimveesoort vanwege een 
grotere kans op contacten. In Nederland zijn inderdaad clusters van bedrijven geïdentificeerd 
die besmet zijn met hetzelfde virus, maar werd ook aangetoond dat de verspreiding tussen 
bedrijven niet beperkt was tot hetzelfde soort pluimvee (Hoofdstuk 4). Helaas konden de 
verspreidingsroutes van LPAI virussen tussen de besmette bedrijven in Nederland niet worden 
achterhaald, wat deels te wijten is aan het beperkte aantal virusisolaties en de afwezigheid van 
contacttracering. 
Virusverspreiding tussen bedrijven kan ook afhangen van eigenschappen van het 
virus. Grootschalige verspreiding van virussen wordt beïnvloed door het vermogen van het 
virus om zich te repliceren en gedurende een voldoende lange periode uit te scheiden, 
waardoor overdracht tussen gastheren mogelijk is. De snelle verspreiding van HPAI H5N2 
virussen in kalkoenen in de Verenigde Staten in 2014-2015 werd bijvoorbeeld geassocieerd 
met een ongewoon lange asymptomatische periode, hoge niveaus van virusuitscheiding en 
verhoogde aanpassing van het virus aan kalkoenen. Voor sommige van de LPAI virussen die 
zijn gevonden op besmette pluimveebedrijven in Nederland werd een deletie in het NA eiwit 
aangetoond (Hoofdstuk 4), wat een belangrijke aanwijzing is voor aanpassing van het virus 
aan Galliformes soorten (kippen en kalkoenen). Deze mutatie kan de replicatie, excretie en 
pathogeniteit van virussen beïnvloeden. Een eerdere experimentele studie naar LPAI H5N7 en 
H7N7 virussen in kippen liet zien dat virale eigenschappen die belangrijk zijn voor efficiënte 
verspreiding aanzienlijk kunnen verschillen tussen virusstammen. Experimenten die de 
transmissie-efficiëntie vergelijken van verschillende LPAI virusstammen in verschillende 





Aanbevelingen voor het verbeteren van LPAI virus monitoring 
De afgelopen jaren is een verminderde inzet van tijd en middelen voor AI virus monitoring in 
levende wilde vogels waargenomen. Bovendien zal monitoring in pluimvee naar verwachting 
niet toenemen, aangezien door een nieuwe verordening in de diergezondheidswet van de 
Europese Unie (EU) LPAI virussen van subtypen H5 and H7 vanaf april 2021 niet langer 
meldings- en bestrijdingsplichtig zijn. Voortdurende of zelfs uitgebreidere monitoring met 
meer gerichte benaderingen is echter nodig om beter te begrijpen hoe vogelgriepvirussen 
zich verspreiden in wilde vogels en pluimvee. De onopgemerkte circulatie van LPAI virussen in 
wilde vogels wordt waarschijnlijk veroorzaakt door een bias in de monitoring met betrekking 
tot de soort, locatie en tijd van bemonsteren, die de identificatie van vogelsoorten als bron 
voor virusinfectie in pluimvee en het ophelderen van verspreidingsroutes bemoeilijkt. De 
monitoringsprogramma’s kunnen worden verbeterd door te bepalen welke wilde 
vogelsoorten veel voorkomen in de omgeving van pluimveebedrijven, wat gerichte 
bemonstering van vogelsoorten binnen specifieke perioden van het jaar mogelijk maakt. In 
een recente studie zijn videocamera's gebruikt om bezoeken van wilde vogels aan de 
uitloopruimte van een kippenbedrijf in Nederland te kwantificeren. Hoewel dit onderzoek 
beperkt is tot één pluimveebedrijf, bevestigt het eerdere waarnemingen dat wilde eenden vaak 
in de buurt van pluimveebedrijven worden gezien. Tevens is een breed scala aan andere wilde 
vogelsoorten geidentificeerd die mogelijk een rol hebben in de overdracht van AI virussen 
naar pluimvee. Er zijn ook onderzoeksinspanningen gedaan om een methode te ontwikkelen 
voor het onderzoeken van (indirecte) contacten tussen wilde vogels en pluimvee op basis van 
de samenstelling van het microbioom in de mest van kippen. Deze studies dragen bij aan de 
identificatie van potentiële wilde vogelsoorten die de bron zijn van virusinfecties in pluimvee 
en de rol van wilde vogels in de overdracht van LPAI virussen naar pluimvee inzichtelijk maken. 
Het blijft onduidelijk waarom bepaalde veelvoorkomende virussubtypen uit wilde eenden niet 
worden overgedragen naar pluimvee of niet in pluimvee worden gedetecteerd, terwijl wel 
indirect contact tussen de twee vogelgroepen is waargenomen. Experimentele studies naar de 
persistentie van LPAI virussen in de omgeving, de overdraagbaarheid van LPAI virussen in 
pluimveekoppels en de inductie van adaptieve immuunresponsen na LPAI virusinfecties bij 
pluimvee zijn beperkt. Deze experimentele studies kunnen meer informatie geven over 
subtype-afhankelijke verschillen in transmissiedynamiek in pluimvee. 
Het huidige AI virus monitoringsprogramma in pluimvee in Nederland is uitgebreider 
dan door het EU programma is vereist. Vrije uitloopkippen en kalkoenen worden bijvoorbeeld 
vaker getest dan andere pluimveesoorten vanwege een hoger risico op LPAI virusinfecties. 
Bovendien worden in Nederland multiplex-serologische methoden gebruikt voor een snelle 
diagnostische screening voor alle virussubtypen. In veel EU lidstaten is serologische 
monitoring bij pluimvee daarentegen beperkt tot LPAI virussen van subtypen H5 en H7. 
Verhoogde monitoring in risicovolle pluimveesoorten en de implementatie van multiplex-
serologische methoden in andere Europese landen zou meer inzicht geven in de verspreiding 
van niet-meldings- en bestrijdingsplichtige LPAI virussubtypen in pluimvee buiten Nederland, 
wat vergelijking van virussubtypen- en stammen tussen wilde vogels en pluimvee op grotere 
schaal mogelijk zou maken. De AI virusmonitoring in pluimvee in Nederland kan worden 
verbeterd door de bemonstering van gedomesticeerde eenden te verhogen, die ook een 
hoger risico hebben op introductie van LPAI virussen en relatief vaak zijn besmet met LPAI 
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virussen, ondanks hun relatief kleine populatie (Hoofdstuk 2). Bovendien blijven LPAI 
virusinfecties vaak onopgemerkt tot serologische screening wordt uitgevoerd, terwijl 
virusisolatie en daaropvolgende genetische karakterisering kan worden gebruikt om virussen 
uit wilde vogels en pluimvee te traceren en met elkaar te vergelijken. Om inzicht in de 
overdracht van LPAI virussen van wilde vogels naar pluimvee en tussen bedrijven te vergroten 
zou het daarom waardevol zijn om vaker virologisch te testen op LPAI virussen die niet 
meldings- en bestrijdingsplichtig zijn. Tenslotte wordt het traceren van contacten tussen 
bedrijven en het opsporen van secondaire virusinfecties niet uitgevoerd voor uitbraken met 
LPAI virussubtypen anders dan H5 en H7, maar zou dat waardevol zijn om meer duidelijkheid 
te verkrijgen over mogelijke verspreidingsroutes. 
DE VERSPREIDING VAN HPAI VIRUSSEN IN WILDE VOGELS EN PLUIMVEE 
Uitbraken van HPAI virussen vinden niet alleen plaats na introductie van LPAI H5 of H7 virussen 
in pluimvee en de daaropvolgende verspreiding tussen bedrijven, maar ook wanneer HPAI 
virussen uit wilde vogels naar pluimvee worden overgedragen. In de afgelopen jaren hebben 
wereldwijd meerdere vogelgriepuitbraken plaatsgevonden na de introductie van HPAI 
virussen uit wilde vogels. De HA genen van deze HPAI virussen behoren tot de H5N1 
A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (GsGd) stam, die in 1996 voor het eerst werd geïsoleerd uit een 
gans in China en sinds 1997 uitbraken heeft veroorzaakt in pluimvee in Azië. Het virus heeft 
zich vervolgens verder verspreid en ontwikkeld tot diverse fylogenetische subgroepen (clades). 
Door reassortment zijn er ook verschillende subtypen ontstaan (H5N2, H5N3, H5N5, H5N6 en 
H5N8). Een rol voor wilde vogels in de verspreiding van deze virussen werd eerder al 
gesuggereerd tijdens uitbraken van het HPAI H5N1 clade 2.2 virus in pluimvee in Azië in 2001-
2004. Deze rol werd nog duidelijker tijdens een grootschalige HPAI H5N1 uitbraak onder 
trekvogels aan het Qinghaimeer in China in het voorjaar van 2005, en de daaropvolgende 
wereldwijde verspreiding van HPAI H5N1 virussen in 2005-2006. Deze HPAI H5N1 virussen 
bleken hoog pathogeen voor sommige wilde vogelsoorten, terwijl voorafgaand aan de 
detectie van HPAI H5 GsGd virussen HPAI virussen zelden werden gedetecteerd in wilde 
vogels, en uitbraken van ernstige ziekte en hoge sterfte beperkt waren tot pluimvee. De 
verspreiding van HPAI virussen in wilde vogels kan worden beïnvloed door uiteenlopende 
factoren, zoals de vogelsoorten die besmet raken, bestaande immuniteit na eerdere infecties, 
het moment van het ontstaan van het virus, of veranderingen in eigenschappen van het virus. 
Met introducties en de daaropvolgende circulatie van HPAI virussen in wilde vogels is het met 
toenemende mate belangrijk om herintroducties in pluimvee te voorkomen. Een beter begrip 
van HPAI viruscirculatie in wilde vogels zal bijdragen aan het voorspellen van virusverspreiding 
en de potentiele blootstelling van pluimvee aan het virus. 
Het moment van reassortment beïnvloedt de HPAI virus verspreiding in wilde vogels 
Eind 2014 vonden gelijktijdig uitbraken plaats van HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 groep A virussen 
in Europa en Noord-Amerika, na detectie van het virus in Zuid-Korea in het begin van 2014. 
In een uitgebreide studie op basis van genetische, epidemiologische en ornithologische 
gegevens werden trekvogels die over lange afstanden migreren geïdentificeerd als de meest 
waarschijnlijke verspreiders van het virus, hetgeen eerdere uitbraakstudies bevestigde. De 




contact met materialen die besmet waren met uitwerpselen van wilde vogels werd beschouwd 
als de meest waarschijnlijke route van virusverspreiding naar pluimvee. Andere routes, zoals 
verspreiding via de handel in besmet pluimvee of besmette pluimveeproducten, werden 
minder aannemelijk geacht. De analyse identificeerde ook belangrijke routes in de 
verspreiding van het H5N8 virus in trekvogels: in het voorjaar van Zuidoost-Azië naar 
noordelijke broedplaatsen, en in de herfst van deze broedplaatsen naar overwinteringslocaties 
in Noord-Amerika en Europa. 
Twee jaar later, in 2016-2017, vond de meest omvangrijke HPAI virusuitbraak plaats 
in Europa. Deze uitbraak werd gekenmerkt door de detectie van veel verschillende HPAI 
virusvarianten, die variabele samenstellingen van gensegmenten bevatten door reassortment 
met co-circulerende LPAI virussen. In totaal werden vijf verschillende HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 
groep B virusvarianten gedetecteerd in Europa. Bovendien werden drie HPAI H5N5 
virusvarianten en één HPAI H5N6 virus gevonden (Hoofdstuk 5), al was de verspreiding van 
deze virussen beperkt vergeleken met H5N8. Net als de H5N1 clade 2.2 virussen en H5 clade 
2.3.4.4 groep A virussen, werden de H5 clade 2.3.4.4 groep B virussen gedetecteerd op 
noordelijke broedplaatsen in het voorjaar, voorafgaand aan hun introductie in Europa in de 
herfstperiode. Vermoedelijk zijn de virussen door trekvogels van noordelijke broedplaatsen 
naar overwinteringslocaties in Europa gebracht, vergelijkbaar met het HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 
groep A virus. De detectie van een HPAI H5N5 virus in het Russische Verre Oosten laat zien 
dat de virussen ook door trekvogels via een andere trekroute naar de Beringstraat regio zijn 
verspreid (Hoofdstuk 5). In tegenstelling tot het HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 groep A virus zijn 
de H5N5 virussen echter niet gedetecteerd in Noord-Amerika. Fylogenetische analyse wees 
ook op overeenkomsten in de verspreiding van HPAI virussen binnen Europa, met meerdere 
onafhankelijke introducties van H5N5 virussen in Europa gevolgd door lokale verspreiding 
(Hoofdstuk 5), vergelijkbaar met H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 groep B virussen. 
Informatie over patronen van HPAI virusverspreiding in trekvogels, gecombineerd 
met schattingen van het moment van ontstaan van virussen, kan worden gebruikt om in te 
schatten wanneer (vóór, tijdens of na de migratie van wilde vogels vanuit hun broedplaatsen) 
en waar (op broedplaatsen of langs trekroutes naar Europa) reassortment plaats heeft 
gevonden, wat meer inzicht geeft in de evolutionaire geschiedenis van de virussen. Het 
ontstaan van nieuwe virusvarianten vlak voor of tijdens het broedseizoen draagt mogelijk bij 
aan een efficiënte virusverspreiding tussen wilde vogels op de broedplaatsen, en de 
daaropvolgende verspreiding naar andere (overwinterings-)gebieden. Virusvarianten die aan 
het eind van het broedseizoen zijn ontstaan, na de start van de migratie van wilde vogels, 
infecteren daarentegen waarschijnlijk maar een relatief klein aantal wilde vogels. De meest 
voorkomende en geografisch wijdverspreide HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4. groep B virusvariant is 
inderdaad naar alle waarschijnlijkheid in de lente ontstaan, terwijl de minder frequent 
gedetecteerde H5N8 virusvariant waarschijnlijk in de zomer is ontstaan. Op eenzelfde manier 
is de meest voorkomende HPAI H5N5 virusvariant waarschijnlijk in de zomer ontstaan, terwijl 
de H5N5 virusvariant die beperkt werd gevonden waarschijnlijk pas in het najaar is ontstaan 
(Hoofdstuk 5). De beperkte verspreiding van de H5N5 virussen in vergelijking tot de H5N8 
virussen zou ook kunnen worden verklaard doordat er veranderingen in de virale 
eigenschappen zijn opgetreden, zoals veranderingen in de pathogeniteit of het 
replicatievermogen. Experimenten met primaire kippen- en eendencellen toonden echter 
slechts kleine veranderingen aan in het replicatievermogen en het veroorzaken van celdood 
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tussen de verschillende H5N5 virusvarianten en het H5N8 virus (Hoofdstuk 5). Het moment 
van reassortment in trekvogels heeft mogelijk invloed op de mate van verspreiding van 
verschillende HPAI virusvarianten in wilde vogels, en kan ook de beperkte verspreiding van 
H5N5 virussen in vergelijking met H5N8 virussen verklaren. Uitgebreide analyse van het virale 
genoom vergroot ons begrip van de evolutie en verspreiding van HPAI virussen in wilde 
vogels. 
Verschillen in HPAI virus pathogeniteit tussen wilde vogel- en pluimveesoorten 
Het aantal gerapporteerde HPAI virusinfecties varieerde sterk tussen de uitbraken van H5N8 
clade 2.3.4.4 groep A virussen in 2014, H5N8 en H5N5 clade 2.3.4.4 groep B virussen in 2016-
2017 en H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4 groep B virussen in 2017-2018 in Europa. Ook werden er grote 
verschillen in sterfte onder wilde vogels waargenomen. Tijdens de H5N8 2.3.4.4 groep A 
uitbraak in 2014 werd virus aangetroffen in een beperkt aantal zieke en dode wilde vogels en 
in mestmonsters van smienten in Nederland. Ook werden er HPAI-specifieke antilichamen 
gedetecteerd bij wilde vogels in Nederland, voornamelijk smienten en zwanen. In tegenstelling 
tot het H5N8 2.3.4.4 groep A virus veroorzaakte het H5N8 2.3.4.4 groep B virus massale sterfte 
onder wilde vogels, voornamelijk kuifeenden en smienten. Tijdens deze uitbraak werd ook 
virus gedetecteerd in ogenschijnlijk gezonde wilde vogels, voornamelijk wilde eenden. Dit 
geeft aan dat deze vogelsoort mogelijk resistenter is, en als reservoir voor het virus kan 
fungeren. Er werden ook HPAI-specifieke antilichamen gedetecteerd in verschillende wilde 
vogelsoorten, waaronder wilde eenden, meeuwen, smienten en zwanen. Het H5N6 2.3.4.4 
groep B virus werd ook aangetoond in verschillende dode wilde vogels, maar in veel mindere 
mate dan het H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 groep B virus. 
Experimentele studies met wilde en gedomesticeerde eenden toonden aan dat HPAI 
H5 GsGd virussen van verschillende subtypen –en stammen een verminderde virulentie 
hebben in vergelijking met het H5N1 voorouder virus, waaruit blijkt dat de pathogeniteit 
varieert tussen de virusvarianten. Ook werden verschillen in de vatbaarheid voor ziekte en 
permissiviteit tussen wilde vogelsoorten waargenomen. In overeenstemming met 
waarnemingen uit het veld was infectie met het H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 groep A virus subklinisch 
in veelvoorkomende wilde vogelsoorten. Smienten vertoonden de hoogste virusuitscheiding, 
hetgeen in overeenstemming is met de detectie van virus in mestmonsters en antilichamen bij 
deze vogelsoort tijdens de uitbraak. Een experimenteel onderzoek met H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 
groep B virus toonde daarentegen een hoge mortaliteit aan onder wilde eenden, wat 
overeenkomt met de massale sterfte onder wilde vogels tijdens de uitbraak. Bestaande 
immuniteit door eerdere infecties kan de detectie van virus in ogenschijnlijk gezonde wilde 
eenden tijdens de uitbraak verklaren.  
De pathogeniteit van HPAI H5 GsGd virussen varieerde ook tussen wilde vogels en 
pluimvee, waarbij eenden een verzwakte en minder invasieve virusinfectie lieten zien 
vergeleken met kippen. Intraveneuze pathogeniteitindex (IVPI) testen bevestigden een hoge 
pathogeniteit van de drie uitbraakstammen in kippen. In Pekingeenden werd daarentegen een 
lagere pathogeniteit gemeten voor het H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 groep A virus, terwijl een gelijke 
hoge pathogeniteit werd vastgesteld voor de clade 2.3.4.4 groep B virussen van subtypen 
H5N8 en H5N6. Hoewel het H5N6 virus een vergelijkbare hoge pathogeniteit bij zowel kippen 
als Pekingeenden vertoonde, toonde een analyse van de virusverspreiding en 




virusinfectie aan bij Pekingeenden vergeleken met kippen (Hoofdstuk 6). Ook werden 
histopathologische veranderingen en viraal antigeen gedetecteerd in de meeste organen van 
kippen, terwijl in Pekingeenden de aanwezigheid van microscopische laesies en de expressie 
van antigeen voornamelijk zichtbaar was in de ademhalingsorganen, met name de longen 
(Hoofdstuk 6). Deze bevinding geeft aan dat de virusinfectiedynamiek varieert tussen de twee 
pluimveesoorten. Eerdere experimentele onderzoeken met HPAI H5 GsGd virussen toonden 
expressie van viraal antigeen aan in de pancreas en hersenen van eenden, maar dit werd niet 
waargenomen voor het HPAI H5N6 virus in Pekingeenden (Hoofdstuk 6). Dit suggereert dat 
virusverspreiding naar verschillende organen ook kan variëren tussen virussubtypen en -
stammen. Veranderingen in de virale eigenschappen kunnen verschillen in pathogeniteit en 
virusinfectiedynamiek veroorzaken, en daarmee de verspreiding van HPAI virussen in wilde 
vogels beïnvloeden. Als het virus geen ernstige ziekte veroorzaakt, zullen besmette wilde 
vogels waarschijnlijk blijven migreren, wat virusverspreiding over grote geografische 
afstanden mogelijk maakt. Bovendien kunnen besmette vogels onopgemerkt blijven vanwege 
de afwezigheid van zichtbare klinische verschijnselen, maar vormen ze wel een hoog risico 
voor gevoelige vogelpopulaties, zoals pluimvee. Experimentele studies die de pathogeniteit 
en overdraagbaarheid van nieuwe HPAI virusvarianten bij verschillende vogelsoorten bepalen, 
zijn van grote waarde om de rol van veranderingen in virale eigenschappen in de verspreiding 
van HPAI virussen beter te begrijpen. 
Aanbevelingen voor het verbeteren van HPAI virus monitoring 
Op basis van de wereldwijde patronen van HPAI virusverspreiding in trekvogels, die zijn 
vastgesteld tijdens eerdere uitbraken, kunnen aanbevelingen worden gedaan met betrekking 
tot de locatie en tijd van bemonstering van wilde vogels. Verhoogde 
bemonsteringsactiviteiten in Zuidoost-Azië vóór het broedseizoen in het vroege voorjaar, in 
noordelijke broedgebieden tijdens broedseizoen in het voorjaar en de vroege zomer, en/of 
bemonstering op (beter toegankelijke) stopplaatsen langs belangrijke trekroutes in de late 
zomer en tijdens de herfst, kunnen helpen de verspreiding van HPAI virussen naar Europa te 
voorspellen. Bemonstering is mogelijk het meest effectief op locaties waar grote 
hoeveelheden wilde vogels van verschillende trekroutes met elkaar in contact komen. 
Bovendien zou lokale bemonstering van wilde vogels in Europa tijdens de aankomst van 
trekvogels in de herfst en vroege winter raadzaam zijn voor de vroege detectie van HPAI 
virussen die Europa binnenkomen. Verhoogde bemonstering langs de belangrijkste trekroutes 
van wilde vogels zal de beschikbare gegevens vergroten om de verspreiding van HPAI virussen 
in trekvogels te onderzoeken, wat een meer gedetailleerde analyse van de virusevolutie in de 
tijd mogelijk maakt. 
Veel monitoringsprogramma’s zijn gefocust op wilde eenden, terwijl bemonstering 
ook zou moeten plaatsvinden bij andere vogelsoorten met een potentiële rol in de 
verspreiding van HPAI virussen, bijvoorbeeld vogelsoorten die over grote afstanden migreren, 
minder vatbaar zijn voor ziekte en daarom HPAI virussen mogelijk wereldwijd verspreiden. 
Bovendien is het tijdens het opzetten van monitoringsprogramma’s voor HPAI virussen 
belangrijk om rekening te houden met variaties in de pathogeniteit tussen virusstammen en -
subtypen in verschillende vogelsoorten. EU lidstaten hebben passieve monitoring ingevoerd 
voor de vroege detectie van HPAI virussen, dat met name geschikt voor het detecteren van 
HPAI virussen in vogelsoorten die ziek worden of sterven door infectie. Actieve monitoring is 
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nodig voor het detecteren van HPAI virussen in vogelsoorten die de infectie overleven zonder 
duidelijke tekenen van ziekte. De laatste methode zou waardevol zijn voor de vroege detectie 
van HPAI virussen wanneer geen sterfte in wilde vogels wordt waargenomen, en om 
vogelsoorten te identificeren die verantwoordelijk zijn voor verspreiding van virus over lange 
afstanden. Actieve monitoring door serologische monitoring kan informatie verschaffen over 
eerdere HPAI virusinfecties en de immuunstatus van wilde vogels. Passieve monitoring zal 
nuttig blijven voor de detectie van HPAI virussen bij soorten die ziek worden of sterven na 
infectie, en fungeert daarmee als een vroeg waarschuwingssysteem voor lokale viruscirculatie. 
Hoewel het huidige passieve monitoringsprogramma in pluimvee toereikend is voor 
de vroege detectie van HPAI virusintroducties in pluimvee, onderstreept de dreiging van HPAI 
virussen uit wilde vogels het belang van vroege controlemaatregelen om overdracht van HPAI 
virussen van wilde vogels naar pluimvee te voorkomen. Deze controlemaatregelen omvatten 
onder meer het ophokken van pluimvee om contact met wilde vogels te voorkomen, 
bijvoorbeeld wanneer HPAI virussen in Nederland of andere Europese landen zijn 
gedetecteerd, en het vergroten van het bewustzijn van boeren en de implementatie van 
maatregelen voor een verhoogde bioveiligheid tijdens risicovolle perioden voor HPAI 
virusintroducties. 
CONCLUSIE 
Concluderend, het in dit proefschrift beschreven onderzoek levert nieuwe inzichten in de 
verspreiding van AI virussen in wilde vogels en pluimvee. De studies tonen aan dat het 
analyseren van het genetische materiaal van AI virussen, inclusief virussen van niet-
meldingsplichtige subtypen, zeer waardevol is om onze kennis over de circulatie van AI 
virussen in wilde vogels en pluimvee te vergroten. Het onderzoek benadrukt bovendien de 
waarde van het combineren van genetisch onderzoek met informatie over de verspreiding van 
het virus in plaats en tijd, en fenotypische eigenschappen van het virus, zoals het 
replicatievermogen en de pathogeniteit. Het onderzoek heeft geleid tot aanbevelingen met 
betrekking tot huidige nationale en internationale monitoringsprogramma’s, waaronder het 
gerichter bemonsteren van wilde vogels op basis van soort, locatie en tijd. Gerichtere 
monitoring is van cruciaal belang om gastheersoorten voor infecties in pluimvee te 
identificeren en mogelijke verspreidingsroutes van wilde vogels naar pluimvee en tussen 
bedrijven vast te stellen. De implementatie van efficiëntere monitoring en effectievere 
preventie van de introductie en verspreiding van AI virussen bij pluimvee is belangrijk om de 
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